1. Whether the EKighth Amendment requires state corrections leadership to implement an_ overall “reasonable” statewide response to a public-health emergency in the aggregate, across multiple years and facilities.

2. Whether it was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity that the State of Oregon’s overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic between March 2020 and May 2022 would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, despite a federal judge ruling in June 2020 that the response met constitutional standards.

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2. Whether the trial court érred’ by relying heavily on testimony : that lacked probative value while dismissing or minimizing , important exculpatory evidence, including the complainant’s SO

| initial denial of abuse, inconsistencies in her accounts, and the presence of multiple adults in the shared household-making the allegations implausible. | , |

3. Whether the alleged incident was fabricated in retaliation for the Petitioner’s act of reporting the complainant’s mothet| for engaging in an extramarital affair, providing a clear motive | to harm the Petitioner’s credibility and future. |

(i)

The focus of this petition 1s the prejudice visited on Hiram Ross (Ross) as a result of a series of abuses of the discretion by the district court before and during the trial conducted in the Eastern District of New York. The foundation of the trial court’s errors was its rulings, before and during trial, that had the effect of minimizing the significance of the prejudice. These errors can find no sanction in this Court’s jurisprudence, in the legal provisions of applicable statutes and rules, or indeed in the Constitution itself.

The extent of the prejudice and its compounding effect 1s best understood by posing three questions that, we submit, amply justify the granting of a writ of certiorari in light of the Second Circuit’s affirmance of the judgment of the district court. These are:

l. Whether the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government

to introduce highly prejudicial evidence and argument linking Ross to a violent criminal gang, even though this evidence was wholly unnecessary to the government’s proof to the jury, and served no purpose other than to prejudice Ross in the eyes of the jury.

2. Whether, by failing to grant Ross’s motion for a mistrial based on the prejudicial use of “gang’’-related language by not only the government and but also by Ross’s co-defendant on cross-examination, the district court abused its discretion.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment as applied to an individual with a prior conviction for evading arrest with a vehicle.

2. Whether, for Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), courts can consider only the elements of a prior conviction— not alleged conduct—when determining whether an analogous historical tradition supports permanent disarmament.

In McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018), this Court held that (1) the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the autonomy to decide the objective of his defense, including maintaining innocence at trial despite overwhelming evidence of guilt; and (2) counsel who overrides that decision by conceding defendant’s guilt commits structural error requiring reversal. This Court rejected counsel’s justification that he conceded defendant’s guilt because he believed the innocence claim was false or incredible in light of the evidence, holding that counsel’s belief in his client’s guilt does not authorize counsel to override a defendant’s choice to pursue innocence at trial.

The question presented 1s:

Whether counsel violates the Sixth Amendment when counsel overrides the defendant’s express request to call a witness he identifies as essential to his innocence defense, on the ground that the witness would commit perjury if called – even though counsel hadn’t spoken to the witness – because counsel believed the defendant was guilty.

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