Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires employers to accommodate their religious employees if they can do so without undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(). Petitioners here sued their employer after they unsuccessfully sought religious accommodations to its vaccine mandate. But the Second Circuit held that, because New York would punish any accommodation otherwise required by federal law, such punishment would be a per se undue hardship on the employer, precluding an otherwise non- burdensome accommodation.

But the Supremacy Clause preempts state laws that frustrate federal law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. 191, 202 (2020). State law that conflicts with federal law thus 1s not “a defense to hability under federal law.” Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colorado Deptt of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1233 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether an employer faces a per se Title VII undue hardship if granting an otherwise federally required religious accommodation would conflict with state law purporting to punish such accommodation.

2. Whether, if so, Title VII preempts state laws that purport to prohibit employers from granting federally required religious accommodations.

Under the Lanham Act, any “trademark used in commerce” may be registered. 15 U.S.C. § 1051. That “used in commerce” standard is more lenient than the standard required for trademark infringement, which demands that the allegedly infringing mark have been “use[d] in commerce * * * in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (emphasis added).

The question presented is whether the Ninth Circuit erred in nevertheless holding, in direct conflict with the unanimous holdings of various other federal courts, that a plaintiff can satisfy the infringement standard by alleging mere registration.

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