1. In a use-of-force case which involves multiple instances of force, whether Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025) requires that each use-of-force be analyzed progressively from before the first instance of force used through the last instance of force used, considering the information known to the officer, the suspect’s prior actions (including any compliance, non-compliance, resistance, and reaching or grabbing for a weapon), and the suspect’s reactions to those prior use(s)-of-force, and, if so, whether Officer Moore and Kurtz violated Stephen Romero’s constitutional rights under this standard?

2. When analyzing a defendant law enforcement officer’s motion brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c), in a use-of-force case where body camera video clearly depicts the entire lead-up to and application of force by a law enforcement officer, whether the lower courts may analyze the clearly established law prong of qualified immunity at a more general, plaintiff- friendly, level than at the motion for summary judgment stage of litigation and, if not, whether Officer Moore and Officer Kurtz are entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case?

Time with each parent is allocated to children of divorce according to state statute listing some of the factors to be considered by courts. Colorado | Revised Statutes 14-10-124(1.5)(a)() — (XI). Similar factors are used in all 50 states. The list does not include evaluation standards for its various topics. This absence prompts questions of law. Does lack of objective criteria leave the factors so vague that they fail to give parents adequate notice of what must be done to receive equal parenting time? Should the | factors be struck down as unconstitutional for violating the Due Process provision of the 14th Amendment? Without specific standards, can the factors be dispositive? May a motion to modify parenting time be summarily denied for declining to recite the litany?

1

1. Whether a court may affirm an arbitration award after recognizing that it 1s unclear whether federal or state law governs the standard of review, but without resolving which law applies.

2. Whether a court may reject claims of arbitra- tor partiality and nondisclosure without applying the objective appearance-of-bias standard required by Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).

3. Whether due process permits affirmance where material information bearing on adjudicative neutrality appears on the record during the proceedings but is not addressed.

The Fourteenth Amendment forbids arbitrary and irrational executive action. In land-use cases, the courts of appeals apply materially different standards in deciding when allegedly unauthorized executive permitting may support substantive due process review.

The Second Circuit has recognized that land-use action tainted by “fundamental procedural irregularity,” including action taken without legal authority, may be sufficiently arbitrary to support a substantive due process claim. Cine SKS, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.8d 778, 789 (2d Cir. 2007). The Third Circuit, by contrast, requires conscience-shocking misconduct beyond even bad-faith violations of state law. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.8d 392, 394, 399-400 (8d Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Circuit generally forecloses substantive due process review of executive deprivations of state-created land-use rights altogether. Hillcrest Property, LLP v. Pasco Cnty., 915 F.8d 1292, 1297, 1299-1301 (11th Cir. 2019).

The Question Presented 1s:

Whether, and under what standard, local execu- tive officials’ issuance of land-use permits after a local board of zoning appeals has ruled the proposed use prohibited may support a claim of arbitrary executive action under the Fourteenth Amendment.

1. Whether a state court violates Title Il of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it denies or nullifies medically supported, time-limited disability accommodation requests and then proceeds to adjudicate dispositive motions and issue orders affecting property and jurisdiction while the disabled litigant lacks a meaningful ability to understand, respond, or participate in the proceedings.

In February 2026, the court’s ADA coordination process communicated that Petitioner’s accommodation request was denied on the ground that it would “prejudice the parties”—-a rationale not authorized under Title II of the ADA or governing access-to-court standards, which permit denial only upon a showing of fundamental alteration or undue burden.

This case further presents the question whether a state court acts without constitutional authority to adjudicate at all when Title II access-to-court obligations remain unresolved at the time dispositive power is exercised.

2. Whether a state court violates the Supremacy Clause when, after federal disability- access rights under Title II of the ADA have been properly invoked, it applies state procedural doctrines in a manner that effectively displaces federally required access standards.

| 2

Alvin Beasley was indicted, tried, and found guilty of being a felon unlawfully in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). That offense carried a statutory maximum sentence of 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2019).! But at sentencing, the Government sought to punish Beasley under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which subjects defendants to a 15-year mandatory minimum and a statutory maximum of life imprisonment if they have three prior convictions for violent felonies “committed on occasions different from one another.” § 924(e)(1). Although the Government failed to charge the ACCA enhancement in the indictment and never presented evidence on the issue to the jury, over Mr. Beasley’s objection the district court found for itself that Beasley qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment.

After Beasley’s sentencing, this Court decided Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), which held that a jury, rather than a judge, must decide whether ACCA-predicate offenses were committed on different occasions. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the district court violated Beasley’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Erlinger. Yet the court ultimately affirmed his sentence, finding the Erlinger error was harmless. 1 Congress amended § 924 in 2022, moving the penalty provision for violating § 922(g) from § 924(a)(2) to § 924(a)(8) and increasing the statutory maximum sentence from 10 years to 15 years. Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, sec. 12004, 136 Stat. 1313, 1829 (2022). Beasley’s case predates that change so all references to § 924 in this petition refer to the 2019 version in effect at the time of Beasley’s offense.

1

1. Whether the trial court may admit evidence of sexual assaults in order to prove that the defendant has the propensity to commit another sexual assault when the uncharged acts were intertwined with the charged conduct but not “inextricably intertwined” and not needed to tell the full story regarding the crimes?

2. Whether the general other acts model jury instruction was insufficient when a limiting instruction was read to the jury at the time two witnesses testified but not read to the jury at the time three other witnesses testified as to uncharged acts and only read to the jury as to one witness at the end of the case?

1

For years, Tennessee death-row prisoner Tony Carruthers—who was forced to represent himself at trial—has maintained his innocence and unsuccessfully sought DNA testing. He is now scheduled to be executed tomorrow, May 21, without full testing of available evidence.

Tennessee’s DNA Act of 2001, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-304 and -305— enacted years after Mr. Carruthers’s conviction—provides for mandatory or discretionary DNA testing on the application of a person convicted of a crime. After prior unsuccessful attempts to obtain testing, six weeks before his execution date, Mr. Carruthers petitioned again for DNA testing of key crime-scene evidence, including victims’ fingernail scrapings and cloth bindings used on victims. The testing would have taken two weeks to complete.

Seeking to comply with a 2025 Tennessee Supreme Court rule, which requires that “any state court collateral litigation that would potentially affect the… timing of’ a scheduled execution “must commence with the filing of a motion in” the state supreme court, Mr. Carruthers initially filed his petition for DNA testing in the Tennessee Supreme Court on April 9. Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 12.4(E). The Tennessee Supreme Court waited three weeks before issuing an order dismissing Mr. Carruthers’s petition for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Carruthers promptly re-filed his petition in the trial court, which took more than one week to deny his requests. He then appealed to the state’s Court of Criminal Appeals. The Tennessee Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction of that appeal, and so Mr. Carruthers returned where he had started five weeks earlier. The Tennessee Supreme Court then denied his

1

This case has been seriously flawed from the start. The State of Tennessee did not obtain Carruthers’s convictions and death sentences by producing compelling evidence of his guilt. To the contrary, its evidence, resting entirely on a patchwork of information obtained primarily from snitches, was flimsy. The State’s success at trial instead resulted from three troubling circumstances: (1) the unfair advantage it secured when the trial court stripped Carruthers of counsel and forced him to represent himself against capital charges on the ground that his challenging relationship with a series of appointed lawyers amounted to a forfeiture of his Sixth Amendment right (a ruling the prosecution took full advantage of); (2) the State’s misconduct in suppressing exculpatory and impeachment evidence and eliciting false testimony; and (3) the State’s emphasis on the narrative that the victims were buried alive to obtain the death penalty, a “fact” that subsequent investigation has proven to be a fiction.

Because of Carruthers’s forced self-representation, many trial errors escaped review entirely as waived. Due to the prosecution’s continued dissembling, the full picture of its evidentiary sleight of hand has yet to fully emerge. Nonetheless, new evidence that has trickled in over the years has dramatically undermined the flimsy evidence the State produced at trial. Yet, no court has conducted a hearing to assess the credibility of the new evidence or its impact on the validity of the verdicts.

The questions presented are: