The circumstances following the presented questions, creates two constitutional questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:

1. Deprivation of hearing and procedural exclusion. Does a state trial court violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it enters final summary judgment without holding the hearing it expressly announced, and without considering a duly filed cross-motion for summary judgment? And is this constitutional violation compounded where the self-represented litigant is denied access to the State’s mandatory electronic scheduling system, thereby preventing him from obtaining the promised hearing? |

2. Judicial contradiction and absence of reasoning: Does a state appellate court violate due process when it issues a per curiam affirmed (“PCA”) decision without written opinion that directly contradicts its own prior published opinion in the same case—without any new facts, explanation, or justification—thus- eliminating meaningful appellate review and undermining the rule of law? :

1. Whether by establishing a pyramid scheme, the Government can shortcut its burden of proving the necessary elements of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and securities fraud, including whether each defendant acted with an intent to defraud?

2. Whether the instructions and the definition of pyramid scheme are impermissibly vague and abstruse, which will permit the Government to arbitrarily bring charges and _ convict participants in multi-level marketing companies?

3. Whether the Sixth Circuit’s opinion directly conflicts with the Court’s recent decision in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226, 248 (2025), and whether the Sixth Circuit misapplied Napue in allowing the Government’s knowing failure to correct false evidence to go unaddressed?

1. Whether Petitioner Heid’s two grounds for challenging the arresting officers’ defense of qualified immunity defense constitute a valid “Franks challenge’ pursuant to this Court’s holding in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)!?

2. Whether the Eleventh Circuit evaded Heid’s “Franks challenge” and, as such, must be reversed and remanded?

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In an excessive use of force case, an arresting officer may establish a defense of qualified immunity only on the basis of evidence that is competent or ad- missible and objectively reasonable. Here the Eleven- th Circuit reversed the district court’s finding the arresting officers were not entitled to qualified 1m- munity, but it did so without relying upon competent or admissible evidence or evidence that is objectively reasonable.

First, the arresting officer’s qualified immunity defenses are based upon sworn affidavits that are false, or were made with callous indifference toward truth. 2 1 This issue goes to the heart of the law of American evidence jurisprudence. See, e.g., Fed. R. E. 101 (purpose) and 102 (scope). It also goes to the heart of The Civil War Amendments—1i.e., the prohibition of tyrannical abuse, involuntary servitude, and the like; as well as the nature of police misconduct being enabled through tyrannical manipulation of material evidence.

2 See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

28 U.S.C. § 1859, require courts to determine whether diversity of citizenship has been improperly manufactured to avoid or secure federal court jurisdiction. There is broad disagreement, commented on by Congress, commentaries, and the lower courts on what standard should be applied when a court determines whether jurisdiction has been manufactured. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue since the early 1900s. This case presents the following federal question:

Whether the proper standard to be applied by

a court determining if diversity jurisdiction has

been improperly manufactured is the motive

test applied by some circuits or the substantial-

stake test applied by other circuits.

The “interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children[| is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). But that right is mere rhetoric if federal judges bar parents from court via a miserly interpretation of standing doctrine—a question, as three Justices recently recognized, that 1s of “great and growing national importance.” Lee v. Poudre Sch. Dist. R-1, 607 U.S. –, 2025 WL 2906469, *1 (2025) (Alito, J., statement) (citation omitted).

It 1s certainly important to Petitioners, who are parents of gender-confused children (ancluding one child who previously ran away) and who do not wish to affirm that confusion. They challenged Washington laws designed to give runaway minors “gender- affirming treatment” without parental notice or consent. But despite their being the challenged laws’ target, and despite their alleging specific current harms and a substantial risk of specific future harms to their ability to parent, the Ninth Circuit held that Petitioners lacked Article III standing.

The question presented 1s:

Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision- making role as to “gender transitions’ of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.

Whether DRNY, as a Protection & Advocacy System authorized by Congress to bring lawsuits in its own name on behalf of individuals with disabilities pursuant to the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15041 et seq., the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, 42. U.S.C. § 10801 et seq., and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794e, has Article III standing to bring a case or controversy on behalf of injured individual(s) with disabilities?

1. Did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals err in

agreeing that a federal district court does not have

jurisdiction to judge unconstitutional actions of

officers of the federal government with respect to

their Jan6 misconduct.

2. Whether this Court will exercise its prerogative to

make an unusual and unprecedented declaratory

judgment on the plaintiffs original complaint as to

whether, as a Jan6 defendant, he was subjected to a :

malevolent and opprobrious political show trial . coordinated by the Executive and Judicial branches,

which violated his First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment Rights.

1

Brandon Sykes was convicted of capital murder for killing Keshia Sykes, his ex-wife. Defense counsel pursued a residual-doubt strategy, arguing that the State had “no idea how anything happened” in Keshia’s house the day she died. In rebuttal, the pros- ecutor agreed that he could not “know exactly what happened,” for “only two people in the world [] know what happened in that house. One of them’s dead, and the other one is sitting right there at the end of that table.” “[B]ut,” he added, “we can look at the facts in evidence.” Sykes did not object.

In context, the remark was “perfectly proper.” United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 383 n.5 (1988). Numerous courts have allowed comments just like it. But the lower court ignored the context and held that any “direct comment” on the decision not to testify violates the right against self-incrimination under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). It added that any uncured Griffin error “must be reversed” (App.23a) despite this Court repeatedly rejecting “a per se rule” of “automatic reversal,’ United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 (1983) (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The Court should summarily reverse on this question presented:

1. Whether courts must reverse for Griffin error without examining a prosecutor’s comment in context and without finding prejudice.

Or the Court should grant the petition to decide:

2. Whether Griffin should be overruled.

Michael Powell was convicted of capital murder for shooting a gas-station clerk, Tracy Algar, in the head during a robbery. While awaiting trial, Powell tried to frame another man by forging a confession letter. Among other things, the letter said, “I hid the gun” and “told [Powell] where to find [it].”

Powell’s counsel argued there is “doubt all over the place” because the State had “no gun.” Again: “This case 1s riddled with doubt” because there’s “no gun.” In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded: “[T]here is only one person in this room who knows where the gun 1s. One person, he is sitting over there.” Powell objected. At a sidebar, the prosecutor explained his inference based on the letter, adding: “I am not going to say he didn’t tell us.”

In context, the remark was “perfectly proper.” United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 383 n.5 (1988). But the lower court ignored the context and held that any “direct comment” on the choice not to testify violates the right against self-incrimination under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). It added that any uncured Griffin error “requires” reversal (App.24a) despite this Court repeatedly rejecting “a per se rule” of “automatic reversal,’ United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508 (1983) (applying Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). The Court should summarily reverse on this question presented:

1. Whether courts must reverse for Griffin error without examining a prosecutor’s comment in context and without finding prejudice.

Or the Court should grant the petition to decide:

2. Whether Griffin should be overruled.

For over 1,000 years, Catholics have given an an- nual offering to the Pope called Peter’s Pence. A parishoner claims he was misled during Mass by an invitation from the pulpit that imprecisely described the Pope’s use of Peter’s Pence. He sued the U.S. Con- ference of Catholic Bishops, seeking discovery into the donors to, uses of, and internal deliberations about Pe- ter’s Pence. He requests an injunction restraining how the Church describes and uses the offering, and a re- fund for himself and a class of millions of donors.

The Bishops moved to dismiss under the Religion Clauses’ church autonomy doctrine. The district court refused, holding the dispute could be resolved under the “neutral principles” approach developed for church property disputes. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the Bishops’ interlocutory appeal, concluding that church autonomy provides only a defense against hability, not a structural immunity from suit, and that the “neutral principles” approach avoided “any violations” of church autonomy.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether church autonomy provides a struc- tural limit on state power that protects churches from the burdens of litigating unconstitutional claims.

2. Whether a church may immediately appeal a dispositive church autonomy defense that was denied on legal grounds.

3. Whether the “neutral principles” approach ap- plies outside the church property context to a dispute over a church’s description and use of an offering that was used solely for religious purposes.

1. When this Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma that an indigent defendant must make a threshold showing that their sanity would be a significant factor at trial, what are the conditions that satisfy that threshold showing?

2. If a defendant meets the threshold showing, is the denial of psychiatric assistance under Ake v. Oklahoma subject to structural or harmless-error

analysis?

3. Once a threshold showing is met does the 6th Amendment right to the Assistance of Counsel apply to mental illness pleas in the context of independent psychiatric assistance as it relates to an examination, and assisting in evaluation, preparation and presentation of an affirmative defense?

i

1. Whether state judges are BOUND by the Veterans Judicial Review Act (VJRA) Pub. Law 100-687 (1988) pursuant to Article I § 8 of the Constitution, thereby REQUIRED to OBEY the Complete Federal Preemption expressed in the plain text of current Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511.
2. Whether the Respondents are Personally Liable , in their Individual Capacity for violations of the | rights established by Positive Law 38 U.S.C. § 511 and § 5301 in the complete absence of Jurisdiction

on the Subject Matter of Title 38.

i

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. “[F]act[s] that increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt’—except for prior convictions. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 & n.15 (2000). Apprendi grounded its rule in history and tradition but relied on precedent—Almendarez-Torres v. United States—for the exception. See id. at 477-83, 487-90 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 528 U.S. 224 (1998)).

Can Almendarez-Torres be reconciled with the Sixth Amendment’s history and tradition; and if not, should this Court overrule it?

1

Petitioner was framed with false incriminating evidence back around 2014. A corrupted military court hearing was held without the petitioner being present. The petitioner never received notice to trial and he never.had a chance to challenge the

| evidence. The petitioner did not receive any legal counsel either. The entire military :

court hearing was completely rigged from the very start. The judge ruled for the petitioner to be detained indefinitely:and nobody ever said anything about it.

All court information has been wrongfully withheld from the petitioner in a very dishonest manner so that the petitioner could not have a chance of challenging the wrong doing. The petitioner has been held to secret detention now for many years and still nobody will come forward with any information. During being unlawfully detained the petitioner has been subjected to torture, cruel and unusual punishment, sexual abuse, unethical human experimentation, and much more. This case is very complex due to lots of corruption, fraud, waste, and abuse.

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition with the district court around March of 20285. In April of 2025 the district court dismissed the habeas corpus petition without prejudice and ruled frivolous. It has been told that the district court judge.was involved with. corruption by accepting a bribe to dismiss the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition. The petitioner then submitted the habeas corpus petition to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In September of 2025 the circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision. |

My case is not frivolous because being detained indefinitely is not frivolous. Being denied due process without being able to challenge the evidence is not frivolous. Being denied notice of trial or detention is not frivolous. Not being able to have legal counsel or a chance .to call on key witnesses is not frivolous. Ellis v United States 356 U.S.674 (1958) case had been established that it is not frivolous if it presents any issue that is not plainly frivolous.

e Habeas Corpus / Frivolous Standard - Whether a.federal circuit. court violates the statutory standard for indigents under 28 U.S.C. 1915 (e)(2)(B)(I) and this court’s precedent in Ellis v.United States 356 U.S. 674, by affirming the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition challenging fundamental constitutional violations-as frivolous?

e Due Process / Military Court Jurisdiction - Whether the indefinite military detention of a U.S. citizen imposed by.a military court without affording the detainee notice of trial, the assistants of counsel, or an

1. Whether an individual’s probation or supervised release status categorically strips them of Second Amendment protection under 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1), or whether courts must instead apply the Bruen- Rahimi historical analysis to determine if the specific predicate offense historically justified disarmament?

2. Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violate the Commerce Clause when the gsovernment’s only jurisdictional burden is to prove that a part of the firearm crossed state lines at some point in the indeterminate past?

1

In 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)G), Congress authorized courts to reduce a federal prisoner’s otherwise final sentence for “extraordinary and compel- ling reasons.” Congress did not define that phrase and placed a single limita- tion on its scope: “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be consid- ered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Congress also directed the Sentencing Commission the issue policy statements reflect- ing the Commission’s “view” as to the “appropriate use of’ Section 3582(c)’s modification authority—to include “descri[ptions of] what should be consid- ered extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction, as well as the “criteria to be applied and a list of specific examples.” Jd. § 994(a)(2), (t).

In the First Step Act of 2018, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to eliminate, on a prospective only basis, an entire category of mandatory pun- ishment: “stacked” sentences for multiple first-time Section 924(c) offenses. Individuals sentenced prior to the Act’s effective date thus remained subject to “stacked” prison terms that are decades-longer than the terms they would face today for the exact same conduct.

The courts of appeals have since openly split over whether a sentencing disparity produced by an intervening, nonretroactive change in law—like the FSA’s anti-“stacking” amendment—may contribute to a finding that “ex- traordinary and compelling reasons” exist to grant a Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(1) reduction. In 2023, the Sentencing Commission updated its relevant policy statement to permit courts to consider such disparities as among the reasons for granting a reduction, though only in specific and defined circumstances. USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6), (c).

The question presented is:

Whether the fact that a prisoner is serving a sentence that is significantly longer than the law would now permit, in light of the

First Step Act’s nonretroactive changes to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),

may contribute to a finding that “extraordinary and compelling

reasons” warrant a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)q).

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