l. Does a court of law violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when the issuance of a permanent protective order relies on the Petitioner’s violation of conditions and terms from a prior temporary protective judicial order that is effectively facially unenforceable, void, invalid, and legally inoperative?

2. Whether federal firearm prohibitions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) constitutionally apply— consistent with the Second Amendment as interpreted in United States v. Rahimi—when the underlying permanent protective order was predicated on an alleged violation of terms and conditions of unenforceable, void, and invalid prior TPO judicial order and was not lawfully and constitutionally issued?

3. Does a_ state court violate’ the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it summarily denies a motion to dismiss a permanent protective order within three days—which restricts permanent freedom rights, parental rights and triggers federal firearm prohibitions—without granting a hearing, considering newly discovered evidence, or providing findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision?

28 U.S.C. § 1782 allows foreign litigants to seek discovery in federal district courts “for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).

Respondents Qatar Charity and Qatar Bank filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking discovery against Perles Law Firm, P.C. But a binding protective order issued by a federal district court in another Circuit prevented Qatar Charity and Qatar Bank from accessing the very materials they sought under 28 U.S.C. § 1782. Despite Perles’s argu- ments that § 1782 may not be used as a forum-shop- ping, end run around a binding protective order, the D.C. district court granted the § 1782 application, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.

The question presented is whether a district court may grant an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 when it would amount to a modification of a binding protective order issued by a federal district court in another Circuit.

1. Whether the Fourth Circuit violated the Anti- terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the party-presentation principle by granting habeas relief based on its de novo review of the state court’s decision.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit violated AEDPA and the party-presentation principle by grant- ing habeas relief on a state-court judgment that was not before it.

The Video Privacy Protection Act (“V PPA”) prohibits a “video tape service provider” from “knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). The statute defines “consumer” to include a “subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Jd. § 2710(a)(1). It defines “personally identifiable information” to include information that “identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.” Id. § 2710(a)(8).

The National Football League (“NFL”) is a “video tape service provider.” It has never argued otherwise. Brandon Hughes is the NFL’s “consumer” because he subscribed to the league’s online newsletter and to NF’L4, a premium video-streaming service. After Mr. Hughes watched videos on NFL.com, the NFL disclosed his video- watching history to Facebook. Facebook understood the disclosed information to identify Mr. Hughes as having requested or obtained those videos. The NFL knew Facebook would understand the disclosed information that way. The Second Circuit dismissed Mr. Hughes’s VPPA claim, however, because an “ordinary person” would not also have understood the disclosed information.

The question is whether information that, to one recipient, “identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider” counts as “personally identifiable information,” even when a hypothetical “ordinary person” would not understand the information to do so.

In Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. 8S. 692, 704-05 (1981), this Court held that pursuant to a lawfully ex- ecuted search warrant, officers have a limited author- ity to detain an individual during the search. How- ever, this Court did not address the issue of custodial interrogation during such a detention. See United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 976 (CA9 2002). This Court also has not provided “criteria for identifying “special circumstances’ for determining when a deten- tion is “prolonged”; in particular, it fails to tell law en- forcement officers whether a detention will always be permissible, however protracted, so as 1t does not ex- ceed the length of the search ***.” See Summers, 452 U.S. at 712 (Stewart J. dissenting, Brennan and Mar- shall JJ., joined). This case tests whether federal agents exceeded this limited authority when they de- tained and then interrogated the target of a search warrant for one hour and forty-minutes without read- ing him his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona by presenting the following questions:

1. Whether police officers executing a search war- rant must provide Miranda warnings to an individual who is detained pursuant to the search warrant and interrogated?

2. What are the criteria for identifying “special circumstances’ or for determining when a detention is “prolonged” in relation to a search warrant detention?

I WHETHER THIS COURT’S POWER TO ISSUE A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS SHOULD BE EXERCISED WHEN A STATE PRISONER IS CONFINED BY A COURT WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND IS SERVING ASENTENCE FOR CRIMES NOT INCLUDED IN THE INDICTMENT DUE TO FABRICATED EVIDENCE AND REPEATED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS.

1. Does the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment entitle an Petitioner in a PCRA Petition, Notice of Appeal and Allowance of Appeal where the state court’s failed to address and correct improper denial of a claims for an evidentiary hearing, withdrawal guilty plea, new trial, invoke insanity defense, competency hearing and sanity commission, and | subsequent resentencing based on Defendant true military psychiatric medical history based on newly discovered evidence of clear and convincing

| evidence in the nature of military law mandates and defendant psychiatric

diagnosis of Military PTSD and Schizophrenia. The clear materiality of the newly discovered evidence goes to the : (1) Trial or verdict; (2) Withdrawal of Guilty Plea; (3)

2. Whether the State Government erred in fact or law deny PCRA petition due to 1988 diagnosis was available?

3. Whether Petitioner raised incompetency for the first time in 2023 before the PCRA Court ? ,

4. Whether the State Court are benefiting from Federal concealment, error, crimes and evidence deprivation?

5. Whether the State Court refual to review Petitioner Petitions liberally asa Pro se litigant.

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1. Should a defendant’s juvenile status at the time of the offense qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a modification of a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)G)?

2. Should the reduction in a codefendant’s sentence years after sentencing, either alone or along with a defendant’s juvenile status at the time of the offense, qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a modification of a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)@)?

3. Should a defendant’s multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) within the same case under the First Step Act qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a modification of a term of imprisonment 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)G)?

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Border patrol agents found Juan Carlos Bejar-Guizar walking in a heavily populated residential and commercial area close to a large mall—places near the border where U.S. citizens often go. They arrested him on suspicion of illegally entering the United States.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a court assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment may exclude facts that show a likelihood of innocent behavior when weighing the totality of the circumstances.

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Section 404 of the First Step Act opened a pathway to sentencing relief for people convicted of crack cocaine offenses prior to August 3, 2010. The act’s text limits relief to those individuals convicted of a “covered offense.” And “covered offense” means “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” In the mine run of drug distribution cases, it isn’t hard to determine the statutory penalty: the indictment and verdict form will contain drug type and quantity. But what about a pre-Apprendi case, before drug type and quantity became elements of the substantive offense? In those cases, the indictment and verdict form may, as here, say nothing helpful about drug type and quantity. This case addresses the interplay between Apprendi and Section 404 of the First Step Act, an issue that has split the circuits. Succinctly stated, the question presented is: in a pre-Apprendi case, how does a district court decide a person’s statute of conviction and thus determine § 404 eligibility?

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