Petitions and applications docketed on April 01, 2026
type Caption Docket No Court Below Petitioner's Counsel Counsel's Address Recent Filings QP
paid Mark A. Bauersachs

v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

25-1140 First Circuit, No. 24-1796

Judgment: October 07, 2025

Mark Andrew Bauersachs 5 Patriot Lane Hudson, MA 01749 NA
paid Jason Tywann Bell

v. John Gilley, Warden

25-1141 Fourth Circuit, No. 22-6189

Judgment: August 06, 2025

Dana Kagan McGinley Amold & Porter 601 Massachusetts Avenue NW Washington, DC 20001 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedQUESTION PRESENTED

Petitioner challenged the legality of his 2003 federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that it was unconstitutionally enhanced under the residual clause of the then-mandatory career offender (Guideline—a provision materially indistinguishable from the residual clause this Court held unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015).

The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s challenge, holding that this Court’s intervening decision in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023)—which held that § 2255(e)’s saving clause does not allow resort to § 2241 to raise claims based on intervening statutory-interpretation decisions—forecloses relief even for constitutional challenges. The court of appeals held further that this result raises no Suspension Clause problem, even where, as here, a federal prisoner is left with no forum in which to raise a constitutional challenge to his plainly unconstitutional sentence.

Approximately three weeks after the court of appeals issued its mandate, petitioner finished serving his term of supervised release, completing his entire challenged sentence and mooting the case before he could seek this Court’s review.

The question presented is:

Whether, pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950), this Court should vacate the court of appeals’ judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.

(i)

paid Mark Zavislak

v. Netflix, Inc.

25-1142 Ninth Circuit, No. 24-4156, 24-4175

Judgment: September 24, 2025

Oral Shane Balloun Balloun Law Professional Corporation 355 Harris Avenue, Suite 201 Bellingham, WA 98225 [Main Document] [Lower Court Orders/Opinions] [Petition] NA
paid D.A., a Minor, By and Through his Mother, B.A.

v. Tri County Area Schools

25-1143 Sixth Circuit, No. 24-1769

Judgment: October 14, 2025

Conor Terrence Fitzpatrick Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression 700 Pennsylvania Ave. SE Suite 340 Washington, DC 20003 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented1 QUESTION PRESENTED

Students have a First Amendment right to wear political apparel to school unless it causes substantial disruption. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 508 (1969). The Court later recognized a narrow exception by allowing schools to prohibit profane and sexually lewd speech. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 408 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

This case concerns “Let’s Go Brandon,” a popular political slogan for expressing disdain for President Joe Biden. Members of Congress have used it during floor speeches, and it airs uncensored on broadcast TV and radio. But a divided Sixth Circuit panel applied Fraser to hold a Michigan school district can ban high school students from silently wearing apparel with the slogan because of its origin in a profane chant.

To reach its published holding, the majority split with the Third and Ninth Circuits, which confine the Fraser exception to “plainly” profane and lewd speech. The majority instead held Fraser permits censoring nondisruptive political speech that any single teacher or administrator “reasonably understands” as vulgar.

Judge Bush dissented that the test grants schools “unrestrained authority to suppress speech based on subjective interpretations’ and, given nationwide confusion over its scope, “the Supreme Court … must ultimately clarify, and ideally limit, Fraser’s reach.”

The question presented 1s whether Fraser permits schools to censor nondisruptive political speech that is not plainly profane or lewd.

ifp Jerrell Tito Bowman

v. United States

25-7124 Fourth Circuit, No. 25-6701

Judgment: December 02, 2025

Jerrell Tito Bowman #35085-058 FCI Ashland P.O. Box 6001 Ashland, KY 41105 NA
ifp Anthony William Beeson

v. Christopher Pierce, Warden

25-7125 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-2787

Judgment: December 04, 2025

Anthony William Beeson #BJ8851 Ironwood State Prison P.O. Box 2199 Blythe, CA 92226 NA
ifp Gabriel L’Ambiance Ingram

v. United States

25-7127 Fourth Circuit, No. 23-4448

Judgment: August 04, 2025

Gabriel L'Ambiance Ingram 33535-171 FCI Atlanta PO Box 150160 Atlanta, GA 30315 [Main Document] NA
ifp Luis Alberto Llamas-Venegas

v. California

25-7128 Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District, No. A165779

Judgment: August 01, 2025

Luis Alberto Llamas-Venegas #BS9431 Mule Creek State Prison P.O. Box 409099 Ione, CA 95640 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented5 ee oal « D.W.A. cydence Used —_— TE Sew assault occured Why was J. : TT ¢ vo Tayo Oe Ce nal oe Sot cbse SARE than Sho" could rN Saal assay lt OCtVe mer AW XO | at 4s Pan and ‘Je 3 hoe, Mother and Rother not be awat fon oF r mu (Y) \< sal Cowet abvsed 45 Asccre tion yay deny A he Hekeroe Motion Ao See Cones, cesultiny \ arossly Unkorr devo (5) he Trial Cowt ecced in yy 0osin 1) Unavthorized devs of QS do Life under Lhe One Strike Lam Penal code Section 667.6\ Which LoS Dased Solely o% +he MvI4ip e Victim Circumstance ©) \q Lyfe Terms mn Section 661.6| Subawision\ (£)(4) Vielated the coseaghan on HUH RIE bunzahnrnents 6 SeCNAN 2° 1 (YY Tradeq uae and Una rlect iWWe Assistance® ot Couns (
ifp Antonio Goodwin

v. Cellular Sales Service Group, LLC

25-7129 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-5567

Judgment: September 26, 2025

Antonio Goodwin 21021 Sycolin Rd Apt 503 Ashburn, VA 20147 NA
ifp Donald Anthony Roderick

v. United States

25-7130 Fourth Circuit, No. 25-6398

Judgment: September 23, 2025

Donald Anthony Roderick #08822-510 FCI Danbury 33 1/2 Pembroke Road Danbury, CT 06811 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedUESTIONS PRESENTED
  1. Whether a defendant can be procedurally barred from raising inef fective assistance of counsel claims before a court that lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.

  2. Does a jurisdiction limiting clause in a statute only apply if the statute is charged?

  3. Does the weight of a jurisdictional question allow for a bypass of any time bars?

  4. Can a question of a court’s jurisdiction be muted by a claim of procedural default?

  5. Can a proceeding be time barred if the imposing court never had the power to bring / prosecute a given charge?

  6. As established, jurisdiction of a court is the first element examined before a court proceeds. When a question pertaining to the jurisdiction of a lower court is brought to the appellate court is that to be included in the primary examination of elements?

  7. When is a deployed, active member of the Armed Forces not subject to MEJA and/or UCM?

  8. Does 18 USC §2252A have extraterritorial reach to include active military personnel located overseas in Poland?

  9. Whether 18 USC §2252A apply to conduct that occurs in Poland when an individual engages in the criminal conduct not on any land controlled by the U.S. government.

  10. Does a charge under 18 USC §2252A allow the courts to disregard clear directives

(statutes) from Congress; if so, is the unsolicited receipt of child pornography

| in a foreign country a crime that allows the courts to ignore Congress’ directives as outlined in 18 USC §3261(d); if not how is the restriction on the district court dismissed by the district court when a defendant falls squarely within the class in 18 USC $3261, and as such was supposed to have the charge heard pursuant to the UCMJ.

ifp José L. Yeyille

v. The Florida Bar

25-7131 Supreme Court of Florida, No. SC2024-0235

Judgment: October 24, 2025

José L. Yeyille 5505 SW 135th Court Miami, FL 33175 NA
ifp Carlton Smith

v. Florida

25-7132 Supreme Court of Florida, No. SC2025-1740

Judgment: December 02, 2025

Carlton Smith #C07410 Franklin Correctional Institution 1760 Highway 67 North Carrabelle, FL 32322 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presented— Pekihioner. Asseets the SuPreme Court of Floarda “Acted in Excess Of ifs Suaisdichoo and denied the Petition Gao wield: Of Mandamus witetscuina ‘an Oeder +p Show Cause’ onthe Atiorren Geneent {be the ResPondents Which {3 A dePebune “eae the 88n hal hezuletners of the law,and Cause. Materia Tnaduex thar Cannot be Correc on HPP each ea te "A Manifest suotiod ole Pewvect Rithinee of his Rahs AgPinat the U-S. Const. It Amendment.
ifp John Louis Atkins

v. United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

25-7133 Fifth Circuit, No. 25-10667

Judgment: September 22, 2025

John Louis Atkins #02184778 Coffield Unit 2661 FM 2054 Tennessee Colony, TX 75884 NA
ifp Martin Chavez-Zarate

v. United States

25-7134 Ninth Circuit, No. 25-5742

Judgment: January 28, 2026

Vicki Marolt Buchanan Vicki Marolt Buchanan, PC 19201 Sonoma Highway, #243 Sonoma, CA 95476 [Petition] [Appendix]
Question(s) presentedNo. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES MARTIN CHAVEZ-ZARATE, PETITIONER VS. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS The Petitioner, MARTIN CHAVEZ-ZARATE, by his undersigned counsel, asks leave to file the attached Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, without prepayment of costs and to proceed in forma pauperis. Vicki Marolt Buchanan was appointed counsel for Mr. Chavez-Zarate in the court of appeals under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b). * Kk ok