In August 2024, after inheriting a large case- load from then-ascending Judge Maldonado, Judge Gettleman of the Northern Illinois District Court, after having no prior involvement, dismissed this case along with over half of the cases he inherited from Judge Maldonado. His dismissal, which, as he wrote, should’ve been a de novo review, largely parroted points from a magistrate’s report and recommendations. Judge Gettleman’s order contained hallucinated people, brand- new legal theories never before discussed, decisions based on precedent test outcomes instead of the logical tests themselves, logic that’s dependent on time travel existing, and decisions solidifying a witness as psychic; all of which are highly indicative of gener- ative AI. The Seventh Circuit, when reviewing the pleadings, opted to use a standard of deference in reviewing the case, and declined to rehear the case when the issues above were pointed out.

The Questions Presented are:

1. Whether it is appropriate for a standard of deference to be applied when the reviewing opinion demonstrates a clear lack of familiarity with the case, and if it is, whether a Supreme Court precedent can be knowingly sidestepped and ignored by lower courts

without justification?

2. Should the use of generative AI be used on the — side of justice in the courts, and if so, what are the appropriate oversights, rules, and/or regulations that should be done to ensure justice is delivered by a human instead of an algorithm?

Whether petitioner sustained his burden prohib- iting United States Court of Appeals for Third Circuit exercising original jurisdiction from imposing reciprocal discipline suspending petitioner from practice of law in that court for five years effective 10/21/2025 based on Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s imposition of discipline suspending petitioner from practice of law for five years effective 12/19/2019 involving entirely : truthful administrative and judicial state removal proceedings based entirely on administrative Workers’ Compensation judges admitted ex parte communi- cations and proceedings fifteen years after petitioner’s purported state ethical violations without notice and hearing blatantly violating all Selling infirmities involving due process, proof, grave injustice and petitioner’s constitutional rights under First, Fifth,

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act provides that “lalny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice,” with certain specific enumerated exceptions. 52 U.S.C. § 10508. Texas passed a state statute that makes it a crime “to compensate another person for assisting voters” who vote by mail or to “solicit|], receive[], or accept|] compensation for” doing so. See Tex. Elec. Code § 86.0105. The Texas statute undisputedly makes it a crime for the staffers or compensated — volunteers of — social service organizations to assist voters with disabilities or voters who are unable to read or write proficiently in English who request their assistance to vote by mail.

Does the Texas statute run afoul of Section 208?

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Respondents challenged Washington state legislative district 15 (“LD-15”), alleging it diluted Hispanic votes under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”’), 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). Petitioners intervened to oppose the VRA claim and assert that LD-15 was a racial gerrymander. The district court ruled for Respondents, enjoined the Commission’s map, and adopted a new remedial map that reduced the Hispanic Citizen Voting Age Population (““HCVAP”) in LD-15 from 52.6% to 50.2%.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Petitioners lack standing to challenge the VRA ruling or assert their own Section 2 claim based on the remedial map’s dilution of Hispanic votes. It further held that one Petitioner had standing to challenge the remedial map as a racial gerrymander, but strict scrutiny was unnecessary because the remedial map was not “predominantly” based on race, even if race may have been “a” motivating factor.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a voter who is moved into a new

district and a legislator whose district is

reconfigured by a court-drawn remedial map have standing to challenge that map or the

underlying determination of VRA Section 2

hability that caused the remedial map to be

drawn.

2. Whether a map drawn to remedy racial vote

dilution 1s subject to strict scrutiny under the

Equal Protection Clause when it is race

conscious.

Whether, under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, challenges to the factual basis of an expert witness’s testimony always go to the weight of the evidence ra- ther than to admissibility, as the First and Fourth Cir- cuits hold, or whether such challenges go to weight only if a court first finds it more likely than not that an expert has a sufficient basis to support the testi- mony, as the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits hold.

U.S.C. § 2250(a) by living a nomadic lifestyle of constant travel through multiple , states and counties. No instructions were presented to the jury to decide whether he violated any state sex offender registry law or established a “change of residence” | according to the ordinary-English-usage rule announced in Nichols v. United States, | 578 U.S. 104, 1868. Ct. 1113, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324 (2016). Instead, the trial court relied | on lengthy DOJ guidelines to conclude that his regular day-time commutes to one city and brief stays at campgrounds in multiple counties of West Virginia altogether constituted a violation of SORNA. Trial counsel failed to preserve errors. Question Presented: Did the lower courts commit plain error requiring summary

reversal by reinterpreting the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, (construed by the unanimous Supreme Court panel in Nichols v. United States, 578 US. 104, 18658. Ct.

1118, 194 L. Ed. 2d 324 (2016),) to thereby criminalize a law-abiding modus ~

operandi of never staying longer than state law allows unregistered visitors and moving on? , , Question Presented: Is the term “habitually lives” merely ambiguous in isolation, or subject to the rule of lenity, in any regard, because the Attorney General was not delegated specific authority to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2250 in compliance with judicial , canons and lacked the expertise required to provide Skidmore deference post-Loper Bright?

Based on his plea agreement’s boilerplate waiver of most appellate rights, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s challenge to his federal sentence. Was that wrong?

Petitioner agreed to waive his appellate rights in exchange for the Government’s promises to dismiss an illegal reentry charge and to refrain from filing additional charges for conduct “underlying and related to” his plea of guilty. After the district court accepted his guilty plea, but before the court accepted the plea agreement, Petitioner learned that the State of Texas intended to pursue the attempted murder charges based on the very same conduct. Petitioner asked to withdraw from his guilty plea so that he could plead cuilty without any plea agreement.

The district court denied that motion, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Did Petitioner show a “fair and just reason” to withdraw from the agreed plea?

1. Whether the “in common use for lawful purposes” measure for applying Second Amendment protections to certain firearms is determined as part of Bruen’s step one textual/conduct analysis, or Bruen’s step two historical analysis?

2. Whether 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), part of the National Firearms Act, violates the Second Amendment as applied to England’s possessing an unregistered short-barreled shotgun, where England introduced uncontradicted evidence proving that firearm is no more dangerous and unusual than comparable unregulated non-NFA weapons in common use for lawful purposes?

3. Whether the individual right to keep and bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment applies only to “law-abiding citizens” who have no prior convictions?

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When a noncitizen is “in the United States in violation of law,” it 1s a federal crime, punishable by five years in prison, to “transport or move’ that person “within the United States by means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1824(a)(1)(A)(a1).

The question presented 1s:

What mens rea is required for the element that the defendant transport or move the noncitizen “in furtherance’ of a violation of law?

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Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the United States Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” That authority is not unlimited. Congress only has authority to define and punish felonies that occur on the high seas, which raises the question of where the high seas begin and end.

The Question Presented is: Under the Define and Punish Clause and the Founders’ understanding of sea zones, does Congress have the authority to punish felonies that occur in another country’s contiguous zone?

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When a sentencing court considers imposing a term of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 85838(c) stipulates which factors the court may weigh, while U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) provides guidance on applying supervised release to deportable aliens. Petitioner Otto Melvin Ramirez is a deportable alien who has been given a sentence which includes supervised release. The circuit courts are divided over the Question Presented, which is as follows:

Whether a district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) and U.S.8.G. § 5D1.1(c) by imposing a term of supervised release on a deportable defendant without making an individualized finding that such supervision is necessary.

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A 2.

A. Whether All The Ninth Court Of Appeals’ Decisions Rendered Against This Particular Petitioner In This Very Case, Conflict With All The Other Federal Circuit Courts’ Decisions Rendered On Similarly Related Issues Of A Citizen Of A Foreign Country Lawfully Admitted To The United States And Domiciled In The Same State As The Respondent?

B. Given The U.S. Long-Standing, Present Day And Current Government’s Nationwide Immigration Sentiments, Whether The ‘Forum Defendant Rule’ Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 14.4] (b)(2), Stopped State Court Cases From Being Removed To Federal Court If A Defendant Is A Citizen Of A State (such as this Arizona) Where The Suit Was filed?

C. Whether Ninth Circuit Court Of Appeals Abused Its Discretion By Circumvention Of Interpretation Of The Legislative Act Of Federal Courts Jurisdiction And Venue Clanfication Act Of 2011, § 101 - Regarding Treatment Of Immigrant Aliens?

D. Whether The Respondent Anzona Government’s Removal Of Its Own Citizen’s State Court Case From Its Own Court Was Not Only A Suspicious Move Against Its Own Government, But Whether It Has Assurance Of Success In Federal Court

E. Whether Respondent John S. Halikowski’s Removal Of The Originated Case From State Court To Federal Court Was Timely Under Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b)?

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