The Drug Price Negotiation Program (Program) threatens enterprise-destroying fines unless a drug manufacturer both provides its’ products. at sovernment-dictated prices and publicly declares that those coerced prices are “fair.” The fines at the root of the law are unprecedented in scope—for petitioner Novartis, they would swiftly escalate to $93.1 billion annually. The Third Circuit declined even to address whether this extraordinary penalty was excessive under the Eighth Amendment, because it found that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) divests federal court jurisdiction over any challenge to a civil penalty unconnected to criminal conduct so long as Congress labels 1t a tax. The court then concluded that the coerced transfers did not reflect an unconstitutional taking because they were “voluntary,” and that the compelled speech at issue did not implicate the First Amendment because it was merely “incidental” to the regulation of conduct. Each holding involves constitutional questions of first-order importance.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the AIA bars review of any challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause of a civil penalty unconnected to criminal conduct whenever Congress labels it a tax, even when it is effectively unpayable.

2. Whether the Program violates the Fifth Amendment by forcing manufacturers to transfer drugs to third parties at government-dictated prices.

3. Whether the Program violates the First Amendment by coercing manufacturers into expressing the government’s preferred viewpoints on matters of public concern with which _ the manufacturers disagree.

Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act provides that “[alny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice, other than the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s union.” 52 U.S.C. § 10508.

In 2021, Texas amended its election code to establish a felony for anyone who “compensates or offers to com- pensate another person for assisting voters” to vote by mail or who “solicits, receives, or accepts compensation for” assisting voters to vote by mail. Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 86.0105.

Texas law now renders criminal what federal law ex- pressly protects. Under Texas’s new law, a voter who is blind, disabled, or cannot read or write commits a felony if she offers money to a friend or neighbor in exchange for help filling out her mail ballot. Blind, disabled, and low literacy voters who are members of La Union del Pueblo Entero (“LUPE”), a non-profit social services organiza- tion, can no longer choose to receive assistance complet- ing their mail ballots from LUPE employees whom they know and trust and who are compensated for delivering assistance.

This petition presents the following question:

Whether Section 208 preempts a state law that prohibits eligible voters from compensating their chosen assisters or from choosing trusted assisters who are compensated.

Andrew Johnston cooperated in the investigation and prosecution of a high-ranking member of the Sinaloa Cartel. In return, the government moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) for a reduction in Johnston’s’ sentence. Rule 385(b) authorizes sentence reductions when “the defendant, after sentencing, provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.” The District Court denied the full reduction requested, relying on sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 8553(a) unrelated to the value of Johnston’s assistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) “narrowly circumscribe[d]” its review to whether the “sentence… was imposed in violation of law.” It also held that the District Court did not err in considering factors beyond the value of the assistance Johnston provided.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether an appeal from an order partially denying a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) motion for sentence reduction 1s an appeal from “an otherwise final sentence” subject to the limited scope of review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

2. Whether a district court deciding a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) motion for sentence reduction may deny the government’s requested reduction by relying on sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are unrelated to the value of the substantial assistance provided.

Noblesville High School freshman E.D. worked hard to bring Noblesville Students for Life (NSFL) and its life-affirming message to her school. She took a summer job to fund its launch, secured an adviser, and met with her principal. At least initially, the principal approved NSFL as one of the school’s many student-interest clubs, which are “student-driven and student-led,” and not school-sponsored. App.29a—30a.

These noncurricular clubs could hang flyers in school common areas to promote non-school meetings and events; no written policy governed the flyers’ content. Yet when E.D. asked for permission to post flyers advertising the first NSFL meeting, the school said no because the flyers contained a picture of stu- dents holding “Defund Planned Parenthood” signs. The school then revoked NSFL’s recognition.

The Seventh Circuit upheld the school’s censor- ship under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), on the theory that a “reasonable observer could easily conclude that the flyers reflected the school’s endorsement.” App.13a. In so doing, it exacerbated a deep, longstanding circuit split over when Hazelwood’s reduced speech protection applies.

The question presented 1s:

Whether Hazelwood applies (1) whenever student speech might be erroneously attributed to the school, as the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held; (2) when student speech occurs in the context of an “organized and structured educational activity,” as the Third Circuit has held; or (8) only when student speech is part of the “curriculum,” as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held.

The Clean Water Act generally prohibits filling in wetlands that qualify as “waters of the United States.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Landowners who want to confirm whether wetlands on their property fall within that definition may obtain an “approved jurisdictional determination” from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is subject to judicial review. 33 C.F.R. § 331.2; see U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 597-99 (2016). Landowners may also, however, forego that process and simply seek a permit from the Corps based on a “preliminary jurisdictional determination.” See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); 38 C.F.R. § 331.2. Those who do agree that “all wetlands and other water bodies on the site affected in any way by that activity are jurisdictional waters of the United States” and that accepting the permit “precludes any challenge to such jurisdiction . . . in any administrative or judicial compliance or enforcement action, or in any administrative appeal or in any Federal court.” Pet. App. Ya.

The question presented is:

Is a Clean Water Act permittee’s waiver of “any challenge” to the jurisdictional status of a wetland “in any Federal court” limited to government suits to enforce permit conditions, thereby allowing jurisdictional challenges in suits by states and private citizens under the Act’s citizen suit provision?

1. Whether the Declination Order is clearly erroneous and whether the resulting Judge Parisien’s refusal to hear Rodrigue’s postjudgement motions deprives Rodrigue of fundamental constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

2. Whether Judge Parisien did not have discretionary authority to | refuse to hear Rodrigue’s postjudgement motions and whether her refusal to hear is an usurpation or abuse of power.

3. Whether Rodrigue has no adequate legal remedy to obtain redress from Judge Parisien ‘s refusal to hear Rodrigue’s postjudgement motions such that the writ of certiorari should issue.

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1. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo, are courts permitted to credit hypothetical reasons for trial counsel’s errors irrespective of the record, as the Ninth Circuit did here, or must a court consider the record evidence in determining the reasonableness of trial counsel’s actions, as the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth (intra-circuit conflict) Circuits, as well as the D.C. Court of Appeals, have held?

2. When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo, does a court’s extensive and material misapprehension of the underlying record violate federal law requiring prejudice to be assessed by reweighing the totality of the available mitigating evidence against the evidence in aggravation?

1

DOES THE JUDICIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO

PERMIT MALICIOUS AND CORRUPT JUDICIAL RULINGS TO BE

CLASSIFIED AS ERRORS OF LAW OR MISAPPLICATION OF LAW THAT

RESTRICT A LITIGANT’S ABILITY TO OBTAIN RELIEF FROM A VOID | JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 60(b)(4) OF FRCP(FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL

PROCEDURE) TO A ONE YEAR PERIOD WITH DISCOVERED NEW

EVIDENCE?

1. Whether the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA) exceeds Congress’s Article I powers, particularly where the MDLEA is extended to the prosecution of a foreign citizen whose offense had no nexus to the United States?

2. Whether Congress exceeded its authority under the Felonies Clause by defining a “vessel without nationality” to include vessels that are not stateless under international law?

3. Whether the prosecution under the MDLEA of a foreign citizen whose offense had no nexus to the United States, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?