At the final pretrial conference held a week before Petitioner’s trial, the prosecutor announced an ultimatum in open court: if the defendant did not waive his right to a trial by jury and accept an eight- year plea deal, the State would amend the charges to include a count for “human trafficking,” a crime that carries a mandatory life sentence. He rejected the deal and insisted on going to trial. Then, as promised, the prosecutor amended the charges.

The human trafficking count was not justified by any new developments in the case. The evidence against him was the same as the day of his arrest some ten months before. And human trafficking seemed like a poor fit for the case because Mr. Ford did not “traffic”? any “human.” His charges arose because he sent text messages to a law enforcement agent posing online as a minor and agreed to pay the non-existent minor for sexual services. Nevertheless, the jury found him guilty of human trafficking, which the State argued he committed merely by soliciting a minor for prostitution.

QUESTION 1: Does a prosecutor engage in vindictive prosecution in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment where she amends the criminal charges one week before trial to bring a life felony on a novel legal theory that was not justified by any substantive developments in the case and announced on the record she was motivated to do so because the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial?

Petitioner testified at trial that the deceased tried to take his gun during a robbery inside a car. The gun discharged once during a struggle, and the deceased was unintentionally killed. A bullet was found in the deceased’s head. The prosecutor called a witness who testified that, although the first shot was fired unintentionally during a struggle, petitioner then intentionally fired two more shots, one of which killed the deceased. The car doors were closed, the windows were up, and no other bullets or bullet strikes were found in the car. Petitioner was convicted of capital murder instead of felony murder. The state habeas trial court reeommended a new trial because the prosecutor intentionally elicited misleading testimony that petitioner fired three shots inside the car and made false and misleading statements during her closing argument. Nonetheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) denied relief, presumably on the basis that the false and misleading testimony and argument were not “material.”

The TCCA’s standard for determining the “materiality” of perjured testimony is contrary to the “materiality” standard set forth in Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S. 226 (2025). See Kx parte Warner, 721 S.W.3d 436, 447-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (Finley, J., concurring). The TCCA’s unreasoned order in petitioner’s case failed to apply the correct “materiality” standard.

The question presented is:

Whether the Court should grant certiorari, vacate the TCCA’s judgment, and remand to apply the correct “materiality” standard for false and misleading testimony and argument.

1. Whether the Indiana Court of Appeals, as a state court of last resort, has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with two decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2013), and Jones v. Zatecky, 917 F.3d 578 (7 Cir. 2019)? |

2. Whether the decision by the Indiana Court of Appeals is in conflict with United States Supreme Court precedent Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny, and Boute v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), and its progeny?

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Petitioner Demetrius Franklin was convicted of first degree murder based on the testimony of a single identifying witness, Shanti Day. The prosecution failed to disclose the following material and favorable evidence to Franklin: Day’s felony charge was reduced to a misdemeanor on the same day that Franklin was charged with first degree murder; the investigating officers provided assistance to Day in fighting her felony charge; and an officer from the homicide bureau wrote a letter to the presiding judge in Day’s criminal case requesting that the fine levied against her be dropped.

But when presented with this evidence, the state court failed to perform the proper analysis this Court required in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (19638), and the district court held that even if the prosecution should have disclosed the evidence regarding the only identifying witness, Franklin had not shown that the evidence was material. The Ninth Circuit then summarily denied even a certificate of appealability (“COA”), effectively deeming these decisions “not even debatable.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 116 (2017).

The question presented is thus: did the Ninth Circuit’s summary denial of a COA here so clearly misapply Buck’s modest standard for eranting a COA as to call for reversal and remand?

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