1. Why did both lower court judges say a fourth amendment seizure requires an arrest and refuse to challenge your stare decisis ruling, Hodari D., 499 U. S., at 624, that states it doesn’t require arrest or detention “A seizure doesn’t have to necessarily result in actual control or detention. It is true that, when speaking of property, “Iflrom the time of the founding to the present, the word ‘seizure’ has meant a ‘taking possession.”” cited in the original Complaint?

2. If officers acknowledges no criminal activity and no reasonable suspicious or probable cause to act but start assuming the incident being under domestic duties using their authority to take possession of Petitioner’s freedom of movement from reboarding a bus that breach Georgia’s Motor contract carrier laws a private contract agreeing with the same bus driver refusing Petitioner contract paid service, would this be a “meeting of the minds” as in Adickes a Conspiracies Between Public Officials and Private Persons, Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., Id. at 158, 90 S. Ct. at 1609,?

3. How is it that the lower district courts expecting self-litigants/pro se to support all allegations with supporting proof when this lower court judge granted respondent/defendant’s motion that claimed separate entities having no supporting proof nowhere found on the record

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This Court has recognized an “implied license” that permits a “visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” Fla. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 10 (2013). Police rely on this “implied license” to conduct untold thousands of so-called “knock-and-talk” investigations each year under the theory that entering the curtilage of the home to conduct a “knock and talk” does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. But this Court in Jardines also instructed that an officer’s purpose in entering the curtilage of the home has constitutional relevance. If police “enter the protected premises of the home in order to do nothing but conduct a search,” they have conducted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Jd. at 8 n.4 (emphasis added). This Court reinforced these principles in Collins v. Virginia, holding that “[w]hen a law enforcement officer physically intrudes on the curtilage to gather evidence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred,” and the conduct is thus “presumptively unreasonable absent a warrant.” 584 U.S. 586, 593 (2018) (emphasis added). The question presented is:

When police enter the curtilage of the home to conduct a “knock-and-talk” investigation with the purpose of gathering incriminating evidence against the homeowner, do police conduct a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?

1. Whether the state court erred in upholding, contrary to U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998), and the Excessive Fines Clause, a mandatory fine pursuant to a statute that does not allow any proportionality considerations?

2. Whether the state court erred in affirming, contrary to the holdings of the supreme courts of other states and the Excessive Fines Clause, fines and surcharges imposed under statutes that do not allow consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay?

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This Court recognizes that the right to counsel is “necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (19388). It also recognizes that the Sixth Amendment includes a right to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-820 (1975). It has not outlined baseline requirements for standby representation, nor hast 1t established a standard to evaluate attorney effectiveness when standby counsel is forced into a case with inadequate preparation time. Therefore, the questions presented are:

(1) If a court utilizes standby counsel, does the Sixth Amendment

require that the court give standby counsel adequate time to

prepare so they may try the case, if needed?

(2) Does a court violate the Sixth Amendment when it replaces

standby counsel and forces replacement standby counsel to take

over the representation without adequate time to prepare?