The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause guaran- tees that private property shall not “be taken for pub- lic use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V.

Local police officers trying to catch a criminal de- liberately inflicted major damage to an innocent homeowner’s property when raiding her house. (The raid was an error; the criminal had no connection to the homeowner or her house.) The government has not compensated her, leaving her to bear thousands of dollars in costs herself.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Takings Clause has a _ police- power exception, making no compensation due when the government damages private property under its police power outside of eminent domain (as the Sev- enth, Tenth, and Federal Circuits hold)—or not (as the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits hold).

2. Whether the government is exempt from liabil- ity under the Takings Clause when law enforcement officers intentionally destroy an innocent person’s property while trying to apprehend a fugitive.

This petition arises from a decades-long mass tort settlement administered under federal court supervision in which over 2,600 South Korean nationals received formal approval of their claims against Dow Corning Corporation for personal injuries caused by silicone gel breast implants—yet received nothing, or far less than they were owed. The Settlement Facility imposed an address confirmation requirement that proved impossible for Korean Claimants to satisfy, denied premium payments to all Korean Claimants and basic payments plus premium payments to some Korean Claimants, and refused all meaningful communication with their counsel. When Petitioners sought judicial scrutiny of the Claims Administrator’s conduct and neutrality, the district court refused without briefing, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in three pages. Subsequently, the district court terminated and dissolved the positions assigned for the settlement facility, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed in three pages. The questions presented are:

1. Whether a federal court discharges its duty to supervise a court-administered mass tort settlement when it permanently extinguishes the formally approved claims of more than 2,600 foreign nationals—relying exclusively on declarations submitted by the claims administrator whose neutrality 1s disputed, refusing without briefing a claimant-funded independent audit, and never independently examining whether the administrative process that produced 100% denial of an identifiable national group complied with due process

This case concerns Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny. The prosecution’s theory of the case was based solely on Petitioner’s estranged wife’s testimony. Her pretrial police interviews, along with other witnesses, were audio-recorded and supplied to the defense in substantially inaudible condition. The defense complained, and the trial court ordered the prosecution to provide written transcripts of their witnesses’ statements. The prosecutor represented the transcripts as everything comprehensible and known to him from the original tapes in the possession of his lead investigator. It was ultimately discovered that the detective who made the recordings, and manufactured the transcripts, had possessed perfectly audible recordings, and had suppressed material impeachment evidence through the insertion of false information, false pronouns, and omissions that were unnecessary and unjustified. |

1. Is the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in conflict with Brady v. Maryland, and its progeny, when the state court shifted to the defense, the duty to learn of favorable impeachment evidence in the possession of the prosecutor’s lead investigator?

2. Is the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in conflict with Brady v. Maryland, and its progeny, when the state court did a sufficiency of evidence test and failed to distinguish between the guilt and punishment phases of the trial concerning the materiality of the suppressed information?

(1)