The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using “unreasonable” force. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor, this Court held that reasonableness depends on “the totality of the circumstances.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)). Garner expanded upon Graham in addressing whether deadly force is justifiable in preventing individuals from attempting to escape custody, ruling the common law “fleeing felon” rule unconstitutional and establishing that officers can only use deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect if they have probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical harm to the officer or others. But in the issue on appeal, the Fifth Circuit not only rejected the limitations of the fleeing felon rule imposed by Garner but effectively expanded the old rule to apply to any detainee who poses a “risk of flight”, including those merely suspected of criminal activity, and in so doing has created a circuit split on the issue with all of the other appellate courts and with the Supreme Court’s forty- year-old precedent in Garner. Abandoning even its own established precedent requiring “sloshing through the fact-filled morass” of each case, the Fifth Circuit now applies a new doctrine that establishes a per se rule allowing the use of deadly force any time a suspect—felon or not—poses a “risk of flight”, regardless of the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the incident.

The question presented is:

Whether the mere “risk of flight” renders a suspect so dangerous to the public at large that police are justified under the Fourth Amendment in using deadly force to prevent their escape.

(i)

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) requires courts to “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts” and to “enforce them according to their terms.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 3338, 339 (2011). This “equal-treatment rule” prohibits contractual “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate 1s at issue.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 507 (2018). The rule also prohibits defenses that “have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements,’ even if they “presumably” apply in other limited circumstances. Concepcion, 568 U.S. at 342.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the FAA’s equal-treatment requirement is violated by a rule deeming arbitration agreements procedurally unconscionable when they incorporate the American Arbitration Association’s rules because those rules are “subject to change’— even though changeable procedural rules are routinely enforced in courts and non-arbitration contracts.

2. Whether California’s arbitration-specific severability doctrine—under which the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce the severance provision in the parties’ arbitration agreement—violates the FAA’s equal-treatment rule.

One year after this Court’s decision in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), the Court exercised jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to a broad prior restraint on the speech of federal employees filed originally in district court. United States v. Natl Treasury Emps. Union, 518 U.S. 454 (1995). Cross-Petitioner here, the National Association of Immigration Judges (“NAIJ”), brought a similar pre-enforcement challenge to an across-the-board policy restricting the speech of the nation’s immigration judges. The court of appeals concluded, however, that under step two of the test articulated in Thunder Basin, this kind of challenge can be raised only through the administrative scheme provided by the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”’), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, even though that scheme does not guarantee any—let alone meaningful—judicial review of NAIJ’s “here- and-now’ injuries. Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 191 (2028).

The question presented is whether the CSRA impliedly strips federal district courts of jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to a broad prior restraint on the speech of federal employees, even where:

(a) the challenge could not be raised at all under the CSRA’s review scheme;

(b) the CSRA’s review scheme would not guarantee judicial review of the challenge in any event, because the availability of judicial review

1

To discourage unnecessary litigation and protect patent owners’ rights, the America Invents Act re- quires a petition for inter partes review to identify “all real parties in interest” both “to the patent owner” and “to the public.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)-(b). When a real party in interest is named to a petition, estoppel at- taches to that entity, precluding it from bringing cer- tain further challenges to the patent. § 315(e).

Notwithstanding the statutory text, the Federal Circuit concluded that patent owners have no right to know all real parties in interest to petitions brought against them and suffer no injury from deprivation of that information. It also held that § 314(d), which ren- ders the Director’s determination whether to institute an inter partes review “final and nonappealable,” bars review of final written decisions concerning real par- ties in interest. In so doing, the Federal Circuit failed to cite or discuss this Court’s contrary decision in SAS Inst., Inc. v. fancu, which held that “nothing in § 314(d)” withdraws judicial authority “to ensure that an inter partes review proceeds 1n accordance with the law’s demands.” 584 U.S. 357, 371 (2018).

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a patent owner is injured by the Pa- tent Trial and Appeal Board’s refusal to require a pe- tition to identify all real parties in interest.

2. Whether § 314(d) bars judicial review of a final decision regarding real parties in interest.

Section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (the “Trade Act’), permits the U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to take all “appropriate and feasible action” to “obtain the elimination” of any “unreasonable or discriminatory” foreign trade practice that “burdens or restricts United States commerce.” To invoke that authority, USTR must first pass through a gauntlet of procedural safeguards. See id. §§ 2411-2414.

Pursuant to Section 307 of the Act, and subject to far fewer procedural requirements, USTR may also “modify or terminate” a tariff action taken under Section 301 upon a finding that (as relevant here) the initial action is “no longer appropriate.” 19 U.S.C. § 2417(a)-(b). In 2018, USTR relied on its modification authority to increase ten-fold the scope of its original Section 301 action, which had imposed duties on $50 billion in imports from China, to impose new duties of up to 25% on up to $550 billion in imports from China—virtually the entire U.S.-China trade portfolio.

The question presented 1s:

Whether USTR’s streamlined authority under Section 307 to “modify” an existing tariff action confers on the agency essentially unlimited power to expand the scope of that initial action, as reflected in the ten- fold expansion challenged here.

(1)

Wealthy conglomerate Georgia-Pacific contrived a way to sequester its asbestos liabilities in bankruptcy. It split itself in two, placing its asbestos liabilities with one new entity designed for bankruptcy (“Bestwall”), while enabling another new entity to operate outside of bankruptcy (“New GP”). Bestwall then filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in North Carolina, where it conceded that funding from New GP enables it to pay any conceivable current and future liabilities.

The bankruptcy court refused to dismiss Bestwall’s bankruptcy for lack of good faith under 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1). It found that Bestwall’s ability to pay all its liabilities meant its petition was not “objectively futile” under Fourth Circuit precedent, and it refused to consider Bestwall’s subjective bad faith. The court later refused to dismiss Bestwall’s bankruptcy for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and again refused to dismiss for lack of good faith. The court recognized that Bestwall’s conceded ability to pay its debts presented a jurisdictional question under the Consti- tution’s Bankruptcy Clause, art. I, § 8, cl. 4, but it concluded that the Clause imposed no jurisdictional limit on Bestwall’s bankruptcy. <A divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed, and a sharply divided en banc court denied rehearing. The question presented 1s:

Whether a debtor with a conceded ability to pay all habilities now and in the foreseeable future properly can invoke bankruptcy protection.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a discriminatory Title [X investigation— whose findings are relied upon by a decisionmaker to impose concrete employment consequences—can constitute an adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
2. Whether a court of appeals may affirm summary judgment in a race-discrimination case by crediting an employer’s asserted “honest belief” and resolving disputed facts and witness credibility in the employer’s favor, notwithstanding evidence of contradictory sworn testimony, shifting explanations, and unsubstantiated justifications, in conflict with Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 5380 U.S. 133 (2000), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
3. Whether an employer’s reliance on new or expanded justifications for an adverse employment action—raised only after litigation begins—may be deemed non- pretextual on the ground that those reasons are merely “additional” to earlier explanations, contrary to Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), and decisions of other circuits holding that shifting or post hoc explanations permit an inference of discrimination.
4. Whether a court misapplies the “but-for” causation standard clarified in Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), by treating the employer’s articulation of multiple asserted reasons for an adverse employment action as defeating causation, rather than asking whether race was a determinative cause of the decision.

1. Does probable cause exist to stop, search, arrest, and prosecute a criminal suspect for evading arrest where unrefuted video evidence and the suspect’s own admissions demonstrate that he refused to yield to the traffic stop, subsequently briefly stopped, and then accelerated away again?

2. Where an appellate panel is not in agreement about whether an underlying constitutional violation has occurred, how can the panel subsequently conclude that the law is “clearly established” such that a law enforcement officer is not entitled to qualified immunity for the claimed constitutional violation?

| C. by vacating the February 24, 2023 scheduling order from the bench without motion or notice, citing “directives” from higher courts, and denying motions to compel previously served discovery (App. A35, A37-41); D. by granting summary judgment without resolving the unconscionability dispute in favor of the non-movant, despite acknowledging that Defendant signed the contract ten days after Plaintiff and that Plaintiff sought reformation of commitment dates as unconscionable, contrary to Pennsylvania Commercial Code § 2302 and the rule that all factual disputes be construed in favor of the non-moving party (App. A26, A32); E. by failing to address any of the six appellate questions—each alleging discovery misconduct, bias, or due-process violations— and by applying de novo instead of “abuse of discretion” review (App. Al1-12); 2. Whether the following actions violated the right to an impartial tribunal under Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927): (a) a trial judge concealing a conflict through a spouse’s firm’s ,

1

Like every other State, Arizona permits only United States citizens to vote in federal elections. To enforce that qualification, Arizona requires every ap- plicant who registers to vote to produce “satisfactory evidence of citizenship.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. §16- 121.01(C). If election officials obtain “information” from periodic inspections of Arizona’s voter rolls that “confirms” a “person registered 1s not a United States citizen,’ they “cancel the registration.” Id. §16- 165(A)(10).

The Ninth Circuit held that the National Voter Registration Act—52 U.S.C. §§20506(a)(6)(A)(i1), 20508(b)(1), 20507(c)(2)(a)—preempts those provi- sions of Arizona law. It also held that Arizona cannot require voter-registration applicants to produce proof of citizenship because in 2018, a previous Arizona Sec- retary of State entered a consent decree with private litigants. This Court has granted an emergency stay on each issue: One in this case and one in a Fourth Circuit case. The RNC raises both questions here on the merits. The questions presented are:

(1) Does the National Voter Registration Act or a fed- eral consent decree prohibit Arizona from requir- ing voter-registration applicants to produce “satis- factory evidence’ of U.S. citizenship when register- ing with a state registration form?

(2) Does the National Voter Registration Act prohibit Arizona from implementing a program within 90 days of a federal election to cancel the registrations of voters who are not U.S. citizens?

An Oregon statute, commonly known as HB 4005, re- quires a pharmaceutical manufacturer to create reports that include narrative justifications for the prices at which the manufacturer has chosen to offer its products for sale. A state agency then must publish all such reports on its website. Even if a report includes confidential infor- mation, the agency must publish it—destroying the value of any trade secrets that it contains—whenever the agency deems publication to be in “[t]he public interest.”

A divided Ninth Circuit panel upheld HB 4005 under the First Amendment. The court held that intermediate— rather than strict—scrutiny applies to all “government reporting requirements” that compel the disclosure of “product-specific” information. In purporting to apply such intermediate scrutiny, the court further held that Oregon’s asserted interest in correcting “information asymmetries” was sufficient, by itself, to sustain the law.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected a challenge under the Takings Clause to HB 4005’s requirement that trade se- crets must be published whenever the State deems publi- cation to be in “the public interest.” The court held that a drug manufacturer has no investment-backed expecta- tions in the secrecy of its trade secrets—and thus can never assert takings claims—because it “chooses” to op- erate in a “highly regulated” market.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a government reporting requirement is subject to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny, and satisfies such scrutiny, so long as it aims to correct “infor- mation asymmetries” that are “product-specific.”

2. Whether entities that operate in “highly regulated” industries categorically lack reasonable investment- backed expectations in their trade secrets for purposes of the Takings Clause.

(i)

Arizona’s state voter registration form requires ap- plicants to provide proof of citizenship and proof of residence. Registrants who have not provided proof of citizenship may not vote by mail. The district court found that the mail-in voting restriction and the proof of citizenship and residence requirements for the state form are preempted by the National Voter Registra- tion Act (NVRA) and, in the case of citizenship, by a consent decree. This Court stayed the district court’s injunction against the proof of citizenship require- ment. A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the in- junction. It also reversed the district court’s conclu- sion that H.B. 2248, a related law that requires elec- tions officials to check various databases to identify non-citizen or non-resident voters, was not intention- ally discriminatory. Over 11 dissents, the Ninth Cir- cuit denied rehearing en banc. The questions pre- sented are:

1. Whether the NVRA or a prior consent decree precludes Arizona from requiring documentary proof of citizenship and residence when applicants use its state-specific form to register to vote in federal elec- tions.

2. Whether the NVRA preempts Arizona’s prohi- bition on mail-in voting by registrants who have not provided proof of citizenship.

3. Whether the district court clearly erred in con- cluding that H.B. 2243 was not motivated by discrim- inatory animus.

Mr. Acebo was tried for First Degree Murder (and other offenses) in connection with the shooting death of Derek Pappan. He asserted the defense of self- defense. At his jury trial, Mr. Acebo took the stand in his own defense and sought—in support of his defense of self-defense—to testify as to specific incidents 1n his past with Mr. Pappan that led him to fear the victim, including threats and acts of violence against Mr. Acebo and his family. The Government, which had actual notice of all that Mr. Acebo sought to testify to, sought and obtained exclusion of this testimony by Mr. Acebo, arguing that he was required to give notice of his intent to introduce this “reverse 404(b)” evidence by the District Court’s scheduling order. Under these facts, was the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision 1n conflict with decisions of this Court (and other Courts of Appeals) by concluding that a District Court’s scheduling order (or any other local rule or practice for that matter) can effectively amend the notice requirement contained within Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) expanding it to apply to a criminal defendant, when the Rule’s drafters expressly required such notice only from “the prosecutor’?

1

permits a defendant to raise an affirmative defense that the defendant had a concealed-handgun license, violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution?

RELATED PROCEEDINGS Multnomah County Circuit Court: 21CR33362 Oregon Court of Appeals: A181186; City of Portland v. Ali, 339 Or App 674 (2025) Oregon Supreme Court: S071996; 374 Or 372 (2025)

Whether the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause allows a State to introduce forensic laboratory testing through a technical reviewer who neither per- formed nor observed the testing first-hand, and whose testimony depends on the truth of an absent analyst’s statements.

(1)

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1. Whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel when court-appointed counsel failed to file or consult Petitioner about filing, a petition for panel rehearing under Federal rule of Appellate Procedure 40 or a petition for rehearing en banc under Rule 35, resulting in the complete forfeiture of appellate review on Counts 1-29.

2. Whether procedural forfeiture (default) caused solely by counsel’s neglect or abandoned as opposed to any informed or strategic decision by the defendant must be excused under this Court’s decision in Maple v Thomas , 565 US. 266 (2012), Holland v Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), and Garza v Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019).

3. Whether an indigent defendant may be denied the right to proceed pro se on direct appeal, and whether the denial of that right followed by counsel’s subsequent forfeiture of all appellate remedies constitutes structural error the Sixth Amendment. :

2

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Whether the federal government “constructively possesses” property seized by state law enforcement—thereby conferring jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g)—when state authorities expressly defer to federal prosecutors on the disposition of the property, federal prosecutors refuse to return it, investigate its provenance, dispatch federal agents to interrogate the owner’s family about it, and initiate steps to liquidate it to satisfy a federal restitution order.

1

Federal supervised-release revocation sentences are frequently measured in months rather than years. Because appellate review often extends beyond the custodial portion of such sentences, revocation defendants may complete their terms of imprisonment before a court of appeals renders judgment. When no additional term of supervised release remains, several courts dismiss the appeal as moot without reaching the merits. The result is that the legality of revocation imprisonment may evade meaningful appellate review. The question presented 1s:

Whether expiration of a short federal supervised-release revocation sentence during the pendency of a direct appeal categorically moots the appeal under Article III when no further supervision remains, even though such sentences routinely expire before appellate review can be completed.

1

1. Did the district court’s misapplication of Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) in denying Petitioner’s Rule 29 Motion For Judgment of Acquittal — endorsed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals — represent such a departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the Supreme Court’s supervisory power?

2. Were the district court’s actions during the run up to, and during, jury deliberations — endorsed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals through its denial of Petitioner’s Rule 33 Motion For New Trial — so coercive in their effect on the jury’s deliberations as to deprive Petitioner of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial, and, moreover, represent such a departure from the usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for the Supreme Court’s supervisory power?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING All parties to the proceedings are listed in the caption. The petitioner is not a corporation. 1

Dozens of federal offenses require, as a jurisdictional element, that the offense be committed “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Is the status of a particular physical location under this language (1) a question of fact that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the fact- finder or (11) a question of law that may be answered through judicial notice?

(1)