Global Marine Exploration discovered a 16th- century shipwreck lost for centuries and sought com- pensation for its efforts under longstanding admiralty salvage law. The court of appeals held that the Sunken Military Craft Act (“SMCA”) eliminates all salvage remedies, including traditional in personam actions. The panel did so without implementing SMCA’s limiting dictate, that it only applies to actions “directed at” a sunken military craft.

In the Eleventh Circuit, Amici and the United States presented full briefing on the constitutional consequences of that interpretation under Article ITI. The panel declined to consider these arguments, this Court’s significant admiralty precedent, and conflicting case law from the Seventh Circuit, reasoning that it was barred by the party presentation principle from interpreting a statute using analysis not presented by the parties themselves.

The Questions Presented Are:

1. Whether SMCA’s prohibition that “no salvage rights or awards shall be granted” bars all admiralty salvage claims—including long-recognized in personam actions—or instead applies only to in rem claims “directed at” the res.

2. Whether the party presentation principle prevents a federal court from considering ordinary tools of statutory interpretation, including context and constitutional avoidance, that bear directly on the meaning of a statute solely because those arguments were primarily developed by amici and the United States.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- ment prevents a state court from exercising personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant unless that defendant has, among other things, sufficient “mini- mum contacts” with the forum that relate to the plaintiff’s claims. Intl Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945). Despite the central role that Internet-based businesses play in our economy, the Court has not addressed “whether and how a defend- ant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 n. 9 (2014).

The Vermont Supreme Court held that Petitioners were subject to personal jurisdiction in Vermont based on their purported “business model’—1.e., generating revenue by selling online advertising space to third parties—even though this suit does not involve any claims based on that third-party advertising. That ruling deepens an existing split on whether a plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in specific, claim-related activities that establish purposeful availment of the forum or may bypass that test and establish personal jurisdiction based on allegations regarding the defendant’s “business model.”

The question presented is whether a plaintiff may establish specific jurisdiction over a non-resident de- fendant based on its forum-agnostic “business model,” or whether the plaintiff must allege that the defend- ant undertook specific, claim-related activities in or directed at the forum.

1. This Court has been grappling with the contempt due process requirements when a contemnor removes property from a receiver’s control without authorization since the landmark decision in Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). The federal circuits are split over whether orders directing flat, unconditional restitution of property to an arm of the court—like a receiver—constitute civil or criminal contempt and, therefore, whether heightened criminal due process protections apply. The Ninth Circuit has held that receiver restitution orders vindicate the court’s authority and constitute criminal contempt. The Third Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and now the Nevada Supreme Court hold that receiver restitution orders are compensatory and constitute civil contempt. The first question presented is:

Whether, under due process, an order directing a flat, unconditional restitution payment to a receiver as an arm of the court for withdrawing funds without authorization constitutes civil or criminal contempt.

2. This Court has held that flat, unconditional statutory fines designed to punish for as little as $50 constitute criminal contempt. Still, the Nevada Supreme Court found a “nominal fine” exception to this rule when paid to the complainant instead of the court. The second question presented is:

Whether there is a “nominal fine” exception to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s requirements for criminal contempt.

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The “relatedness” requirement of specific personal jurisdiction, last addressed by this Court in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Kighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), demands that the plaintiffs claim “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s forum- directed conduct. The question presented is:

Whether a _ plaintiffs claim “relates to” a defendant’s forum-directed conduct merely by alleging defects in a product the defendant sold in the forum, in the absence of any in-forum injury or other incident involving the product in the forum.

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The relevant federal criminal statute requires that “la]Jny person subject to the [Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)] who solicits or advises another to commit an offense under [the UCMJ] … shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C. § 882 (emphasis added). The term to “commit an offense under the UCMJ” has been construed in other contexts to require both jurisdiction over the offense and that the person be subject to the UCMJ. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 262 (C.A.A.F. 2012). However, in ruling against Petitioner, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the statute to merely require that the solicited conduct be generally considered an offense under the UCMJ if the solicited person had been subject to the code, rather than the solicited person actually being subject to the UCMJ.

This case raises the following question:

Where a federal criminal statute for solicitation requires the person solicited to fall within a narrow class, can a conviction be sustained if the person solicited was not actually in that class?

2. In applying Jackson v. Virginia 443 U.S. 307 (1979) to a Habeas Corpus claim based on the

State’s unreasonable application of “Sufficiency of Evidence” in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d) (1), can petitioner be convicted when no elements of the crime were proved beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the facts which have been unreasonable determined by the State Courts, in violation of subsection (d)(2) ? |

3. In applying Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2001) to a habeas corpus claim based on the unreasonable application of the Constitutional Standard for “Effective Assistance of Counsel” in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d) (1), can the Federal Court “Hypothesize” about Reasonable Judgment for “Tactical Choices” trial counsel might have made on the basis of facts which are pursuant subdivision (e)(1), undermined by clear and convincing evidence in the State Court Record? , .

4. In applying Strickland and Richter. to a Habeas Corpus claim based on the State’s unreasonable application of the Constitutional Standard for “Effective Assistance of Counsel” in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 ({d)}(1), can the Federal Court determine trial’s counsel “Performance” as of “adequate pre-trial investigation, communication/Consultation, interview of witnesses, prosecutor’s witnesses, cross examination, objections to evidence and inadmissible evidence ” trial counsel might have made on the basis of facts which have been , unreasonable determined by the State Courts, in violation of subsection (d)(2)?

5. In applying Strickland to a Habeas Corpus Claim based on the State’s unreasonable application For “assessing the prejudice from trial Counsel’s Cumulative Errors and Omissions” in violation of 28 U.S.C & 2254 (d)(1), is there a reasonable probability that absent “counsel’s Errors and Omissions” the Factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting to guilt basis on the facts which have been unreasonable determined by the State Courts, in violation of subsection (d}(2)? _ ,

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1. Whether the “materiality” prong of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 | (1978), is satisfied when a search warrant affidavit recklessly omits a confidential informant’s history of dishonesty, perjury, and drug addiction, but the lower court upholds the warrant solely because police corroborated “innocent details” (such as the defendant’s address and vehicle) rather than incriminating conduct.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that reckless omissions regarding a confidential informant’s credibility are “immaterial” to probable cause, thereby creating a dangerous precedent that allows law enforcement to sanitize warrant applications so long as they can independently verify a suspect’s public : movements.

Federal statute of the United States Code - 18 U.S.C. § 1014, prohibits making a (misleading or) “false statement” for the purpose of influencing certain small business investment corporations, financial institutions, any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally related mortgage loan as defined in section 3 of the Real Estate | Settlement Procedures Act of 1974. This case presents the , following questions:

1. Is it legal for entities (fiduciaries or a non-fiduciaries) to engage in heinous criminally tortious conduct that affects many victims? , .

2. Will the courts allow entities to illegally violate. individuals that entities are meant to care for (with a fiduciary’s standard of care or an ordinary duty of care)?

3. Can a person/entity be held accountable for his/her/it’s false and misleading statements that have caused damages and have established a precedent that influences others and causes limitless damages to other victims? |

4. Should the U.S. Supreme Court review the court cases that have been unfairly prolonged due to the defendants’

| (threatening and intimidating) criminally tortious conduct towards me and the courts? | Petition for Writ of Certiorari \

1. Whether bankruptcy-appeal deadlines under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(d) are jurisdictional or subject to equitable excusable-neglect review consistent with Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993).

2. Whether the Fifth Circuit violated Pioneer, by dismissing the Petitioner’s appeal without applying excusable-neglect analysis when the delay was solely caused by counsel’s incorrect advice.

3. Whether bankruptcy trustees are immune or hold a fiduciary duty to pay the required taxes of an estate under: Jn re Texas Pig Stands, Inc., 610 F.3d 937 (5th Cir. 2010).

4. Whether the bankruptcy court violated Texas Pig Stands by denying the Petitioner’s Motion to Remove the Trustee for Breach of Fiduciary Duty for failing to pay the taxes owed by the estate.