Maine requires all federally-permitted lobstermen, including Petitioner Frank Thompson, to install a GPS tracker on their fishing boats and submit to 24/7 government surveillance as a condition of keeping their fishing license. The First Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment’s administrative search doctrine authorizes Maine’s trespass—even when lobstermen are not using their private fishing boats for commercial purposes. In doing so, it concluded, in conflict with the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, that Fourth Amendment trespassory protections under United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), apply to criminal cases only, not to commercial cases.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether Maine’s requirement that lobstermen place a GPS tracking device on their private fishing vessels and submit to 24/7 surveillance constitutes an unreasonable trespassory search in violation of the Fourth Amendment?

2. Whether courts must evaluate the reasonableness of a warrantless administrative search based on the Fourth Amendment’s protections against government trespass, and not solely on a business owner’s’ reasonable expectations of privacy?

When a company directly and regularly sells a product into a state, and that product causes injury in the state to one of the state’s residents, does the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbid the state from exercising personal jurisdiction over the company solely because the company took steps to limit sales only to some purchasers, for some uses, within the state?

1. Video evidence standard at Rule 12(b)(6). Whether a district court may, or must, consider objective video evidence at the motion-to-dismiss stage when that evidence is central to the complaint and blatantly contradicts or utterly discredits the allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive-force action, given a circuit split between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits (which permit consideration of such videos) and the Tenth Circuit (which does not)?

2. False Plausibility. Whether a § 1988 plaintiff can satisfy the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), by strategically omitting known facts, here, that the decedent fled the police in a reckless manner by vehicle, fired a weapon at officers just prior to being shot, and was running toward an occupied civilian vehicle at the time of the shooting, when including those facts would defeat the claim?

3. Clearly established law and Tennessee uv. Garner. Whether Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), standing alone, clearly establishes a Fourth Amendment violation sufficient to defeat qualified immunity at the pleading stage in a factually complex officer-involved shooting 1n which the decedent had moments earlier fired a weapon at officers, ignored repeated commands, and fled toward an occupied civilian vehicle, contrary to this Court’s repeated instructions that clearly established law must be defined with specificity and particularity to the facts

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1. Whether Congress may provide by statute that members of the Merit Systems Protection Board—an adjudicatory body—“may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d).

2. Whether, to the extent the Merit Systems Pro- tection Board possesses some minimal non-adjudica- tory powers, the appropriate remedy is to sever that authority rather than invalidate the for-cause re- moval provision.

(1)

Petitioner Roxana Towry Russell is an artist who designs sculptural lamps. She owns copyrights in both the lamps and photographs of the lamps. A jury found Walmart infringed Russell’s copyrights by selling knock- off lamps on its website. Walmart’s product listings used Russell’s copyrighted photographs and declared the infringing lamps were “Sold & shipped by Walmart.”

Walmart did not appeal the district court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). It appealed only from the earlier judgment entered on the verdict. The Ninth Circuit recognized that, as a result, the denial of the Rule 50(b) motion was not before it on appeal. The Ninth Circuit nonetheless held it could review the suffi- ciency of the evidence by reviewing the denial of Wal- mart’s pre-verdict motion for JMOL under Rule 50(a). It then held, over a dissent, that there was insufficient evidence to hold Walmart liable for infringing Russell’s copyrights in the photographs used in Walmart’s product listings, even on a secondary-liability theory, because the photographs allegedly were uploaded by a contractor.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a court of appeals may assess the suffi- ciency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict by re- viewing the denial of a Rule 50(a) motion.

2. Whether the Court should hold this petition pend- ing Cox Communications Inc. v. Sony Music Entertain- ment, No. 24-171—which concerns the proper standard for secondary liability for copyright infringement—and then dispose of this petition as appropriate following its decision in Cow.

(i)

1. Petitioner was convicted 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) of a child pornography offense for a hand drawn cartoon image on his computer involving no real or real looking person. This statute prohibits “knowingly … possess[ing] with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, [or] cartoon … that depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and is obscene.”

The first question presented is whether § 1466A(a)(1) violates the First Amendment as applied to mere hand drawn pure cartoon images that depicted no real, real looking children, computer generated images, Al, or deepfakes under Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, New York v. Ferber, nor Miller v. California.

2. A forensic search of Petitioner’s computer showed approximately 300 images of child sexual abuse material in the “carved space” of Petitioner’s computer hard drive. The proof showed, however, it could not be accessed by him without a utilities program, which he did not have. There was no proof at trial how it got there, who downloaded it, or whether he even accessed it at all.

The second question presented is whether this is a complete failure of proof by the government making Petitioner’s conviction for possession of child pornography in violation of due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

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I. Circuit courts of appeals applying Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi have adopted different approaches to testing 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1), but each has overlooked three important points about the text and history of the Second Amendment. First, the right to keep and bear arms belongs to “the people,” and on its plain meaning, that term of art includes ex-offenders. Second, at the Founding, there was no tradition of premising the rights to keep or bear arms on the absence of a criminal record. Third, all of the contemporary textual and constitutional evidence points in the opposite direction. A criminal conviction might disqualify an ex-offender from holding office or voting, but not a single American jurisdiction exempted the same class from those protected by the Second Amendment or its state-level analogues. The question presented 1s: Whether there is an obvious and irreconcilable clash between § 922(¢)(1) and the rights protected by the Second Amendment.

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