I. Whether a state court violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by entering judgment of eviction against the landowner without a trial or evidentiary hearing?

II. Whether a state court violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by refusing to disqualify the same judge who was the decision maker in the prior trespass case with the same parties, same request for possession not granted in the lst case?

II]. Whether a _ state court violates the Fundamental Right to Contract Underthe Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth and the U.S. Constitution Contract Clause by ordering Petitioner to be evicted from his own home and farm which he never contracted away to Respondent?

IV. Whether a state court violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by ruling contrary to the binding law?

V. Whether a state court enabled a RICO! scheme of Respondent’s taking of Petitioner’s home and farm without paying for it when it issued judgment of possession to someone who has no transfer deed in his name and has not paid for the property?

1 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 96 i

Congress has long provided that a patent may be held invalid at any point during its term, including when the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) de- termines that the patent should not have been issued in the first place—that is, that it never met the re- quirements for patentability. In the America Invents Act, Congress created inter partes review to enable third parties to petition the PTO to adjudicate the va- lidity of, and potentially cancel, a patent.

The PTO recently announced that a patent owner acquires “settled expectations” in a patent when that patent has been in force for six years—regardless of whether it is invalid—and, further, that such “settled expectations” provide a justification for refusing to in- stitute inter partes review and therefore refusing to adjudicate whether the patent is invalid.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the PTO lacks statutory authority to deny institution based on “settled expectations” where the patent statutes allow for administrative review at any time during the life of a patent.

2. Whether courts have power to review a PTO de- cision denying inter partes review on grounds that are contrary to statute.

In 1878, the State of California (“State”) enacted legislation, 1878 Cal. Stat. ch. 851 (1878 Act’), au- thorizing Serranus Clinton Hastings (°S.C. Has- tings”), the State’s first Chief Justice, to found and es- tablish a public college of law (“College”) “upon the condition” that he pay the State $100,000. App. 72a— 74a. The 1878 Act represented that the College would “forever” be known as “Hastings College of the Law” and that one seat on its Board of Directors (“Board”) shall “always” be reserved for 8.C. Hastings’ heirs and representatives. App. 72a. S.C. Hastings paid the State $100,000 and founded and established the Col- lege. App. 62a.

In 2022, the State enacted Assembly Bill 1936 (“AB 19386”), which “finds and declares,” inter alia, that 8.C. Hastings “promoted and financed” the mas- sacre of Native Americans in the 1850s, removes “Hastings” from the College’s name to atone for the “crimes of the past,” and eliminates 8.C. Hastings’ heirs and representatives’ entitlement to a Board seat. App. 60a—72a.

This case presents the following two questions:

Whether a state law that requires a specified name and governance structure for a public college and is enacted in exchange for payment of a specified sum creates binding contractual obligations on the part of that state subject to the protections of the Con- tract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Whether state legislation posthumously declaring an individual as having engaged in criminal conduct and, on that basis, stripping benefits secured by state law for that individual and his descendants violates the Bill of Attainder Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

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1. Whether the Due Process Clause permits imposition of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)’s mandatory “results in death/serious physical injury” sentencing enhancement — cquivalent in severity to homicide punishment — absent proof that the defendant acted with at least recklessness as to the risk of death/serious physical injury. .

2. Whcther the Due Process Clause permits the “but for” causation for death/serious physical injury under 21 U.S.C. 841 (b) (1) (C) to be established without proof that the substance charged in the Indictment (Fentanyl) was the cause of the serious physical injury or, in the case of death, without proof that such substance caused death absent being combined with other substances.

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