Whether a district court may dismiss as moot an appeal from a bankruptcy court’s denial of a stay © pending appeal when the bankruptcy court’s underlying order both remanded state-court litigation and modified the automatic stay to permit that htigation to proceed to final judgment. ,

Q) |

In Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496 (2015), this Court held that a bankruptcy order is final when it definitively resolves a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy case. In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35 (2020), this Court applied that rule to automatic-stay litigation, holding that such ltigation constitutes a discrete procedural unit whose resolution yields a final, immediately appealable order.

In the proceedings below, the bankruptcy court denied motions for protective relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), holding that its prior remand order permitted Qi) entry and docketing of a state-court judgment affecting estate property and (i) continuation of

appellate proceedings against the debtor. The district court dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the bankruptcy court’s orders were not final and, in one instance, that the appeal was moot after judgment was entered. The court of | appeals affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court’s orders did not “definitively dispose of discrete disputes.”

The question presented is:

Whether a bankruptcy court order conclusively determining the scope of the automatic stay is a final order appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § | : 158(a)(1), or may ~be~- rendered __ effectively unreviewable through the combined application of non-finality and mootness doctrines.

(i) |

Where the Lower Court Judge ruled in erred in Leslie Sanders vs. City of Long Beach by not allowing substantial evidence to be enter in court by the plaintiffs that was logged and filed, that could dispute the defendant’s : | knowledge of a dangerous and negligence condition, inconsistent statements from the substantial credible witness, violating our 5th, 6th and 14th Constitutional Amendments under Due Process, the judge ruled the plaintiffs could not use that evidence to impeach the witness for falsities, depriving the plaintiffs from cross examination and confrontation of the individual that provided the defendants hearsay statements that was not under oath. Judicial Biased by the Judge Kim, commenting throughout the proceeding how the | defendants were the only one with truthful, credible, knowledgeable with confident testimony, lastly the blatant departure from established uniformity of U.S. precedent laws and state laws and Federal rule of evidence. Under what circumstances do the plaintiffs have justice and equality under the rule of law | after these substantial procedural issues and violations that present an | important question of Federal Law and protected rights.

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In 2018, Congress removed hemp from the Con- trolled Substances Act and placed it into the stream of lawful interstate commerce. Now-legal hemp and ille- gal marijuana derive from the same plant and produce the same odor; no K9 or field test can tell them apart. In this case, a police K9 trained to detect cannabis (in all its forms, legal and illegal) alerted to petitioner’s vehicle, prompting a search that spawned no drug-re- lated charges. But the search revealed a firearm, which the Government convicted the petitioner of pos- sessing under 18 U.S.C.§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed that conviction, holding that the dog alert supplied probable cause for the ve- hicle search and that petitioner had failed to meet his burden to prove otherwise.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a drug-detection dog’s alert to cannabis— a substance that encompasses both legal hemp and 1l- legal marljuana—provides probable cause to conduct a warrantless vehicle search when the alert may sig- nal more than “the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983); see also Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).

The court of appeals declined to decide whether Petitioner’s traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). Instead, it held that suppression was unnecessary because the evidence would inevitably have been discovered in a later inventory search, even though no impoundment or inventory process had begun, and the district court’s oral ruling did not address active pursuit. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the inevitable-discovery doctrine permits admission of evidence based on discretionary, hypothetical future conduct rather than _ objective, contemporaneous proof that lawful discovery was already underway at the time of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation.

2. Whether the Government satisfies the inevitable-discovery’s “active pursuit” requirement—where no impoundment or inventory process had begun—the asserted lawful path depended on officer-created exceptions rather than standardized policy.

3. Whether a court may decline to decide whether a traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged under Rodriguez by invoking inevitable discovery based on a post hoc inventory-search theory.

When a sentencing court considers imposing a term of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 8583(c) stipulates which factors the court may weigh, while U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(c) generally discourages applying supervised release to deportable aliens. Petitioner Jose Antonio Ibarra-Vasquez is a deportable alien who has been given a sentence which includes supervised release. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit affirmed without requiring individualized findings, holding that even if the district court plainly violated § 3583(c) and § 5D1.1(c), relief was unavailable under plain- error review, effectively insulating this recurring statutory violation from appellate correction. Courts of appeals have articulated differing approaches to how 18 U.S.C. § 3588(c) and U.S.8.G. § 5D1.1(c) operate when sentencing deportable defendants. Therefore, the question presented is as follows:

May a district court impose a term of supervised release on a deportable defendant without making the individualized finding contemplated by 18 U.S.C. § 35838(c) and U.S.8.G. § 5D1.1(c)?

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1. Whether the state court violated the Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency when it refused to consider a study that demonstrated that Duval County’s death qualification procedures and the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges disproportionally excluded nonwhite jurors from his jury.

2. Whether the state court violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment’s right to due process in denying him an opportunity to be heard on his Eighth Amendment postconviction claim.

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