California requires physicians to complete 50 hours of Continuing Medical Education (CME) every two years as a condition of maintaining their medical h- censes. In 2022, the State began requiring that every CME course—even highly technical instruction on subjects such as retinal tumors—address implicit bias and its role in producing disparities 1n healthcare.

Petitioners—an ophthalmologist who teaches CME courses and a professional association whose mem- bers develop and teach accredited CME programs— challenged this mandate as compelled speech in viola- tion of the First Amendment. Because CME courses are produced and delivered by private actors, Califor- nia cannot require them to convey the State’s message on a controversial subject.

The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that CME courses constitute government speech based on the State’s ex- tensive regulation of the medical field—even though the State does not create, review, or edit the content of CME courses. In one of two three-judge dissents from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge VanDyke warned that the decision puts the Ninth Circuit “out of step with the precedent of the Supreme Court” and its “sister circuits.”

The question presented 1s:

Whether private instruction in courses required for state licensure constitutes government speech.

Owners of agriculturally zoned land in Marin County, California, may lawfully build a single-family residence on their property. But the County refuses to issue a residential building permit unless the landowner records a restrictive covenant limiting ownership to commercial farmers who actively and directly farm the land. The covenant runs with the land in perpetuity, binding all future owners. The California Court of Appeal upheld the requirements, finding that forcing property owners to be commercial farmers furthers the County’s goal of “maintain[ing] agriculture as a viable industry.” The questions presented are:

1. Whether Marin County may, under its power to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, compel private landowners to enter and permanently remain in a_— government-chosen occupation as a condition of a residential development permit?

2. Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—which protects the fundamental right to “engage in any of the common occupations of life,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)—also encompasses the fundamental right not to be forced into an occupation of the government’s choosing?

600 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 344-4000

Kan M. Nawaday VENABLE LLP

151 West 42nd Street New York, NY 10036 (212) 8307-5500 Counsel for Petitioner White Knight Broadcasting, Inc.

a. Whether the Bruen analysis permits consideration of whether a class of persons is among “the people” prior to the Second Step in which the government bears the burden to demonstrate a historical tradition that would permit disarming that class.

b. Whether the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation permits the permanent disarmament of all illegal aliens based on their perceived lack of loyalty to the United States.

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interpretation of its own regulation only if, after exhausting all traditional tools of construction, the regulation remains “genuinely ambiguous.” The circuits are divided on the methodology for making that threshold determination. The question presented 1s:

Whether a court of appeals correctly applies Kisor when it

finds a term “genuinely ambiguous” based on a multiplicity

of dictionary definitions alone, or by invoking the

regulation’s purpose to introduce rather than resolve

ambiguity.

1. Whether the statutory gatekeeping function assigned to the courts of appeals | under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) is satisfied when the court issues a rubber-stamp denial that does not address any of the criteria Congress requires for authorizing a successive habeas petition.

2. Whether, after Counterman v. Colorado, the First Amendment requires the | Government to prove that a defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) had a subjective intent to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, rather than allowing conviction under an objective | “reasonable person’ standard.

3. Whether due process permits a § 2422(b) conviction based on ambiguous online speech that does not clearly establish either the defendant’s subjective intentora =. violation of the elements needed to convict.

it -

Three substantial questions of federal law are presented, each requiring construction of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520, incorporating by reference Secs. 2511 and 2515, in particular that this federal law preempts state judicial rules in conflict with it, as follows:

A. Whether Messrs. Lucero and Vos, nonresidents of Texas, can be dismissed by the Texas court for lack of personal jurisdiction, when nationwide jurisdiction is necessarily implied or the Wiretap Act’s remedy is vitiated;

B. Whether the Fifth Amendment’s minimum contacts test, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment’s, applies to defendants sued in state court in a federal question case, specifically Lucero and Vos, in this case, for their violations of the Wiretap Act:

C. Whether Mr. Bankston’s affirmative defense of statute of limitations can imply the same time limit to service of process, when no limitation on time of service is expressed in the Wiretap Act, nor even in any published state court rule; and whether the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act, which is the basis for that and other defenses raised by Mr. Bankston but not decided on appeal, is preempted in its entirety.

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I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) 1s constitutional in all its applications or is it subject to as-applied challenges?

II. If as-applied challenges are prohibited, 1s 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) facially invalid because it violates the Due Process Clause and is substantially overbroad?

III. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately states the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines?

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1. Was the lack of contention by the direct appeal council of the Petitioner’s right to a speedy trial violated given the significant delay between his arrest and the commencement of the trial, contrary to the principals, ways, and means outlined in the speedy trial act and relevant state laws, thus infringing upon his rights guaranteed by the constitution?

2. Did the lack of contention by the direct appeal council of the addition of a new charge of Sexual Abuse of a Minor six business days before trial violate the Petitioner’s right to adequate notice and preparation time, thus infringing upon his due process rights guaranteed by the constitution and speedy trial act.

3. Was the petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel during trial when the attorney refused to authorize funding for DNA testing on evidence that could have been pivotal to the defense and failed to challenge the credibility of witnesses who admitted to providing false testimony, thus infringing upon his due process rights guaranteed by the constitution?

4. Did the Appellate attorney association with the same public defendev’s office which represented the Petitioner during a conflict of interest at trial constitute ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, thus infringing upon rights guaranteed by the constitution?

5. Did the Wyoming courts err in failing to address the conflict of interest arising from the same public defender’s office representing both the Petitioner and a key witness, AG and Brandy Blaylock who testified against the petitioner during trial, thus infringing upon his rights guaranteed by the constitution?

6. Did the District Attorney’s reliance on discredited testimony compromise fairness of the trial, thus infringing upon his rights guaranteed by the constitution?