In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), this Court recognized a cause of action under Bivens v. Six Un- known Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for a claim that federal prison staff had violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s (ultimately fatal) asthmatic attack. The question presented is whether Carlson per- mits an inmate’s claim that prison staff at a pretrial de- tention center violated the Fifth and Eighth Amend- ments through deliberate indifference to an inmate’s

chronic pain after a surgery.

(I)

Despite sometimes highly technical subject matter, federal courts have always trusted lay juries to resolve patent disputes, including by evaluating expert testimony. That has been the rule since the Patent Act of 1790, which the First Congress passed and President Washington signed even before the States ratified the Seventh Amendment and its no-re- examination mandate in 1791. And deference to juries in patent cases was also the touchstone in every regional circuit before Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, in a statute that did not (and could not) change that constitutional norm. But as numerous commentors—including the United States —have observed, the Federal Circuit has since claimed the authority to second-guess a Jjury’s evaluation of expert credibility on the basis of a cold appellate record, and overrule jury verdicts based on its own assessment of the expert testimony.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a_ purported inconsistency in the testimony of an expert witness is an issue of credibility for the jury to resolve, as every regional circuit holds, or whether it instead supplies a basis for judgment as a matter of law, as the Federal Circuit held below and routinely holds in other cases.

Congress enacted the Paycheck Protection Program to fund “payroll costs,” defined to include “the sum of payments of any compensation with respect to employees’ and “the sum of payments of any compensation to or income of a sole proprietor or independent contractor.” Seville Industries, a small business with both W-2 employees and independent contractors, sought a PPP loan to cover both employees and independent contractors. The SBA eranted partial forgiveness for employee-related costs but denied forgiveness the portion of the loan covering independent contractors—ruling that such payments cannot count as “payroll costs.” The district court and Fifth Circuit affirmed.

The question presented 1s whether “the sum of payments of any compensation to or income of a sole proprietor or independent contractor that 1s a wage, commission, income, net earnings from _ self- employment, or similar compensation” includes payroll costs for a business’s independent contractors.

Whether a State violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it limits a defendant’s ability to raise all meritorious claims on direct appeal, then in collateral review refuses to address the merits of the claims it forced the defendant to abandon. Afterwards, upon the discovery of new evidence to support his claims, various state courts systematically refuse to adjudicate those claims on the merits—shifting procedural rationales at each stage of review so that no court ever reaches the substance of the constitutional violations, despite the record showing and the state acknowledging the existence of jurisdictional defects and illegal sentences.

Whether a State provides an “adequate and effective” corrective process, aS required by due process, when a criminal defendant is denied merits review of conceded or facially valid claims—first in the trial court, then on direct appeal, and finally in the state court of last resort—based on continually changing procedural bars that ensure the claims can never be heard by a competent court.

Whether due process is violated where a State prosecutes a criminal case without jurisdiction and imposes an illegal sentence, yet forecloses all avenues of correction by engaging in procedural gamesmanship that renders constitutional review illusory rather than meaningful.

Congress enacted the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) to fund “payroll costs” in order that small businesses stay afloat during the COVID-19 pandemic. “Payroll costs” are defined to include “the sum of payments of any compensation to or income of a sole proprietor or independent contractor.” Veltor Underground, LLC (“Veltor”’) a small business with no W-2 employees, used its PPP loan to pay independent contractors who performed its core services. SBA denied forgiveness, determining that such payments do not count as “payroll costs.” The district court agreed with SBA’s determination and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.

The question presented is whether “the sum of payments of any compensation to or income of a sole proprietor or independent contractor that 1s a wage, commission, income, net earnings from _ self- employment, or similar compensation” includes payments a business with no employees makes to independent contractors on its payroll who provide the business’s core services.

1. Whether a claim alleging unreasonable agency delay under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) becomes nonjusticiable when the Government takes the delayed action while the case is pending on appeal.

2. Whether courts should adjudicate unreasonable- delay claims under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) using the six-factor framework set forth in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984), or instead apply the APA’s text as written.

(i)

El Dorado County conditioned issuance of George Sheetz’s residential building permit on a requirement that he pay a $23,420 traffic impact mitigation fee designed largely to offset impacts of new commercial development in addition to the relatively small traffic impacts of his proposed home. The court below upheld the exaction under a state court created rule that the County’s use of a “rational” legislative process to establish the fee program satisfies both the nexus requirement of Nollan uv. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and the rough proportionality requirement of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). The court therefore held that the County’s legislative requirement that residential developers pay for impacts caused by commercial development satisfied Nollan and Dolan.

1. Does the Takings Clause’s protection against unconstitutional permit conditions encompass an evidentiary requirement (as opposed to a legis- lative process) by which the government bears the burden to demonstrate that its development permit exaction complies with Dolan’s “rough proportionality” standard?

2. Can an impact fee be roughly proportional when imposed on one discrete class of development (residential) for the purpose of addressing impacts caused by another discrete class of development (commercial)?

In Lanham Act false advertising cases, the courts of appeals have split 6-1 over whether a jury may infer consumer deception and reliance upon finding that an advertising campaign is deliberately false.

The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits hold that a jury may draw such an inference. They consider that inference so powerful that it gives rise to a presumption of consumer deception and reliance. Only the Third Circuit—home to a disproportionate number of corporate advertisers— holds the opposite, altogether forbidding a jury from inferring that aé_ deliberately false advertising campaign had its intended effect.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a jury hearing a false advertising case under the Lanham Act should be barred from inferring consumer deception and reliance upon finding that a defendant conducted a deliberately false advertising campaign.

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l. Was the Third Circuit decision to affirm the District Court’s 404(b) Ruling : . and sentencing correct? |

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