In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979), this Court held that a state judge who participated in the execution of a search “allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party,’ and “was not acting as a judicial officer, but as an adjunct law enforcement officer.” The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply that principle to deny absolute immunity to judges who personally direct or supervise officers in conducting arrests. The Third Circuit below parted company with its sister circuits in refusing to withhold judicial immunity for actions indistinguishable from a sheriffs in directing Petitioner’s warrantless arrest 1n his home.

The question presented 1s:

Whether absolute judicial immunity bars a 42 U.S.C. § 19838 action against a state trial judge who personally directs and supervises police officers in conducting a warrantless arrest of a litigant inside the litigant’s home.

1

Respondent Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) relied on federal copyright law, and federal copyright law alone, to reject Petitioner Miranda Stovall’s Kentucky Open Records Act request for a copy of a survey it administered to her child. JCPS claimed that giving Mrs. Stovall a copy of the survey would violate Respondent NCS Pearson, Inc.’s copyright. However, under the Copyright Act, giving her that copy is a fair use, not copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.

This situation has arisen in other states. Plaintiffs have sued for access to documents withheld due to copyright under open records acts in state courts, including in Missouri, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. State courts in these four refused to decide whether the proposed copying was a fair use, citing federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over copyright questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1838(a).

So, Mrs. Stovall did the logical thing: she sued in federal court, in the Western District of Kentucky. The court held it lacked jurisdiction to answer her question. App.22a. She appealed, and the Sixth Circuit upheld the district court, holding that a state court can (and a federal court cannot) answer her question. App.8a—9a.

The Question Presented Is:

Whether federal courts must, or state courts may, decide whether it is a fair use, under the Copyright Act, to request and obtain a copyrighted document under state open records law.

Whether federal district courts may conscript counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 83006A, to represent a defendant at trial where the defendant: 1) has never asked for counsel and has made it clear through words and action that he does not want court-appointed counsel to represent him; 2) has refused all efforts of court-appointed counsel to meet and discuss the facts, possible defenses, potential consequences, and defendant’s procedural and constitutional rights at trial; and 3) has told court-appointed counsel nothing about the case that would enable the court-appointed counsel to provide the competent and effective representation that the court-appointed counsel is ethically and constitutionally bound to provide.

1

I. Whether the Due Process Clause and Title IT of the Americans with Disabilities Act permit a receiving State, after a federal district court has ordered that ADA access requirements apply to the underlying disciplinary proceedings and after the receiving State has been served with that order, to continue reciprocal discipline while treating the disabled attorney’s exclusion from meaningful participation as irrelevant to enforcement of the foreign judgment.

2. Whether the Due Process Clause permits a receiving State, after actual notice that a foreign disciplinary judgment lacks the constitutional predicates required by Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), including jurisdiction, meaningful ADA compliant access, due process, reliable attribution, and record integrity, to permit its disciplinary prosecutor to present that foreign judgment to the state supreme court as clean, uncontested, and self- proving without disclosing the known predicate defects.

3. Whether a state supreme court violates due process when, after express notice that a foreign disciplinary judgment lacks the constitutional predicates required for reciprocal enforcement and after notice of a federal ADA access order, it permits reciprocal discipline to proceed without first making an on the record determination that the foreign judgment is constitutionally enforceable, or whether the court instead has an independent supervisory duty to verify those predicates before any coercive effect may attach.

1