This petition presents an issue of national and con- stitutional significance under the Military Selective Service Act, which requires men, but not women, to register with the Selective Service System, to be called upon to serve in the military if the President initiates a draft.

1. Standing: Whether the individual Plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitu- tion, established by allegations of a concrete and par- ticularized injury-in-fact; and whether the organiza- tional Plaintiff possesses standing by virtue of an 1n- jury to itself or through the injuries sustained by its members. Whether leave to amend the complaint should have been granted.

2. Justiciable: Whether this Court’s continued deference to Congress concerning the male-only regis- tration requirement of the Act 1s consistent with con- stitutional principles and judicial standards of review.

3. Constitutional: The paramount question is whether the male-only registration requirement is discrimination on the basis of sex and therefore a vio- lation of Petitioners’ Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.

In recent years, this Court has seen petitions where plaintiffs have asserted Takings Clause claims related to destructive law-enforcement activity. See Slaybaugh v. Rutherford County, 145 8S. Ct. 1959 (2025); Baker v. City of McKinney, 145 8S. Ct. 11 (2024); Lech v. Jackson, 141 8. Ct. 160 (2020). Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch have recognized that these cases “raise[] an important question that has divided the courts of appeals,” Baker, 1458. Ct. at 11, yet they felt it was a question that “would benefit from further percolation in the lower courts prior to this Court’s 1n- tervention.” Id. at 13. Since then, the Ninth Circuit has weighed in, and the Seventh Circuit has reaf- firmed its previous approach, adding to the doctrinal disarray in the lower courts.

The Questions Presented are:

1. Whether the government is exempt from liabil- ity under the Takings Clause when law enforcement officers intentionally destroy an innocent person’s property in the course of attempting to apprehend a fugitive.

2. Whether the doctrine of “public necessity” 1s an exception to the Takings Clause.

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), which criminalizes killing a person with intent to prevent them from telling authorities about a federal crime, necessarily involves murder, as the Third Circuit found, or whether it can also be committed through manslaughter, as the statute explicitly contemplates.

2. Even if § 1512(a)(1)(C) necessarily involves murder, whether charging and convicting someone of second-degree murder—which carries no mandatory minimum—but then sentencing them for first-degree murder—which carries mandatory life imprisonment—violates Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2018).

3. Whether a state or local jurisdiction’s chief prosecutor may delegate authority to apply for wiretaps under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seg. (Incorporated from petition for a writ of certiorari in James Perrin v. United States, No. 25A935, permanent case number pending)