Petitioner is a state prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief attacking an Executive Agreement regarding his physical custody in Oklahoma. Thus, he proceeded under the general habeas corpus statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, rather than 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which deals with state prisoners attacking their underlying criminal convictions and sentences.

However, the Tenth Circuit held that the limitations period of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 applies to petitions filed under 2241. There is a circuit split on this issue, with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits holding that the limitations period of 2244 does apply to 2241 petitions; and the Seventh Circuit concluding the opposite.

This Court recently decided Bowe v. United States, No. 24-5438 (U.S., January 9, 2026), holding that certiorari provisions of 2244 do not apply to 2255 petitions. The question presented 1s:

Does the limitations provision of 2244 apply to 2241 petitions, and can the holding of the Tenth Circuit and the majority of circuits deciding the issue be squared with the legal framework of this Court’s decision in Bowe concerning statutory construction and congressional intent?

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The Fourth Amendment demands that warrants outline with sufficient particularity that which is to be seized and searched and also ordinarily prohibits warrantless seizures and searches. Here, law enforce- ment first obtained a John Doe DNA Warrant and Complaint that only included reference to genetic markers that are common to all humans, and failed to attach or reference an actual DNA profile. Decades later, after obtaining a possible DNA match based on Peti- tioner’s mother having provided her DNA to a private DNA genealogy company, police without a warrant obtained DNA from trash items outside Petitioner’s home. Without a warrant, police then extracted the DNA and created a DNA profile. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in a published decision, determined that the Doe DNA Warrant and Complaint’s inclusion of generic markers common to all humans was sufficiently specific and particular and that no warrant was needed to extract and profile DNA obtained without a warrant. Both of these determinations are constitutionally unsound and present issues of first impression to this Court—issues that are likely to repeatedly occur in light of DNA advancements.

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE:

1. Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits, under the specificity and particularity requirements, a John Doe DNA Complaint and Warrant that do not include a DNA profile, and include only genetic markers common to all humans;

2. Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search, seizure, and extraction of DNA and the creation of DNA profiles from.

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Introduction.

The Court in Rutledge v. United States, held that the “in concert” element of a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) under 21 U.S.C. § 848 “signifies mutual agreement in a common plan or enterprise” which “requires proof of a conspiracy that would also violate [21 U.S.C.] § 846” and “conspiracy as defined in § 846 does not define a different offense from the CCE offense defined in § 848.” 517 U.S. 292, 300 (1996). Therefore, a § 846 conspiracy is a lesser included offense of a § 848 CCE. Id. Rutledge noted that to convict a defendant of a CCE under § 848, “the defendant must … commit a series of substantive violations.” Id. at 298 n.7. Subsection 848(c) requires that “a continuing series of violations [must be] … undertaken by [the defendant] in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom [the defendant] occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management.” 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A).

The question presented here is:

Can each of the controlled substance act violations that make up “a continuing series of violations” in a CCE prosecution pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) rest on a finding that the defendant and five or more other persons were part of an agreement to commit the continuing series of violations?

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