The New York City neighborhoods of SoHo and NoHo contain 1,636 lofts subject to a highly restrictive and outdated zoning designation limiting occupancy to City-certified artists. But few certified artists remain, leaving the mostly non-artist current residents bereft of qualified buyers. Residents seeking to transition to a standard residential zoning designation must obtain a conversion permit. But to apply for a permit, residents must pay more than $100 per square foot—hundreds of thousands of dollars per home—into a City-administered “Arts Fund.”

Residents challenged the fee as an unconstitutional permit condition. Under Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause limits the government’s power to demand property from permit applicants in exchange for approval. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2018), recognized that these limits extend to monetary demands. But the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply Nollan and Dolan. Conflicting with other state high courts, it held that a monetary demand triggers the unconstitutional conditions doctrine only where it is imposed in lieu of a dedication of real property.

The question presented 1s:

Does the protection the Takings Clause provides to land-use permit applicants encompass monetary demands beyond those imposed in lieu of a dedication of real property?

Whether Mr. Beasley was deprived of his fundamental constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process, and the Confrontational Clauses of the Sixth Amendment of an opportunity to present a complete defense, when the Government refused to immunize a crucial witness that it had no intent to prosecute, thereby improperly depriving Mr. Beasley of the crucial testimony.

Whether the admission of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of an uncharged count was so egregious as to render Mr. Beasley’s trial fundamentally unfair.

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1. Whether a state labor board’s ruling invall- dating a school district policy requiring parental no- tification when a student seeks to socially transition their gender violates parents’ Fourteenth Amend- ment right to direct the upbringing and care of their children.

2. Whether California’s system of permitting a state labor board to adjudicate disputes affecting constitutional rights, subject only to discretionary and highly deferential judicial review, satisfies pro- cedural due process.

3. Whether a state labor board exceeds its juris- diction by assessing the legality of a school board policy requiring that parents be notified when a stu- dent attempts to socially transition their gender.

1. Whether an indictment satisfies the Fifth and Sixth Amendments when it charges possession of a “machinegun” or “destructive device” un- der 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845 and 5861(d) when the in- dictment does not allege the facts necessary to bring these items within the statutory defini- tion of the crime.

2. Whether a court may uphold an invalid indict- ment on the ground that the defendant could have sought a bill of particulars, notwithstand- ing this Court’s settled rule that a bill of partic- ulars cannot save an invalid indictment.

3. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in summar- ily dismissing Petitioner’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge based on nothing more than erroneous circuit precedent and on which there are multiple circuit splits of authority on questions presently before this Court.

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits the government to seize cell phones under a warrant imposing a 120-day search deadline, take no steps to initiate a search for more than 200 days, and obtain an extension of time without disclosing to the magistrate that no review had begun.

2. Whether probable cause exists to search a residence for evidence of identity fraud based on a single, undated use of another person’s identifying information on a rental application, where the alleged victim was never contacted and the nexus between the offense and the premises rests solely on generalized training-and-experience testimony.

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1. Whether a state may impose or enforce attorney discipline through a proceeding that denies the respondent meaningful access to the tribunal and fails to establish jurisdiction on an accessible, testable record.

2. Whether a state may impose attorney discipline based on alleged speech without establishing jurisdiction and without testing that speech in an accessible adversarial proceeding.

3. Whether federal courts may decline to provide prospective relief from enforcement of a disciplinary judgment entered without jurisdiction and without an accessible adjudicative process, on grounds of judicial immunity or abstention.

II. LIST OF PARTIES

1. Margaret Jean Lowery, an Oklahoma licensed attorney only. | 2. Illinois Supreme Court and its Attorney Registration & Disciplinary

Commission.

III.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page

0 Title or Cover Page 1 I. Questions Presented 1 II. List of Parties 1

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18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) imposes a lifelong prohibition, punishable by up to 15 years’ imprisonment, on the possession of any firearm or ammunition, for any purpose, by “any person … who has been convicted in any court of … a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”

In light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), does § 922(g)(1) violate the Second Amendment, either on its face or as applied to Petitioner, a United States citizen who has no violent prior felony convictions?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner is Yasser Cruz, defendant-appellant below. Respondent is the United States of America. 1

Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.1, a two-level en- hancement applies when a defendant knowingly engages in the “distribution” of child pornography, and not its “mere solicitation.” The distribution enhancement also applies if the defendant aided, abetted, commanded, or induced the distribution.

The question presented is: Is a defendant’s request for child pornography from a minor “mere solicitation” and not “distribu- tion” if the defendant does not disseminate the child pornography to another person after he receives it?

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment as applied to an individual with a prior conviction for injury to an elderly person.

2. Whether, for Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1), courts can consider only the elements of a prior conviction—not the underlying conduct—when determining whether an analogous historical tradition supports permanent disarmament.