Petitioner Mike Yoder and his company, Drone Deer Recovery LLC, use drones to locate downed game and to generate and transmit factual location information to hunters, including Petitioner Jeremy Funke. Michigan criminalizes that speech-producing activity and the receipt of that information, even though the state permits drones to be used for other expressive purposes, such as photographing wildlife and landscapes.

The Fourth and Ninth Circuits hold that the First Amendment protects the means of acquiring and creating information necessary to produce speech, including non-political speech. Garcia v. Cnty. of Alameda, 150 F.4th 1224, 1231 (9th Cir. 2025) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. N.C. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Inc., 60 F.4th 815, 828 (4th Cir. 2023) (PETA). The Sixth Circuit adopted a contrary rule, holding that Yoder’s drone-based information-gathering 1s unprotected because it does not produce “political” speech. As Judge Bush explained in his separate statement, a political/non- political distinction conflicts with those sister circuits and with this Court’s recognition that the First Amendment protects the creation of factual information, including information “devoid of advocacy [or] political relevance.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).

The question presented 1s:

Whether the First Amendment protects the means of acquiring or creating speech when the speech is non-political.

Did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals err by finding that a special masters’ findings in Plaintiffs’ claims filed in the Department of Health and Human Services administrative Vaccine Injury Compensation Plan (“VICP”) were entitled to res judicata effect when the Vaccine Act expressly allows a plaintiff to reject a VICP decision and file a de novo action in a district court?

The Fourth Circuit’s decision below is contrary to Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268 (1995).

Did the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals err by holding the National Childhood Injury Act (“Vaccine Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 800aa-1 et seq. was constitutional where Congress enacted a Vaccine Table in the Act itself listing the vaccines and injuries covered by the Act, but the Act purported to allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulatory action alone to amend or repeal the vaccines and injuries covered by the Act without an act of Congress signed by the President, as required by the presentment clause of the United States Constitution, article I, section 7, clause 2?

The Fourth Circuit’s decision below conflicts with Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 488 (1998) (“There 1s no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.”) and Terran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 195 F.3d 1302, 1317-13821 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Plager, J. Dissenting).

Pennsylvania created rules that prohibited all

historically qualified applicants from obtaining

standard admission to the bar unless they had eraduated from an ABA-accredited law school. As in Dent and Douglas, professional licensing hmitations throughout relevant ratification periods were always specific to an individual’s “knowledge and skill’ and

did not ever authorize bare rational basis deference. In Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, this Court

restored fundamental core protections of Second

Amendment rights by holding that restrictions

inconsistent with America’s historical tradition of

regulation are unconstitutional. Since ABA’s

inception and persistent racial discrimination began

in 1878, states have been divided on whether the

fundamental right to earn a living could be ©

legitimately restricted by an accreditation monopoly. The questions presented are:

1. Whether Pennsylvania’s ABA monopoly within professional licensing qualifications exceeds the limits of Bruen’s text, history, and traditions test in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2. Whether Pennsylvania’s ABA monopoly survives strict scrutiny or invidiously discriminates against Blacks in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. Whether procedural due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment are _ violated by Pennsylvania’s failure to assess an individual’s similar educational qualifications for licensing.

University of Texas officials threatened Professor Richard Lowery with reduced pay, loss of a research post, and other consequences, if he did not stop publicly criticizing the UT administration. Wishing to avoid those outcomes, Lowery self-censored.

In ten circuits, employer threats suffice to establish a§ 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim if they would dissuade a reasonable employee from speaking. But the Fifth Circuit is one of two outlier courts that require a completed adverse action, such as a discharge, demotion, or reprimand, before an employee can state a retaliation claim—employer threats, no matter how credible or severe, are never enough.

The question presented is whether a public employer’s threats against an employee can suffice to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, if those threats would dissuade a reasonable employee from speaking on a matter of public importance.

During closing argument at Petitioner Shawn Powell’s trial, his trial counsel unreasonably conceded Powell’s guilt of vandalism and violation of a protective order. In so doing, she admitted that key witness testimony was truthful—critically undermining trial counsel’s chosen defense strategy of challenging the credibility of witnesses. Powell was prejudiced by trial counsel’s error. Indeed, the prosecution seized on trial counsel’s mistake during closing argument, highlighting the obvious weakness in the defense’s position that the jury should believe only those parts of the witness testimony that supported misdemeanor convictions but not the parts that supported felony convictions. In addition to performing deficiently during closing argument, trial counsel failed to investigate, discover, and present readily available evidence in support of Powell’s defenses to first- degree burglary.

The question presented is thus: did the Ninth Circuit’s denial of the Petition here so clearly misapply Strickland’s mandate regarding ineffective assistance of counsel as to call for reversal?

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Section 922(¢)(1) of title 18, U.S.C., imposes a lifelong prohibition, punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment, on the possession of any firearm or ammunition, for any purpose, by “any person … who has been convicted in any court of … a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

In hight of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), does § 922(¢)(1) violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to petitioner?

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, Walker; Childs and the U.S. Court of Appeal Clerk Clifton B. Cislak disobeyed the law F, R.C.P. , Rule 5S (default / default judgment) due to F. R. C. P. Rule 12 (failure to answer Summons & | Complaints), F. R. App. P. Rule 31 (failure to file Reply Brief), F.R. App. P. Rule 27 (Emergency Motions) as well as all other applicable law refenced under Table of Authorities. Failure to correct Oo the U.S. District Court errors upon “Request to Enter Default Judgment”. Pursuant to F.R. App. P. | Rule 34(a)(2) and 34(j): failure to conduct hearing, deny Petition for Rehearing, wrongfully , disposed of appeal without consent. oo OS

2. Supreme Court Rule 10. Pursuant to the Rules of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.2, “a judge shall oe uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially”. For. instance, the petitioner was treated extremely unfairly due to L.A. County Judge Carol W. Elswick et.al. failure to set probation for a qualified innocent person. On the contrary, U.S. Court of Appeals judges and clerks dismissed all of the crimes accused herein supported by the statement of the facts, applicable law, clear and convincing evidence, court docket sheet etc. .

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