Under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the use of force by law enforcement during the course of an arrest, seizure, detention, or search must be “reasonable,” and necessary for some law enforcement aim. In other words, the uses of physical and coercive force cannot be gratuitous.

When body camera videos clearly depict relevant events, the images are generally accepted for their truth, Scott v. Harris 550 U.S. 372 (2007). (1) Whether it is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) for law enforcement to wield deadly force, secondary impact force, and robust physical force against a suspect who is passive, seated, and does not possess a weapon? (2) Whether any Court is free to disregard the holding in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) that clearly depicted video events are taken at face value?

Petitioner Benancio Garcia III challenged Washington State’s Legislative District 15 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The three-judge district court panel dismissed his claim as moot after a single-judge district court in a different case, Soto Palmer v. Hobbs, No. 3:22-cv-05035 (W.D. Wash.), enjoined the use of the map that created Legislative District 15 and ordered the State to draw a replacement district.

This Court vacated and remanded with instructions to enter a fresh judgment from which an appeal may be taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The three-judge Panel amended its judgment accordingly, and Petitioner appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a plaintiffs Equal Protection Clause racial gerrymandering claim is rendered moot when the challenged legislative district 1s replaced in a different proceeding by a judicial remedy that intensifies the plaintiffs racial classification injury, and which is subject to ongoing appellate review.

1. Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), plainly unconstitutional on its face under New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), because it is permanent and applies to all persons convicted of felonies?

2. Is the lifetime ban on possession of firearms by all felons, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), unconstitutional as applied to individuals whose predicate convictions involve conduct that was not historically subject to permanent disarmament at the founding?

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Page ; | | | Questions Presented …… i : , | | Parties to the Proceeding…… ii | , | | ° Table of Contents…… iii . , 8 | : Table of Authorities…… iv Opinions Below…… 1 Jurisdiction…… 1 a | Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved…… 1 , | Statement of the Case…… 2 Reasons for Granting the Petition…… 6 | |. The Seventh Circuit’s Tolerance of a Conviction Based on Mathematically Impossible Expert Testimony Creates a Profound Due Process Error Warranting This Court’s Review. …… 7 : ll. The Decision Below Deepens a Circuit Split Regarding the Use of Temporally Impossible Facts in Calculating Sentencing _ Guidelines “Intended Loss.” …… 10 . ltl. This Court Should Grant Certiorari to Address Egregious Brady Violations and the Appellate Court’s Reliance on a Clear Factual Error to Excuse Them. …… 12 | IV.The Erroneous Preclusion of Timely Sentencing Objections Violates Rule 32(f) and Fundamental Due Process. …… 14 Conclusion……16 © | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES oe | a : | Cases : | a | Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ……12,13 a | | Giglio v. United States,405 U.S. 150 (1972) …… 12, 13 . } ] : ,

, In re Winship,397 U.S. 358 (1970) ……7,9 — . et Kyles v. Whitley,514 U.S. 419 (1995) …… 13 - : Montoya v. Hernandez,473 U.S. 531 (1985) …… 14, 15 | |

Napue v. Iilinois,360 U.S. 264 (1959) …… 7, 9 , | - United States v. Bagley,473 U.S. 667 (1985) …… 12 | United States v. Eschweiler,782 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1986) …… 14, 15 United States v. Munoz,430 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2005) …… 11 United States v. Saadeh,61 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1995) …… 9 . : an Constitutional Provisions & Statutes oy , | a U.S. Const. amend. V …… 1,7 | | U.S.Const. amend. VI …… 1, 12 | oe U.S.Const. amend. XIV …… 1, 7 : | , 18 U.S.C.§ 1343 ……2 | | 28 U.S.C.§ 1254(1) …… 1 , Rules & Guidelines | . , Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)…… 1, 14,15 - | : | : U.S.S.G.§ 2B1.1…… 10, 11 , | | OPINIONS BELOW oo ,

• The opinion of the United States Court. of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (App. 1a-21a) is not yet widely reported. The district | court’s judgment and sentencing memoranda are unreported but are available in the joint appendix. . | oe 2B.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) imposes a lifelong prohibition, punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment, on the possession of any firearm or ammunition, for any purpose, by “any person … who has been convicted in any court of … a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

In hght of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), does § 922(¢)(1) violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Petitioner, a United States citizen who has no violent prior felony convictions?

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1. Over thirteen years after Roderick LeShun Rankin was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death, the pastor of his deceased brother Rodney disclosed for the first time that Rodney had made detailed confessions only days after the crime.

A habeas court may reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim when the petitioner proves his innocence with “new reliable evidence . .. that was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Although a majority of circuits hold that Schlup evidence is “new” when it was “not presented at trial,” id., the Eighth Circuit limits “new” evidence to that which “was unavailable at trial and could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” The pastor’s disclosures were not “new,” the court below reasoned, because Rodney told his brother before trial that he committed the murders and thus conferred to Rankin the “factual basis’ of the pastor’s later disclosures. The question presented 1s:

May evidence of innocence be “new” under Schlup even if it was available at the time of trial?

2. Trial counsel admits that he never investigated Rodney’s guilt even though he believed that Rodney was the true perpetrator. Counsel thereby failed to investigate and develop evidence of Rodney’s threats to kill one of the decedents (the newly estranged mother of his two children) as well as physical evidence that fit more closely with Rodney than with Rankin. As an alternative to its Schlup ruling, the Eighth Circuit held that counsel performed reasonably “given the lack of evidence pointing to Rodney.” The question presented 1s:

When assessing trial counsel’s performance, did the Eighth Circuit fail to consider the totality of evidence from counsel’s perspective at the time?

3. The Eighth Circuit held that the Arkansas Supreme Court reasonably adjudicated the merits of Rankin’s claim under Atkins v. Virginia, 5386 U.S. 304 (2002), when, five years before Atkins’ issuance, the court credited an IQ score of 72 over an earlier IQ score of 66, determined that Rankin was not “mentally retarded” under state law, and rejected Rankin’s argument that the court should “reduce’ these scores by the possible three point margin of error or ‘average’ them together in some way. Rankin v. State, 948 8.W.2d 397, 404 (Ark. 1997). The Eighth Circuit also ruled that AEDPA bars any post-Atkins evidence. The question presented 1s:

Should the Court hold this case pending its decision in Hamm v. Smith, No. 24- 872, in which the Court is considering “whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing an Atkins claim’?

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