If a court-martial defendant in a sexual assault case seeks to introduce evidence concerning the past sexual activity or predisposition of the alleged victim, Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412(c)(2) requires the trial judge to conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence may be admitted—and to automatically close that hearing to the public, without any case-specific assessment of the need for closing the courtroom.

In petitioner’s case, a divided Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) held that this automatic- closure rule does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Public Trial Clause—solely because Rule 412 hearings are not part of the “trial” the Clause protects, and therefore do not trigger the case-specific analysis for closing pre-trial proceedings that this Court required in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). The CAAF’s holding, from which Judge Maggs dissented, deepens an existing split of authority among state supreme courts—which have divided, 3-1, over whether automatic closures of comparable pre-trial hearings violate the Sixth Amendment.

The question presented 1s:

Whether the Public Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires case-specific determinations of necessity and narrow tailoring before an M.R.E. 412 hearing can be closed to the public.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment is violated when evidence seized outside the scope of a search warrant 1s admitted in a military trial?

2. Whether the Fifth Amendment is violated when an appellate court affirms a conviction despite the Government failing to prove that its evidence was not derived from the defendant’s immunized statements?

3. Does the Constitution preclude a court-martial panel of lay members from convicting a defendant of a criminal offense by a non- unanimous vote?

Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(¢)(1), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprison- ment for a term exceeding one year, violates the Second Amendment as applied to a defendant with a predicate conviction for attempted cultivation of marijuana.

(I)

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prohibits successive habeas applica- tions by state prisoners with only narrow exceptions, in- cluding for claims that “rel[y] on a new rule of constitu- tional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Near-identical language al- lows federal prisoners to file a successive habeas motion that contains “a new rule of constitutional law, made ret- roactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Jd. § 2255(h)(2).

The courts of appeals are divided over whether claims rely on “a new rule… that was previously unavailable” when a claim based on the rule could have been raised in an earlier federal habeas petition but would not have suc- ceeded. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits hold that whether a claim would have been meritorious does not affect whether the rule was previously available. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its view (and that of the Ninth Circuit) that a claim was previously available only if it had “some possibility of merit” based on the evidence available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition.

The question presented is:

Whether a claim relies on a “a new rule of constitu- tional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” when the habeas petitioner could have asserted a claim based on the rule in a prior federal habeas petition.

The National Bank Act grants federally chartered na- tional banks enumerated and incidental powers, subject to federal regulators’ detailed proscriptions and extensive supervision. Given this reticulated federal scheme, the Court has long recognized that the National Bank Act preempts state laws that “prevent or significantly inter- fere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.” Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). Congress codified that preemption standard in the Dodd-Frank Act. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).

Two years ago, in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., 602 U.S. 205, 219-20 (2024), this Court held that bank preemption presents a legal question answered through a “nuanced comparative analysis.” Specifically, courts must compare the “nature and degree of the interference caused by [the challenged] state law” to the nature and degree of the interferences at issue in seven bank- preemption precedents of this Court. Id.

But not all courts got the message. In the decision below, the First Circuit purported to apply Cantero in de- clining to hold that the National Bank Act preempts Rhode Island’s law mandating payment of interest on mortgage-escrow accounts. Yet the court brushed off sev- eral of the precedents this Court instructed it to examine and made other errors that place its decision in direct con- flict with Cantero.

Once again, the question presented is:

Whether the National Bank Act preempts state inter- est-on-escrow laws like Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 19-9- 2(a), which purport to dictate how national banks price their mortgage-loan products.

(I)

Petitioner Moore, who has always maintained his innocence in this case from the time of his initial arrest in 1999, was convicted at trial of first degree murder and sentenced to death.

In state post-conviction proceedings, Moore was refused an evidentiary hearing and his petition dismissed, despite his colorable claims of innocence, ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and serious state misconduct, including claims police planted evidence to connect Moore to the murders and deliberately destroyed exculpatory DNA evidence to prevent it from being tested. Notably, this misconduct occurred afier the State’s only eyewitness could not identify Moore as the perpetrator of the crimes on multiple occasions.

Further, Moore suffered ineffective assistance of trial counsel, who failed to properly investigate his case nor to even present a defense, despite substantial third-party culpability evidence existing as to the original suspect, one Tony Brown. Instead, trial counsel improperly frontloaded purported “mitigation” of Moore’s alleged crack cocaine addiction on cross examination of the State’s witnesses, from which the jury could easily infer that Petitioner was guilty of the homicides due to said alleged addiction.

Finally, Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were further violated because he was not competent at the time of trial due to the severe diabetic ketoacidosis he suffered throughout the guilt phase of trial, caused by the Maricopa County Jail’s contemporaneous refusal to properly feed or medicate Moore during his guilt phase trial.

This case therefore presents three questions:

1. Whether the State’s alleged egregious misconduct in both planting evidence in Petitioner Moore’s bed to wrongfully tie him to the homicides, and by deliberately destroying exculpatory DNA evidence related to blood found on a knife near the first chronological victim’s body, violated this Court’s authority in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S8.Ct. 1637 (1973) and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), respectively holding that outrageous governmental conduct and the purposeful destruction of evidence by police, if proven, require dismissal of his case with prejudice?

2. Whether Capital Petitioner Moore’s 6” Amendment right to be represented by competent trial counsel was violated due to substantial Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC) as defined by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984) and Hinton vy. Alabama, 571 U.S. 170, 134 S.Ct. 1081 (2014) due to former counsel’s failure to not only properly investigate and present readily available and compelling 3™ Party culpability evidence as to the original suspect, yet in his failure to call_a single witness in Petitioner’s defense, and which resultant abdicated defense was most substantially comprised of the cross examination of State’s witnesses to purportedly frontload mitigation as to his alleged addiction, suggesting to the jury that he was guilty in this case and constituting such grave ineffective assistance of counsel or misconduct so as to rival that which occurred in McCoy v. Louisiana 584 U.S. 414, 138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018)?

3. Whether Moore’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment federal constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by the lower Arizona court because he was not competent at the time of his 2001 guilt phase jury due to diabetic ketoacidosis caused by the Maricopa County Jail’s refusal to properly feed him nor give him prescribed insulin medication?

1

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a district court is required to conduct a more

searching inquiry into a defendant’s understanding of how his admitted conduct satisfies

the essential elements of the offense when the defendant denies a substantial portion of

the government’s offer of proof (including the essential element) during the plea

colloquy, or whether the court may instead rely on counsels’ summary assertions that

the remaining admitted conduct is sufficient to support the plea.

1. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that where 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) was neither charged nor submitted to the jury in a prosecution under U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), Petitioner was still subject to the 34 point offense level for a “under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(1) which provides for an increase from a base level 14 where “the offense of conviction is 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1). Petitioner submits for review the question of whether this is a correct reading of both the sentencing guideline and statute, and whether the Circuit’s ruling creates a separate issue under Alleyne v. United States by imposing a penalty based on a finding not submitted to the jury.

2. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals quotes language that appears to come from government pretrial disclosures in its determination of sufficiency of the evidence. Petitioner submits that this is in error and contrary to both this Court’s case law, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Sixth Amendment due process and requests either certiorari or summary reversal on this issue.

in

1. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts aims to ‘double protect’! some citizens at the expense of revoking all protections from others, including Constitutional rights. Does “double protecting” some waive Constitutional protections for all?

2. Do any immunities apply to an “LGBTQ+” Massachusetts when using federal “reimbursements” to subsidize forceful separation and agenda-driven extreme alienation? of innocent American children from their loving American parents?

| See “State Constitutional Law Declares Its Independence: Double Protecting Rights During a

Time of Federal Constitutional Upheaval” by Scott L. Kafker, Associate Justice of the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, as published at https://repository.uclawsf.edu/

hastings constitutional law_quaterly/vol49/iss2/4/ and also attached herein in Appendix E.

2 See the “Parental Alienation Can Be Emotional Child Abuse” NCSC article in Appendix B.

-ii-

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose prior conviction is not accompanied by any judicial finding that he poses a present danger to the physical safety of others, where the Government does not prove that permanently disarming such individuals is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

2. Whether a defendant preserves an as-applied constitutional challenge to § 922(¢)(1) for appellate review by filing and litigating a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, or whether a court of appeals may treat the claim as forfeited and apply plain-error review.

ll

. his racial discrimination claims.

‘ | 2 ~

1. Should this Honorable Court reexamine its destruction of evid- ence standard set out in Arizona v. Youngblood; specifically, © a reform to the ‘bad faith’ requirement, due to significant changes in jurisprudence and society since its inception?

2. Did the State of Texas misapply the Youngblood standard when , it found no due process violation or bad faith, despite State testimony that acknowledged the lack of fairness to Petitioner : due to spoliation? :

3. Because the State of Texas enacted the Michael Morton Act,

| Tex.Code.Crim.Proc. 39.14, and held that this Act guarantees defendants discovery rights beyond Due Process. Does it vio- late Due Process if Texas does not enforce or protect these rights when spoliation occurs to evidence not turned over in violation of the Act?