In courts-martial, a military judge signs the Entry of Judgment (HOJ), marking the end of trial and the beginning of the post-trial process. Air Force regula- tions required that a judge advocate later sign a sepa- rate memorandum titled “First Indorsement.” That First Indorsement memorandum informs the Na- tional Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) that the servicemember had been deprived of his Second Amendment rights pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922, without any finding from the authoring judge advocate or any judicial officer that servicemember has been convicted of a crime of violence or the conduct otherwise falls within the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

Article 66(d)(2), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2), specifically empowers military courts of criminal appeals to provide appro- priate relief to correct errors in the processing of courts-martial made after the HOJ. However, the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (Air Force Court) and the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF) have decided that no military appellate court has the authority to correct an erroneous firearm prohibition included in the First Indorsement.

The question presented 1s:

Whether military courts of criminal appeals have authority under 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2) to correct an un- constitutional firearms ban annotated after entry of judgment.

Petitioner was charged with being derelict in the performance of his military duties, a violation of 10 U.S.C. § 892. The charge alleged Petitioner engaged in “unprofessional relationships,” which a regulation ostensibly proscribed. Pet. 3a. Petitioner ultimately pled guilty to this charge.

Under military law, a defendant who pleads guilty must set out the underlying factual basis for the offense through a colloquy with the trial judge, often referred to as the providence or Care! inquiry.

Despite this requirement, during the providence inquiry, the trial judge only elicited that Petitioner drank alcohol, danced in the presence of his subordinates, and later fell asleep in the presence of his subordinates, acts not prohibited by the applicable regulation. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this conviction applying a standard of review in the “light most favorable to the Government,” Pet. 12a, even though that standard is grounded only ina concurrence and is inconsistent with the standard used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces to assess guilty pleas.

The question presented 1s:

Did the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces abuse its discretion under 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(8) by failing to grant review “upon petition of the accused and on good cause shown,” where Petitioner made an unrebutted showing of good cause?

1 United States v. Care, 40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969)

Morse filed an appeal pro se in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, after the 30-day jurisdictional deadline of 28 U.S.C. § 2107. He filed no motion to extend that deadline in the district court, as provided by the statute. Instead, he obtained counsel, abandoned his appeal, and pursued post-trial relief in the district court.

The Fourth Circuit interpreted his late notice of appeal as a motion to extend the deadline, and remanded to the district court for a ruling on whether the deadline should be extended. The district court ruled that it should. The circuit court therefore reopened Mr. Morse’s appeal and denied it. Based on the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction, the district court refused to consider Morse’s request for post-trial relief

1. Given Morse’s untimely appeal, did the circuit court have jurisdiction to solicit a ruling from the district court, instead of dismissing the appeal?

2. As Morse did not request an extension of the deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), could the district court’s order support jurisdiction 1n the circuit court?

3. As Morse had abandoned his appeal and sought post-trial relief in the district court, was the circuit court 1mpermissibly imposing a legal strategy on him, and a losing strategy at that?

Whether a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrues at the moment of the initial deprivation, or only when the State-mandated grievance and arbitration process has concluded and failed to provide the required due process, consistent with this Court’s decisions in Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023) and Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 603 U.S. 799 (2024).

(1) Did the Fifth Circuit clearly violate the party presentation principle by affirming Petitioner’s judgment based on a hypothetical finding of fact that the government (a) conceded in district court was unsupported by the record, and (b) never urged on appeal?

(2) Did the Fifth Circuit clearly violate this Court’s precedent by affirming Petitioner’s judgment based on its own independent fact finding, particularly considering (a) the government affirmatively waived the argument in district court, and (b) the district court considered and declined to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s alternative ground?

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