1. Whether the National Firearms Act’s taxation-and-registration scheme for covered firearms can be justified as a licensing law.

2. Whether the National Firearms Act’s taxation-and-registration scheme violates the Second Amendment with respect to firearm suppressors.

GISKAN SOLOTAROFF & ANDERSON

1 Rockefeller Plaza, 8th Floor

New York, NY 10020

Natural Lands, LLC, purchased an undeveloped beachfront lot in Palm Beach County, Florida, which was zoned for residential development and “grand- fathered” with a vested right to build a single-family home, subject to certain variance requirements. During a lengthy process to secure building approval, three future City Council members campaigned on promises to deny all development on Natural Lands’ property. When the Council finally scheduled a hearing on its application for a construction variance, Natural Lands requested recusal of these now-elected members. But the Council refused, held the hearing, and denied the application. After a bench trial, the district court held that “the explicit bias of the three Council Members against any development on the parcel tainted the vote on Plaintiffs variance application” and violated the Due Process Clause. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding, in conflict with other Circuits, that the existence of state court remedies barred Natural Lands’ due process claim in federal court.

The question presented is:

Whether the availability of state remedies bars a property owner from seeking relief from a due process violation in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983?

This case does not ask the Court to revisit disputed facts or second-guess a. state disciplinary authority’s credibility determinations. Instead, it presents a structural constitutional question concerning whether professional discipline may rest on findings that never satisfy the constitutionally required elements of misconduct. Although the decision below is framed as a fact-bound disciplinary proceeding, liability was imposed through procedural default and sustained through character-based reasoning rather than specific findings regarding intent, falsity, or constitutionally unprotected speech. The question presented therefore extends beyond petitioner and makes this case a matter of great public importance:

1. Whether constitutional due process allows professional discipline to be ~ imposed where the tribunal failed to make the findings required by this | Court’s precedents before punishment may lawfully issue. 1

[ ] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[X] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all parties to the

proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition is as follows:

State of Oklahoma, Represented by Attorney General of Oklahoma

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In 2025, the State of Florida engaged in an unprecedented spree of death warrants, resulting in 19 executions during the calendar year. During the rash of executions, the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) complied with a records request regarding how the agency carried out the administration of its lethal injection protocol. The logs produced pursuant to said records request, indicated concerns regarding whether Florida is carrying out its lethal injection protocol in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution. Florida courts have consistently refused to force FDOC to produce additional records regarding the evidence of the maladministration of the current lethal injection protocols. Thus, Florida capital defendants under warrant have raised challenges to this Court in an effort for federal judicial intervention at the highest level. The following previously executed defendants raised claims to this court based on Eighth Amendment grounds: Walls v. Florida, cert denied, No. 25-6357, — U.S. ––, 2025 WL 3674295 (U.S. December 18, 2025); Heath v. Florida, cert denied, No. 25-6746, — U.S. ––, 2026 WL 363902 (U.S. February 10, 2026); Trotter v. Florida, cert denied, No. 25-6858, — U.S. ––, 2026 WL 504237 (U.S. February 24, 2026). Undeterred, whereas only this Honorable Court has the power and authority to hold Florida accountable, Petitioner raises the following questions presented regarding this deadly serious matter:

1. Whether the Florida courts’ complete refusal to provide additional FDOC records to King, although he was willing to engage in additional negotiation regarding the records

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1. To protect the right to an impartial jury, the Sixth Amendment requires transferring venue when there 1s extensive and prejudicial pretrial publicity. Social media is now the dominant forum for pretrial publicity, but the court below—like courts across the country—refused to meaningfully analyze it. Was the lower court required to consider “smoking gun” confessions published on Facebook by local news groups and inflammatory Facebook commentary calling for Petitioner’s death without a fair trial?

2. This Court recently reaffirmed 1n Andrew v. White that the erroneous admission of prejudicial, irrelevant evidence about a capital defendant’s sex life, failings as a mother, and demeanor as a wife can render a trial fundamentally unfair. In the sentencing phase of Taylor Parker’s capital murder trial, the State spent weeks eliciting irrelevant, salacious testimony rooted in these same sex stereotypes. Does the Due Process clause require vacatur and remand for a new sentencing proceeding?

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Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a federal habeas proceeding unless a circuit judge or justice issues a “certificate of appealability” (COA). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A COA may issue only if the prisoner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To do so, the prisoner must show that “reasonable jurists could debate” whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

The question presented is:

Whether a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 should be granted where the issue that the petitioner seeks to raise on appeal has been resolved against him by binding circuit precedent but has been resolved in his favor by another circuit.

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