1. Whether the Fifth Circuit followed the author- ity and mandate of Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 305 (20238).

2. Whether the jury was properly instructed on what constitutes “property,” under charging statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 13849, that is, whether the pattern instructions permitted the jury to return verdicts of sullty on the basis of the prohibitive right-to-control theory, rather than traditional property items, no- tions and interests, and whether the jury did so.

3. Whether the evidence of bank fraud and con- spiracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349, constituted an intan- cible right to control assets, as the element of property under these statutes, or constituted traditional prop- erty items, notions and interests.

4. Whether the Fifth Circuit followed the author- ity and mandate of Thompson v. United States, 504 U.S. 408 (2025).

5. Whether the jury was properly instructed, un- der charging statute, 18 U.S.C. §1005, on what con- stitutes “false statements,” that 1s, whether the pat- tern instructions permitted the jury to return verdicts of guilty on the elements of false statements that were misleading, only, and not false, and whether the jury did so.

6. Whether the false statements alleged in the Second Superseding Indictment (E.D. La. ECF No. 318), and presented at trial, constituted false state- ments, or only misleading statements, and found by

Is the MSPB “Adjudication” process as mandated to federal civilian employees who petition MSPB appeals and authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (9) - Judiciary and Judicial Procedure which only authorizes 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) and (d) while omitting 5 U.S. C. § 7708 (c) systemically and illegally limiting, inhibiting, denying, restraining, abridging and\or depriving federal em- ployees of their rights, privileges, immunities, assur- ances and\or protections of established laws and prec- edents including their US Constitutional rights, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in departure from Marchant v. Pa. R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894) where a litigant had the benefit of a full and fair trial or de- priving federal civilian employees subjected to the MSPB process of; life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or otherwise denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws as established in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884), Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884) by extinguishing and denying the Federal Circuit’s the ability to review MSPB cases de novo ?

1. Whether a recidivism statute is unconstitutional under the Due Process and Jury Clauses if it authorizes a sentencing enhancement based on nonjury findings of facts not alleged in the charging document upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence?

2. Whether a statute imposing on all convicted felons a lifetime ban on possession of a firearm or ammunition violates the Second Amendment?

1

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anyone who has been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment either facially or as applied to individuals with prior convictions for offenses that did not result in disarmament in the Founding era.

1. Did the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s suppression ruling violate the party presentation principle, because the court reached a dispositive issue the government waived on appeal and applied a legal theory the government disclaimed in the district court?

2. Whether the Fourth Amendment allows the police to prolong a traffic stop by asking investigatory questions for a de minimis period, notwithstanding Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)?

1

The Hobbs Act robbery statute makes it illegal to interfere with interstate commerce by threats or violence. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. In United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), this Court held that, under the categorical approach, a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) did not qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of a mandatory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). However, the Court left for another day the question of whether completed Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) qualified as a crime of violence for purposes of a mandatory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Under the categorical approach, this Court looks to the least culpable conduct under a given statute to determine whether the offense qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

The Question Presented here is:

Given that a violation of the Hobbs Act robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), can be committed merely by threatening to take intangible rights such as a stock option, or the right to conduct business, by causing a victim to simply “fear” a financial loss—but not “physical violence”— and such an offense does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, is completed Hobbs Act robbery a crime of violence, under the categorical approach, for purposes of a mandatory sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)?

1

Federal law bans the possession of firearms by anyone who has ever been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1). How should courts decide whether an individual prosecution or conviction under that statute 1s consistent with the Second Amendment to the Constitution?

Under the prevailing interpretation of the nexus-with-commerce element of the federal possession ban, a former felon possesses “in or affecting commerce” a firearm if the firearm was made in another state. Does Congress have the constitutional authority to enact such a law?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Petitioner is Terry Dee Hensley, an individual, who was Defendant-Appellant below. Respondent is the United States of America, who was Plaintiff-Appellee below. DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS United States v. Hensley, No. 4:24-cr-43 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2024) United States v. Hensley, No. 24-10509 (5th Cir. Jan. 18, 2026) in