1. Whether a Presidential pardon automatically moots a pending appeal when the defendant has clearly expressed his intent to reject or refuse the pardon and continue pursuing exoneration.

2. Whether acceptance of a pardon can be imputed to a defendant against his will, extinguishing his appellate rights, in light of this Court’s holding in Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915), that a pardon carries an imputation of guilt which the recipient is free to reject.

3. Whether the D.C. Circuit erred in treating the gsovernment’s motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) to vacate and dismiss a conviction as a basis for denying appellate review, where the petitioner seeks adjudication on the sufficiency of the evidence and vindication of his innocence.

4. Whether forcing a pardon upon a defendant over his objection violates fundamental due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and deprives him of the liberty interest to choose appellate review of his conviction.

The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their… papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. A federal statute likewise prohibits the “transfer” or “receipt” of “confidential phone records,” including call logs. 18 U.S.C. § 1039(b), (@). Despite these authorities, a lower court required a governmental body to acquire and disclose its employees’ personal cell phone call logs in response to a public records request, under Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.002(a), even though the government cannot ascertain the public or private nature of the logs. App. fa—lda.

The question presented is:

Does compelled disclosure of public employees’ personal cell phone call logs under state law violate federal law when the government (1) does not own the logs or otherwise have a right to transfer the logs, and (2) cannot segregate the information into public and private content?

1. The “Fraud on the Court” Circuit Split: Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of “fraud on the court” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3)—which strictly limits relief to instances of bribery or fabrication of evidence and categorically excludes the intentional, strategic concealment of dispositive documents by an officer of the court during discovery—creates an untenable conflict with the broader integrity-based standards adopted by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, and contravenes this Court’s foundational holding in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).

2. The Integrity of Voluntary Dismissals: Whether a voluntary dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) constitutes a binding waiver of rights when it was induced by the opposing counsel’s fraudulent affirmative representations of full discovery compliance, made while simultaneously withholding “smoking gun” evidence of whistleblower retaliation—specifically, a defamatory “Security Alert” blacklisting campaign— that was only revealed years later through collateral litigation.

3. TheScope of the Saving Clause: Whether the “saving clause” of Rule 60(d), preserving the judiciary’s inherent power to set aside judgments for fraud, requires a showing that the fraud literally “defiled” the court in a manner that the court itself could not detect (the Second Circuit view), or whether it extends

This case concerns the standard for determining juror bias, a question of constitutional importance that has split federal circuits and state supreme courts. A juror who is actually biased against the criminal defendant cannot sit on the jury. The seating of that biased juror violates the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury. A defense attorney who fails to protect that right renders ineffective assistance of counsel.

In this case, a juror expressed several biased opinions during voir dire. The juror admitted he would favor the child-accuser, and he presumed the defendant was guilty “because we’re here.” The prospective juror never disavowed those opinions, and he failed an attempted rehabilitation. According to the lower courts this was not enough to establish bias, and if it was, the juror was rehabilitated. At times during voir dire the juror remained silent, or the venire “indicated affirmatively,” when the group was asked collectively whether they could follow the law in various respects.

The Question Presented: Whether a prospective juror who admitted bias can be rehabilitated through silence or group answers in response to group questions.

Whether a writ of mandamus should issue directing the 15 Judicial Circuit Court in West Palm Beach, Florida, to perform its ministerial duty to vacate a null and void, fraudulent final judgment of foreclosure order that was egregiously and heinously issued WITHOUT a TRIAL against the Petitioners, in violation of due process, Florida Law, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution? |

11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against Petitioners

that the district court 1mposed to “send a message”

deterring future litigants because it _ believed

Petitioners’ pleading threatened “public trust.” App.9.

Six circuit judges dissented from denial of Petitioners’

petition for rehearing en banc, warning of “the district

court’s weaponization of sanctions to chill politically disfavored litigation” that presented “danger to the rule of law.” App.147.

1. May a district court sanction attorneys to “send a message” not to file politically disfavored lawsuits?

2. May a district court sanction attorneys for presenting legal arguments that are deemed novel or a long shot?

3. May a district court construe a complaint in a light least favorable to attorneys and then impose sanctions based on that construction?

4. Is a motion for prospective injunctive relief sanctionable based on Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006), where the motion is heard nearly four months before the next election and the motion also seeks relief concerning future elections after the next election?

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In acapital case where the pretrial publicity was extensive, gruesome, and negative, including statements by the current Attorney General that the Jimmy Spencer was a “violent offender” and an example of a “badly broken” parole system, and where a significant portion of the jury venire reported a pre-existing beliefin Mr. Spencer’s guilt, did the trial court’s refusal to change venue and the lower court’s decision holding that “prejudice is not presumed” and that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion” conflict with this Court’s decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell holding that “[d]ue process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences’and the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments?

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Has America become so great that it need not consider due

process, comity among nations, follow international law, or

fulfill its treaty obligations? Why are the lower courts not upholding the Constitution?

(1) Did Congress exceed the outer limits of the Foreign Commerce Clause when amending 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) to criminalize non- commercial, illicit sexual conduct occurring entirely in a foreign sovereign territory among its residents?

(2) Can the President and two-thirds of the Senate, by the sole fact of their consent to a treaty, empower Congress to enact legislation that it otherwise could not enact by the exercise of its enumerated powers in Article I? Was a single passing Statement in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) –#

. “Tilf the treaty is valid”… “there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute” – meant to expand Congress’ authority?

(3) May the United States prosecute its citizen without the consent of the foreign sovereign where the crime was committed? Does the holding in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) and its progeny – that ““{t]lhe jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute,” unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender it – apply only in extradition proceedings where the foreign sovereign is requesting the defendant?

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The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) “quoting “Page 475 U.S. 831 The participation of a judge who has a substantial interest in the outcome of a case of which they know at the time they participate necessarily imports a bias into the deliberative process. This deprives litigants of the assurance of impartiality that is the fundamental requirement of due process.

The Questions Presented:

(1) Whether magistrate Judge shopping violates the 14th. Amendment of the U.S. Constitution of due process when a district court judge knowing that they and their spouse have a financial interest in a case allows defendants and a defendants indemnifying insurance company to hand pick a magistrate judge by having the Pro Se docket : manager illegally manually change the random court assignment to a different magistrate judge and the magistrate judge and their spouse also have a known financial interest in the outcome of a case and both judges refuse to disqualify ?

(2) Whether Collateral Estoppel (issue preclusion) applies to new evidence in a current suit brought in Federal Court under Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction under New York law CPLR 214-C two injury rule for a latent separate and distinct disease (Silicosis) in which the Petitioner- Plaintiff was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to

| provide Expert testimony as to causation in a previous suit as to the newly diagnosed latent separate and distinct disease (silicosis) that was diagnosed after the judgment was already entered in the previous Federal Court Diversity of Citizenship jurisdiction case ? :

Emanuel Johnson, Sr., has been convicted and sentenced to die for two unrelated murders. Despite Mr. Johnson already having tried to discharge his postconviction counsel (CCRC-M) in state court due to an alleged conflict of interest, CCRC-M remained on his case and carried it into federal court. Faced with a history of his attorneys’ shortcomings, Mr. Johnson attempted to preserve all reasonably meritorious federal claims for relief by timely filing two pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petitions (one per capital case). These petitions contained claims CCRC-M had previously failed to raise, and which Mr. Johnson had presented to the state court via pro se filings. When CCRC-M timely filed two § 2254 petitions (one per capital case) the following day, an administrative anomaly inadvertently resulted in the creation of four separate dockets (two per capital case). One docket per capital case contained Mr. Johnson’s pro se claims, and one contained the counseled claims. Thus, what should be one holistic 28 U.S.C. § 2254 action per capital case has instead been separated into two actions that are inextricably intertwined, not only in terms of the underlying convictions and sentences implicated, but also the claims and procedural arguments at issue.

Further complicating matters, Mr. Johnson was appointed conflict-free counsel to represent him on the pro se dockets, because the district court recognized CCRC- M’s performance was critical to resolution of the claims. However, even though the same issues regarding CCRC-M’s representation in state court were similarly applicable to the two counseled § 2254 petitions, conflict-free counsel was not substituted in those actions.

Despite being repeatedly warned that continued docket separation would cause chaos and impede fair review of Mr. Johnson’s claims, the lower courts failed to take corrective action because the district court considered consolidation “unwieldy” and it would lay bare the conflict of interest possessed by prior state postconviction counsel. As a result, Mr. Johnson is in the uniquely harmful position of having exhausted § 2254 review in one habeas action per conviction and sentence— which is now being used to disadvantage his still-pending initial § 2254 proceedings challenging the same convictions and sentences.

The questions presented are:

1. Under the threshold certificate of appealability standard, could reasonable jurists debate a district court’s refusal to consolidate inextricably intertwined initial 28 U.S.C. § 2254 dockets pertaining to the same underlying convictions and death sentences, where failure to do so frustrates his opportunity for a full, fair, and complete round of initial habeas review?

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This case concerns the lawful application of “intercept” under the Wiretap Act (Title III), which provides that intercept’ means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” 18 U.S.C. §2510(4). Title III further provides that “the [sanctioning] judge may enter an ex parte order… approving interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting.” 18 U.S.C. §2518(8).

Consistent therewith, Georgia’s Wiretap Law provides that a court may issue an investigation warrant permitting the use of a device for the surveillance of a person or place to the extent the same is consistent with and subject to the terms, conditions, and procedures provided for by 18 U.S.C. Chapter 119 [Title III]. Such warrant shall have state-wide application and interception of communications shall be permitted in any location in this state. O.C.G.A. §16-11-64(c).

In this case, law enforcement used, in their investigation and prosecution, intercepted communications from a target telephone that law enforcement knew was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the sanctioning court at the time of interception.

The question presented is:

Whether the Government met the intended constraints of Title III and state law incorporating Title [JI for a lawful interception of communications within the territorial jurisdiction of the sanctioning court, when it failed to show the intercepted communications were, 1n actual fact, acquired within the territorial jurisdiction and did show it first acted upon intercepted communications outside the territorial jurisdiction, by merely showing the communications were first listened to within the territorial jurisdiction?

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment.

2. Whether Congress may criminalize intrastate firearm possession based solely on the firearm crossing state lines at some point before the defendant came to possess 1t.

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California Penal Code section 209 defines two different offenses: simple kidnapping for ransom (punishable by life with parole) and aggravated kidnapping for ransom (punishable by life without parole). Aggravated kidnapping for ransom requires the state to prove either “bodily harm” or a “substantial likelihood of death.” In People v. Britton, 6 Cal.2d 1 (1936), the California Supreme Court held that defendants were not entitled to notice of such punishment-enhancing facts. Britton did not address the Sixth Amendment right to notice because that right had not yet been applied to the states.

Here, as both the state appellate court and the District Court recognized, the state charged petitioner with simple kidnapping for ransom. App. 87a, 120a. Yet, consistent with the 1936 decision in Britton, the state obtained a conviction for aggravated kidnapping for ransom and the trial court sentenced petitioner to life without parole.

The state appellate court rejected petitioner’s Sixth Amendment notice claim, ruling that it was required to follow Britton and, in any event, the yudge’s comments near the end of trial provided constitutionally adequate notice. App. 157a-16la. The District Court “doubt[ed]” petitioner’s conviction “comported with the notice and pleading requirements” of the Sixth Amendment, but nevertheless denied relief, ruling that Britton was not contrary to “clearly established federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). App. 87a-89a. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in a published opinion. App. 2a-83a. The panel majority’s published opinion gives rise to the following two questions:

l. Does the California Supreme Court’s 1936 holding that a defendant’s right to notice does not apply to facts which merely “increase the penalty” violate the Sixth Amendment?

2. Can constitutionally adequate notice of enhanced charges be given at the end of trial, or must notice be given in a manner that affords defendants an opportunity to prepare before trial?

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