Whether Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), forecloses a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment that an individual has a right to refuse unwanted investigational drugs without incurring a penalty or losing a public benefit to which the individual is otherwise entitled. Question 2:

Whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act preempt states from conditioning employment in a state-licensed healthcare facility on an individual’s receipt of investigational drugs.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act permits federal habeas relief when a state prisoner proves that the state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or was “based on an _ unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To obtain a federal evidentiary hearing, a prisoner must show—subject to two exceptions not applicable here— that they exercised “diligence,” by making “a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, to investigate and pursue [their] claims in state court.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 485 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). The question presented is:

Whether, consistent with §§ 2254(d) and (e)(2), a federal court may deny an evidentiary hearing for lack of diligence and deny habeas relief for lack of evidence when the prisoner presented a colorable claim in state court and pursued available procedures to develop the claim’s factual basis, only for the state court to deny any opportunity for such development and then reject the claim because the prisoner “did not provide any evidence.” App. 77a.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Oath or affirma- tion,” as originally understood, required a witness with firsthand knowledge of the facts to swear an oath before the issuing magistrate.

Without ever addressing the oath requirement in its legal analysis, this Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), held that hearsay can satisfy the Warrant Clause. Jones abandoned the categorical guarantee the Founders embedded in the Fourth Amendment and set the Court on a course toward open-ended balancing, ig- noring the constitutional text, its original meaning, and a century and a half of contrary precedent.

The question presented is:

Whether this Court should overrule Jones and hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a witness with firsthand knowledge to swear an oath before a warrant can issue.

Last time this case was here, the Court held that Pennsylvania did not violate due process by exercising general personal jurisdiction over Norfolk Southern Railway based solely on its registration to do business in Pennsylvania, even though this suit has “no connec- tion to the Commonwealth.” See Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry., 600 U.S. 122, 1385 (2023); id. at 170 (Barrett, J., dissenting). The Court did not resolve “Norfolk South- ern’s alternative argument that Pennsylvania’s statu- tory scheme as applied here violates this Court’s dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,” with the major- ity noting that this issue “remains for consideration on remand.” /d. at 127 n.3. Concurring, Justice Alito ex- plained that registration-based jurisdiction likely vio- lates the dormant Commerce Clause in cases with no forum link. Id. at 160. On remand, the Pennsylvania courts summarily rejected Norfolk Southern’s Com- merce Clause arguments.

The question presented 1s:

Whether “Pennsylvania’s assertion of jurisdiction here—over an out-of-state company in a suit brought by an out-of-state plaintiff on claims wholly unrelated to Pennsylvania—violates” the Constitution, including the Commerce Clause. Id.

(1)

I. Whether an explicit breach of a Rule 11(¢)(1)(C) plea agreement can be excused or “cured” by surrounding advocacy or contextual “bookending,” in conflict with Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and the approaches of the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits?

II. Whether, in a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) case, the government satisfies its obligation to present a “united front” for the agreed cap when it affirmatively states to the court that it cannot oppose a higher sentence outside the agreement, thereby undermining the accept or reject structure of Rule 11(c)(1)(C)?

Il. Whether a court of appeals applying plain error review under Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), may deny relief for an explicit plea breach by pointing to aggravating facts and hypothesizing the same sentence would have been imposed, in conflict with Santobello’s holding that the remedy does not turn on whether the sentencing judge would have imposed the same term absent the breach?

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