Whether a physician who suffers network exclu- sion, contract loss, and practice-sale interference after exposing an unlawful Medi-Cal, kickback and market- domination scheme may seek federal relief under continuing-violation and concealment doctrines that toll the statute of limitations for those claims.

2. Anti-SLAPP and State Court Procedure

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, to strike all state-law claims without conducting the claim by claim analysis required by Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 (2016), and Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, 11 Cal. 5th 995 (2021), thereby extending anti-SLAPP protection to non-petitioning conduct.

3. Immunity and Jurisdictional Dismissal

Whether the Ninth Circuit misapplied Mishler v. Clift, 191 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 1999), by extending absolute quasi-judicial immunity to Medical Board members for ministerial acts—false communications to insurers made long after proceedings ended—and erred in ordering dismissal with prejudice of state-law contract claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment, contrary to Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District, 179 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1999)

(1) Is the United States’ promise to provide the Winnemucca Indian Colony, a_ federally recognized Tribe with lands held in trust established by an Executive Order and a separate legislative act, coupled with the government’s nearly exclusive statutory and regulatory control over the water on Indian lands, sufficient to entitle an Indian tribe to money damages when the United States breaches its fiduciary duty to protect the natural resources on those Indian lands?

(2) Did the Federal Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, err when it affirmed dismissal of the Winnemucca Indian Colony’s third claim for relief — Breach of Trust — Water?

(3) Can the Winnemucca Indian Colony state a cognizable claim for breach of trust against the United States in relation to BIA failure to prevent trespass and theft of natural resources by third parties, under the Winters doctrine and 25 C.F.R. § 152.22?

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause permits a State to permanently extin- guish recorded fee-simple title through a trust-and- estate proceeding resolved on summary judgment when the statutory vehicle and pleadings did not provide notice reasonably calculated to apprise deed holders that vested inter vivos title would be adjudicated and terminated, and when the deed holders were denied a meaningful opportunity to litigate quiet title before deprivation.

2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause is violated when a state court applies an unexpected and indefensible reworking of settled deed-construction principles—including the four-corners rule and the rule construing ambiguities against the erantor—to invalidate facially unconditional inter vivos deeds based on post-execution extrinsic statements attributed to a deceased grantor.

1. For the purposes of determining “clearly established” law under the qualified immunity analysis, does a Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging deprivations of due process arising out of the suggestiveness of a _ pretrial identification procedure require the same analysis as Fourth Amendment claims alleging unreasonable searches and seizures?

2. In a_ section 1983 action brought by a wrongfully convicted former prisoner, whose pretrial identification was accomplished by showing a rape and attempted murder victim three successive “six pack” photographic arrays,each of which depicted the plaintiff, over the course of a two-day period, did the Fifth Circuit panel improperly weigh evidence or judge witness credibility in favor of the moving party In granting summary judgment in Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claim challenging the suggestiveness of a pretrial identification procedure?

(1) Whether after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(2) If so, whether under the Bruen/Rahimi methodology, the Second Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant like Petitioner whose felony convictions are for non-violent offenses.

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