1. Whether the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901-21145, creates federal rights enforceable by private litigants through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or otherwise, a question that has deeply divided the federal courts of appeals and resulted in a state-by-state checkerboard of HAVA election law enforcement.

2. Whether a state’s total deprivation of HAVA- mandated administrative procedures, hearings, and remedies constitutes a concrete Article III injury-in- fact, or whether such a deprivation is merely a bare procedural violation that precludes federal judicial review of state election administration.

1. Whether Arkansas’ terroristic threatening in the first-degree statute is divisible and can qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

2. Whether Arkansas’ battery in the second-degree statute is divisible and can qualify asa violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.

3. Whether Arkansas’ residential burglary statute, which includes burglary of a “vehicle in which any person lives,” matches the definition of generic burglary to qualify is an enumerated violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. |

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ee Whether ad Plo Se Hit gel Who hes filed @ Second itt ime AB US Oe AASY petition. that i$ based on Q@ Condtitvtone . …. lClain That did not become Fite any earlie® than after. tthe 0.d\ydication of. Petitioners first. QASY Petition iS oo Hequifed to Seek fliot, Authorization To file @ Second ov —- – .- Successive. petition Under 29 V.5-C, AAT When the highest _ State Court. has denied. @ Hobess Corpus petition in part a. _— _. _ lGfanted a Petition in port Moking Some Claims Lipe for ae Federal _fel; ef &. Others . Subject to the exhaustion lequilenent 2 ee fla Which Claims…do_not_aneet the. Cequitements. of @ purnissible

i -.. —–|Second_or. SuCCeSSiVe__2254_petition under J U.S.C. Qa | _ Should_an. applicant filing @ petition in. this Unusvel . | __…____|poSture. be treated. ig the Same Mamer 5 @. pliSoner Whose _ habeas petition Was dismissed tof failure to. ekhaust..- _ [State temedies, 4. Who _thea_did exhaust. those Cemedies. IE Weturned to Federal Court? ILS it mescessovy thet Uarige Claims be dismissed din Federay__Court._fitSt fo_forlure fo. exhaust State . . es emedies fathe(_Thon, thou Sting. State_l emedies Sinvl taneous . __-|ly_While_eXheusted Claims Ate being put Sued in fedefal oo Court ee a Oe an

Did the district court violate 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Petitioner’s right to due process, by not recusing itself sua sponte for sentencing, where the district court was the direct victim of Petitioner’s obstructive conduct prior to sentencing?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS Petitioner (appellant in the court of appeals): Christopher John Badsey. Respondent (appellee in the court of appeals): The United States of America. LIST OF PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner was indicted in the Central District of California in United States v. Christopher John Badsey, Case No. 21-CR-00124-JLS, and charged with four (4) counts of wire fraud, and two (2) counts of money laundering under 18 U.S.C § 1957. He pled guilty to counts 1-4 and was sentenced to 87 months incarceration.

Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 23-765. Judgment was affirmed on October 9, 2025 (Dkt. 35.1), and Petitioner’s rehearing petition was denied on January 29, 2026. Dkt. 37.1. See Appx. at 6-7.

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This case arises from a motor vehicle collision involving a governmental entity, resulting in chronic

spinal injury, long-term functional impairment, and a subsequent federal disability determination of total disability. In the state proceedings, the trial court reduced damages and rejected much of the medical and functional limitation evidence, while the appellate courts affirmed without addressing (i) functional limitations documented by treating providers, (ii) federal disability statutes applicable to governmental defendants, or (iii) the probative value of a post-judgment federal disability determination.

The questions presented are:

1. Medical-Causation & Federal Disability Intersection

Whether a state court may discount or disregard medically supported functional limitations and disability findings connected to a tort-based physical injury—while simultaneously affirming reduced damages— without violating federal disability statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §

12101 et seq.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), and without conflicting with

this Court’s decisions recognizing the legal relevance of federal disability determinations and functional limitation evidence. | 2. Administrative Disability Determinations as Competent Evidence

| Whether a state court’s refusal to consider or give weight to Social Security Administration disability

determinations, corroborated by medical records, functional capacity evidence, and treating-provider

records, raises a substantial federal question concerning the status and evidentiary relevance of federal administrative disability findings in civil litigation, in conflict with this Court’s guidance in Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), and related disability jurisprudence. | 3. Procedural Fairness & Fourteenth Amendment Due Process | Whether affirming materially reduced damages in the presence of extensive unrefuted medical, | functional-limitation, and administrative disability evidencé—while precluding meaningful evidentiary | development regarding impairment and limitations—violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural | fairness guarantees by denying a full and fair opportunity to be heard on issues central to causation and damages. |

| LIST OF PARTIES :

When a defendant challenges a sentence imposed after revocation of his supervised release, most circuits apply the same “reasonableness” standard of review that would apply to an appeal of an initial sentence. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-68 (2005). But the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits set a higher burden: a revocation defendant must show that the sentence 1s unreasonable and that the error 1s plain under existing precedent.

Does the standard of review for revocation appeals require a separate demonstration of plainness?

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lands from any of the 50 Union States to the United States? 2). For what specific purpose(s) are those lands acquired by the United States through cession from the 50 Union States? 3). What was the intent of Article VI, clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution, as was written, understood, interpreted, and adopted by the Framers?

: 4). Is morality an actual and true enumerated power granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution, as was written and adopted by the Framers? 5). Does Congress possess any true, actual, delegated power and authority under the U.S. Constitution to create,: defime, legislate, enact, and punish issues of morality? 6). Was the imposition of Chapter 110, 18 USC, a valid and appropriate, or was it an invalid and inappropriate exercise of Congress’ true actual power confer- red by the U.S. Constitution? - 7). What are the only crimes that the U.S. Constitution had specifically enumer- ated and granted Congress the power and authority to legislate over and to pro- vide punishment for? | 8). Can an inferior legislative district court created by Congress under Article 1, section 8, clause 17 of the U.S..Constitution, sitting outside the realm of the District of Columbia, be Jegally conferred with criminal jurisdiction, or subject-matter jurisdiction? 9). Does the current interpretation of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper clauses by Congress, the Federal Government, and the inferior district courts comport with the original understanding, intent, interpretation, and purpose as was written and adopted by the Framers? The Petitioner states that the answers to these questions are not ‘rocket science’, but can be truly answered by adhering to the let- ter of the U.S. Constitution, and this Court’s sworn Oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution. |

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: adjudication of the case on their discretion, is that a violation of civil action 42 USC 1983. | | _ (=e) _ OS®

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In Hurst v. Florida, this Court found that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme—the one in existence at the time of Richard Knight’s trial—was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment because it required the trial judge, not the jury, to make the factual findings to allow the judge to sentence him to death. The Florida Supreme Court initially determined that Mr. Knight’s death sentences were unconstitutional under Hurst v. Florida. But the court found the error harmless based on factual determinations of its own, which it then transformed into a finding that the advisory jury seated in Mr. Knight’s trial, in fact, made the requisite findings based on its unanimous recommendations for death.

In Erlinger v. United States, this Court reaffirmed the jury’s paramount and exclusive role in factfinding under the Sixth Amendment when determining a criminal defendant’s sentencing exposure. When Mr. Knight brought his Erlinger-based challenge to the Florida Supreme Court, however, it decided that Erlinger did not apply to Mr. Knight’s case at all and relied on a revised construction of Florida’s capital sentencing statute that cemented the Florida Supreme Court’s intent to nullify this Court’s mandate in Hurst.

The Questions Presented are:

1. Whether, after this Court finds a state’s capital sentencing statute unconstitutional, the state’s high court may retroactively apply a revised construction of that statute to find no constitutional error in sentences imposed under the prior, unconstitutional construction.

2. Whether Erlinger v. United States allows findings beyond the fact of a prior conviction and the then-existing elements of that offense to be made by a judge, not a jury, ina capital sentencing proceeding if, as the Florida Supreme Court holds, those findings pertain to “selection,” rather than “eligibility,” for the death penalty.

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