1. Whether the Ninth Circuit has ignored this Court’s well-established standards regarding per se antitrust violations, including division of markets (United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)), profit pooling (Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), foreclosure of competitors from a substantial market ntl Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)), and price fixing (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)), where the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleged horizontal agreements between Google and Apple to divide markets, share profits, and foreclose competition, as corroborated by the findings in United States v. Google LLC, 20- cv-3010-APM (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2024).

2. Whether a district court may stay all discovery 1n an antitrust case based solely on a “preliminary peek” at a pending motion to dismiss, without any showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in derogation of the due process and equal protection rights of plaintiffs, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s own precedent in Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968).

3. Whether this Court should resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision below and the District of Columbia’s decision in United States v. Google LLC, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2024), which found that Google’s

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) prohibits intentionally intercepting wire or oral communications or disclosing contents of unlawfully intercepted communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), (c). In turn, Title IIT’s exclu- sionary rule, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, provides that “no part of the contents” of an intercepted communication “and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in ev1- dence in any trial, hearing, or proceeding” before any state or federal court or governmental body “if the dis- closure of that information” would violate Title IIT.

The courts of appeals plus a state high court have openly split over whether § 2515’s exclusionary rule applies against the government when the government wasn’t involved in the unlawful interception. The First, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits and the Massachusetts high court apply § 2515 as written, with no exception if the government wasn’t involved in the interception. United States v. Vest, 813 F.2d 477, 479-80 (1st Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1077-79 (8d Cir. 1997); United States v. Crab- tree, 565 F.8d 887, 889-90 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 327 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976); Chandler v. United States Army, 125 F.3d 1296, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Damiano, 828 N.E.2d 510, 517 (Mass. 2005). The Sixth Circuit alone reads a clean-hands exception into § 2515, allowing the government to introduce unlawfully intercepted communications if the government played no part in interception. United States v. Murdock, 63 F.3d 1391, 1402-04 (6th Cir. 1995). The question presented 1s:

Whether § 2515’s exclusionary rule contains an unwritten clean-hands exception.

Congress has authorized inventors to patent “any new and useful process,” or “any new and useful im- provement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. This Court has read § 101 to include an implicit exception that bars patenting an “abstract idea.”

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Federal Circuit has wrongly ex- tended the prohibition on patenting an “abstract idea’—such as mathematical formulae, fundamental economic practices, or methods of organizing human activity—to also prohibit patenting concrete techno- logical processes.

2. Whether the Federal Circuit has wrongly held that, as a matter of law, a computer-implemented technological invention is patent-eligible only if it claims improvements to computer functionality itself.

1

This petition concerns the proper scope of judicial review under §10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act, which permits a court to vacate an arbitral award where “the arbitrators exceeded their powers.” This Court has held that arbitrators possess only the authority the parties confer by contract. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).

In applying 9 U.S.C. $10(a)(4) after Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2018), lower courts have differed on whether a court must examine arbitral authority if an arbitrator purports to interpret a contract.

1. After Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, does 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(4) require a court to compare an arbitral award with the scope of an arbitrator’s powers to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers, even where the arbitrator purported to interpret the contract?

2. Does a court of appeals violate the party- presentation principle by affirming a judgment on multiple dispositive sua sponte grounds that were neither raised nor briefed by the parties, without providing the parties advance notice or an opportunity to be heard, contrary to this Court’s precedent, including United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020)?

Can a party fail to cooperate in discovery, disobey court rules, interrupt the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting evidence approach and then be granted summary judgement? |

Was a General Motors’ women’s only employee resource group an unlawful D.E.I. initiative, policy, | program, or practice that involved General Motors taking a negative employment action motivated by Julian Bates’ gender or sex as a man?

“e , \

Whether Petitioner was derived of his right, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to a trial by a 12-person jury when the defendant is charged with a serious felony?

There are two other petitions raising the same question presented. See Parada v. United States, No. 25-166; Minor v. Florida, No. 24-7489. This case should at least be held pending resolution of those petitions.

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• 1. In light of the missing voir dire transcript, did the U.S. District Court erred when it held that Petitioner’s Batson claim | was procedurally defaulted because this claim was not presented on direct appeal before post conviction? ,

2. In light of the missing voir dire transcript, did tithe U.S. District Court erred when it held that Petitioner’s Batson claim was procedurally defaulted because this claim was not presented , on collateral attack during and after post conviction?

3. Given the fact that 52% of the transcripts are missing due to negligence by the court reporter, did the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit erred by denying the Certificate of : Appealability? 7 |

4. Did the U.S. District Court erred by failing to read and , | consider Petitioner’s claim of innocence? -j-

1. Did the District Court error by failing to recognizing substantive claims as cognizable under habeas corpus and failing to exercise its equitable au- thority to bypass the limitations of 28 USCS § 2244(d)? Then in turn not determin- ing the merits of the constitutional violations inherent in the petitioner’s substantive innocence claim?

, 2) Did the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit error by denying the petitioner’s application for a certificate of appealability by failing to recognized the District Court’s error as presented above?

3. As it is not controversial that substantive actual innocence claims are cognizable under habeas corpus jurisprudence (Hill v United States, Davis v United States, Jones v Hendrix)’, does the habeas court have a primary duty to re- solve this issue of substantive actual innocence prior to any consideration of re- strictions created in the Anti-terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)? Because a substantive claim of actual innocence is binary in nature, either true or false, does the court have an primary initial obligation to resolve the merits of the claim?

1 Hill, 368 US 424, Davis, 417 US 333, Jones, 599 US 455 | | | 2

whether the Due frovess Clouse permits a State appellate court to atti a civil

take - nothing judgement on the theory thot oa prose, snteroreter— assisted Lifigant “never offered” his olocumen tay exhibits and thetefore waived review, where the. trial transcript Shows that ¢l> the triabcourt reserved aol ’ssibi ley obsectons to Petitioners marked Exhibits /-44 for “the time” of Introoluction, C2) Petitioner attempted te Yeturn to his exhibits c”L want to 90 back to Exhibit 7~”0, c3) the trial Court Cut Petitioner off and immediately entered sudgment, anol c4> the thal Court then confirmed thot the. only admitted exhibits were De-fendant!s Exhibits 1-8: RR 4-48.

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit departed from this Court’s Rule 56 jurisprudence by sanctioning summary judgment where the district court failed to credit, acknowledge, or address record evidence favorable to the nonmovant, instead resolving factual disputes and engaging in speculation in favor of the moving party, contrary to Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014), Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

2. Whether an appellate court denies meaningful review and fails to conduct the required de novo review when it sanctions summary judgment without addressing record evidence cited by the appellant, defers to a procedurally flawed district court ruling, or refuses to review the underlying record necessary to determine compliance with Rule 56, contrary to Tolan v. Cotton, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996), and Agyeman v. I.N.S., 296 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2002).

3. Whether a district court effectively enters a directed verdict under the guise of summary judgment, sanctioned on appeal, when it disregards or rejects the nonmovant’s evidence and version of events without explanation, draws inferences in favor of the moving party, or substitutes speculation for record- based analysis, in violation of Rule 56 and the Seventh Amendment.

4. Whether continued application of the McDonnell Douglas framework at