The Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) defines “payroll costs” to include “the sum of payments of any compensation to or income of a sole proprietor or independent contractor that 1s a wage, commission, income, net earnings from self-employment, or similar compensation.” Petitioner applied for a PPP loan after the government’s own authorized lender expressly advised that independent contractors “are allowed to be included in payroll costs’; thereafter, when federal guidance suggested that independent contractors would not qualify for loan forgiveness, petitioner—out of an abundance of caution—exclusively spent its loan proceeds on employee wages and other statutorily authorized costs. The SBA denied eligibility even though at the time of application the SBA’s own agent was clear independent contractors should be included in the calculation loan forgiveness anyway.

The question presented is whether the statutory definition of “payroll costs” includes payments to independent contractors.

1. Does the Alaska-resident-only Personal Use (“PU”) salmon fishery in Cook Inlet, Alaska, violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution?

2. Does restricting the commercial fishery in Upper Cook Inlet (““UCI’) to provide salmon for the Alaska-resident-only PU salmon fishery, violate the Magnuson-Stevens Act (“MSA”) and the Commerce Clause?

3. Does managing the Kenai River king salmon (Chinook) and other salmon stocks primarily for sport and guided sport uses violate the MSA and the Commerce Clause?

4. Can Alaska restrict the UCI commercial fishery and interstate commerce because it is restricting resident and non-resident commercial fishermen alike?

5. Does the fact that PU fish cannot be bartered or sold mean the impacts on interstate commerce can be ignored?

6. Can the Kenai River king salmon stock be managed for only part of the stock over 34 inches, ignoring the definition of “fish stock” in state law and the MSA?

The Ninth Circuit held that Petitioners’ substantive due process claims were foreclosed by Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) and Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho, 148 F.4th 1020 (9th Cir. 2025).

Because Carvalho, pending as No. 25-765,” cites the present case as an example of the detrimental effects of the Carvalho ruling, the Court may wish to consider this case in conjunction with Carvalho. Additionally, Sweeney v. University of Colorado Hospital Authority, No. 25-1055, involves a materially similar factual and legal backdrop and identical procedural errors by both the district and circuit courts as those detailed herein. The Court may wish to consider these petitions in tandem to address the recurring issues of party presentation and premature merits adjudication at the pleading stage.

Question 1:

Does Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) limit a court’s review of government- mandated investigational medical treatments to whether the mandate is rationally related to a legitimate government objective, or does Jacobson first require the court to determine if the scope and means of the mandate constitute a _ legitimate exercise of the police power of the state that does not infringe upon the federal domain?

“This Court issued a call for response on February 5, 2026.

1. Whether courts may affirm summary judgment in a Title VII case by discounting sworn testimony, drawing inferences in the employer’s favor, and treating the employer’s explanation as controlling, contrary to Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014), Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), and Reeves uv. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 5380 U.S. 133 (2000).

2. Whether a Title VII plaintiff may be denied a prima facie case solely for lack of a “nearly identical” comparator when the plaintiff offers other evidence supporting an inference of discrimination, contrary to McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner Charles Faulk was the plaintiff in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and the appellant in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Respondent Owens Corning Roofing and Asphalt, LLC, was the defendant in the district court and the appellee in the court of appeals. 1