Rule (60)? 5.If the decision from the court is egregiously wrong and discriminatory, whether the whole court can be challenged besides Rule (60)?

6.Whether to revoke the decision from Ninth Circuit over petition for rehearing en banc on March 17, 2025? 7.Whether the people can choose and follow the opinion of the judges of their own people? ,

Petitioner pleaded guilty to committing an assault on a private res- idence located on an Indian reservation in Indian country, 1n violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1138(b)(8) & 11538. Although his plea agreement con- tained a waiver of his right to appeal his conviction, petitioner ap- pealed to the Ninth Circuit, contending that his guilty plea and, thus, also his plea agreement (including the appellate waiver provision) were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because petitioner erroneously was led to believe that he was guilty of violating §§ 1138(b)(8) & 1158 merely because his assault occurred anywhere in Indian country as op- posed to occurring at a specific location in Indian country within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Pe- titioner alternatively contended that the appellate waiver was unen- forceable because petitioner was actually innocent of the assault, as it unquestionably did not occur within the “special maritime and territo- rial jurisdiction of the United States,” an essential element of §§ 1138(b)(8) & 1158.

In view of the foregoing, the questions presented are: I. Whether, in view of Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629 (2022), “Indian country’ in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151 & 1153 is no longer coterminous with the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” II. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred by ruling that petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent when the record clearly reveals that petitioner erroneously was led to believe that he was guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 118(b)(8) & 1153 merely because his assault occurred in Indian country generally as opposed to occurring at a spe- cific location in Indian country within the “special maritime and terr1- torial jurisdiction of the United States.” III. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred by concluding that petitioner’s actual innocence of the charge under 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(b)(8) & 1153 is not an exception to the general rule requiring enforcement of a waiver- of-appeal provision in a plea agreement.

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Petitioner Michael Williams was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery; Hobbs Act Robbery; and use and discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of §924(c).

The jury returned a general verdict which did not identify the theory of liability upon which the verdict rested. Williams therefore contends that his §924(c) conviction must be reversed if any of the predicates is an invalid predicate crime of violence. Alternatively, he contends that each of the three potential predicates (conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery, Hobbs Act Robbery as a principal, and Hobbs Act Robbery under a Pinkerton theory) are invalid predicate crimes of violence.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether Hobbs Act Robbery under a Pinkerton theory is not a predicate crime of violence under §924(c) because Pinkerton requires only a negligence standard of reasonable foreseeability, and this Court has held that a crime of violence requires a greater mens rea than negligence.

2. Whether Hobbs Act Robbery is not a predicate crime of violence under §924(c) because it does not categorically require the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

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