The act-of-state doctrine “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power com- mitted within its own territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). In Sab- batino, this Court held that doctrine barred U.S. courts from examining the validity of a Cuban govern- ment instrumentality’s claim to funds held in escrow in New York, even though they were attributable to the sale of sugar allegedly expropriated in violation of international law. Id. at 401-407, 428. According to the Court, the fact that the expropriated sugar’s sale pro- ceeds were “brought into this country” did not provide a basis for a U.S. “[j]udicial determination[] of invalid- ity of [the Cuban government’s] title.” Id. at 431.

In response to Sabbatino, Congress enacted the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment,” which bars a court from applying the act-of-state doctrine “in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state * * * based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking * ** by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law.” 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). That provision “permit[s] adjudication of claims the Sabbatino decision had avoided.” Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U.S. 115, 121 (2025) (citation omitted).

The question presented is:

Whether a claim for damages as compensation for a foreign taking of property triggers 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)’s exception to the act-of-state doctrine where neither the expropriated property nor any prop- erty exchanged for it has entered the United States.

(I)

1. Whether the 1976 amendment to 5 U.S.C. § 702 provides a standalone or categorical waiver of sovereign immunity for all actions seeking non-monetary relief—as held by the D.C., Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits—or whether that waiver is identified as adhering to a “narrow waiver” view conditioned upon the “agency action” and “finality” requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 704, as held by the First, Fourth, and Federal Circuits?

2. Whether the Federal Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), or the Administrative Procedure Act’s finality requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 704, bars a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement religious challenge to an agency mandate that forces a party to choose between violating sincerely held religious beliefs or incurring significant financial penalties for non-compliance as a “substantial burden” under RFRA?

3. Whether a Court of Appeals abdicates its “independent judgment” duty under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) and the “shall” mandate in 5 U.S.C. § 706 when it employs “Black Box” (8th Cir. R. 47B) summary procedures to bypass de novo review of novel questions or determination of a statute’s best reading of 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (“PRA”) & federal sovereign immunity waivers under 0 U.S.C. § 702, particularly where those laws intersect with the First Amendment and RFRA?

Petitioner Richard C. Trahant is state court co-counsel of record for certain sexual abuse claimants appearing as creditors of the debtor in bankruptcy, The Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, in this Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. Acting sua sponte and without notice or a hearing, the bankruptcy court entered an order finding petitioner in contempt for allegedly violating a protective order, reserving the assessment of “appropriate sanctions” for a hearing at a later date. The court of appeal affirmed the district court judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s contempt order, rejecting petitioner’s defense of lack of procedural due process for the stated reason that the bankruptcy court allegedly “did not sanction” petitioner’s conduct at the time of the contempt order.

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS:

Does the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Consti- tution require notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court may enter a finding of contempt against a person, where the court reserves assessment of monetary sanctions for a later proceeding?

Whether footnote 9 of NYSARPA v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) , creates a presumption of constitutionality for a shall-issue licensing regime’s firearms training mandate that relieves the government of its burden to justify that requirement under M#ruen’s historical- tradition test.

_j-

I. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) comports with the Second Amendment?

Il. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

1

1