Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, consistent with this Court’s precedents in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), and Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), prohibits a State from conditioning an individual’s right to work in a licensed profession upon being injected with an investigational drug and waiving the right to seek judicial remedies for resulting injuries.

601 West Riverside Ave., Suite 810 Spokane, WA 99201-1099 Attorneys for Petitioner

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the fundamental right to keep and bear arms. Although the Second Amendment right is not unlimited, courts must not treat the right as a “second-class right.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 70 (2022) (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010)). Where a citizen has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of more than one year of imprisonment, Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) imposes a permanent ban on the citizen’s right to possess any firearm that previously traveled in interstate commerce even where the possession was in relation to self-defense, a “central component” of the Second Amendment right. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008). This Court should resolve the unsettled and widely disputed question of whether § 922(g)(1) violates the people’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. It should hold this Petition pending resolution of any merits cases involving the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) or other similar regulations that restrict the people’s right to keep and bear arms.

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**H ow can trial Court grant motion in limine for past bad acts ,when there’s no evidence that ties Petitioner to those injuries;only.,that injuries merely happened to H.W.

*Commonwealth intentionally used:fdbricated, doctored false evidence(screenshot embedded in text

__ messages rather than (2) videos) bat motion in limine and at trial.

| 44How can Commonwealth use an inter student from Eastern Virginia Medical School as an expert.

_ Commonwealth blind-sided Petitioner with testimony of a witness (Robert ’’Nicholson”), when he

: was never.informed of their intentions to call him as a witness.He was bias and had aclear conf lict/ “Financial interest to testify in bad faith to avoid civil liability. |

*tHow can Commonwealth present known false evidence, and known perjury by a co-defendant; testify- ing that she did’nt know medical; and did’nt receive payment/leniency for her testimony ,which were both lies.

*sxCommonwealth and trial Court illogically claimed Petitioner held H.W. down in porcerlain bathtub; she had burns to her back and buttocks , which would be impossible for her to burn, as those body parts would be suctioned to the porcerlain bottom without a grip pad in the bathtub.

*Norfolk EMT Julie (“Hughes”) claimed to have administered Midazolam Hydrochloride(Versed)-a barbiturate, benzodiazepine, sedative,and anti-seizure medication.However, Toxicologist ,Connie (”‘Luckie’’) said the medication was not detected in H.W. ’s body and would have been present.

“Norfolk EMT’s failed to administer the medication, and failed to intubate H.W. ;creating Acute Hypoxic Ischemic Changes to her brain. Petitioner did’nt cause this Hypoxia to her brain. City of Norfolk is responsible for H.W. ’s death. Had they intubated, she would bel alive today.

#%Nicholson and employees failed to maintain hot water heater ina safe manner, which violated the International , United States, and Virginia applicable Plumbing Codes. The water exceeded the maximum safe temperatures of 120°F. The water heater in Petitioner’s home did not have a stop-Limit device at the heater or subject water faucet. If it did, it would have been impossible for H.W. to have received her second degree scald burns.

Ms a result, Virginia Natural Gas@Va. Nat. Gas”) ,Ci ty of Norfolk, and Sandy Beach Apartments owner, Nicholson, are responsible for H.W. ’s burns;by removing the ’’Red Tag” without performing proper inspection for compliance;replacing the gas valve without pulling a permit;and by not adding stop-Limit device, allowed unforeseeable and illegal temperatures to soar above 130°F and 134°F.

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ISSUE 1: This court should vacate petitioner’s Count 4 and 6 convictions for lack of jurisdiction because the Taylor decision explicitly abrogated St. Hubert’s “realistic probability” analysis, and the Eleventh Circuit pattern Hobbs Act robbery instruction confirms Hobbs Act robbery 18s categorically overbroad and not a §924(c) “crime of violence, where the Government concedes, Taylor abrogated St. Hubert’s “realistic probability” methodology for the categorical approach and as confirmed by Jackson, Penn, and In Re Fluer, cannot control a categorical approach question under precedent and a pattern jury instruction it never considered; and, Taylor requires element to element matching and this Circuit’s Pattern Hobbs Act robbery instruction confirms that a Hobbs Act robbery conviction is categorically overbroad vis-a vis § 924(c)’s element’s clause; and, the other circuit post-Taylor decisions cited by the Government are inapposite and have no persuasive value.

A bankruptcy court’s decision to abstain is not reviewable, even “by the Supreme Court of the United States under section 1254.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). The Los Angeles County Public Guardian procedurally secured the result that the debtor must defend itself in state court once the bankruptcy court abstained and the federal courts were divested of power to protect the debtor.

The circuits are deeply divided on the scope of trustee authority under 11 U.S.C. § 323—an issue that became outcome-determinative here.

The result was an estate with no debt—after the trustee declared it was not administering any real property—nor any assets, because the trustee agreed to trade the $740,000 parcel of real property owned by petitioner to the Public Guardian in exchange for “$38,756.34 for Chapter 7 bankruptcy administrative expenses.” The Public Guardian’s private law firm secured roughly $190,000 from that deal—all processed after the case had been dismissed with prejudice.

That void judgment was appealed. The Public Guardian and the trustee secured dismissal © of the appeal by asserting that, under federal law, only the trustee could determine the outcome of this issue. Thus resolved not on merit but § 323 power—after abstention.

State review was cut off. Federal review was impossible.

Now a state case presents a clean Article III vehicle to review a federal issue—-one Congress otherwise made unreviewable through the federal courts—arising only because of the decision to abstain. The openly divided circuit courts may now be settled.

The question presented is:

Whether due process permits a state actor to secure federal abstention and assert exclusive

federal trustee power under “a case under this title” 11 U.S.C. § 323 to deny the Fourteenth

Amendment right to defend in state court.

1. Treating automobiles as per se instrumentalities of interstate commerce exceeds the outer limits of congressional commerce power and obliterates the distinction between what is national and what is local.

2. Since there is no federal common law concerning property rights, the Court should consider Georgia law demonstrating that Glynn County did not accept the dedication for public use of neighborhood streets. That law, coupled with the evidence presented by the government, establishes that Glynn County did not provide or administer the neighborhood streets.

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