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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) requires courts to vacate judgments entered outside the issues pleaded. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254 (1891). The question here is whether the law-of-the-case doctrine permits a court to skip that determination.

The question presented is:

Whether Rule 60(b)(4) requires a court to

vacate a judgment that decides a matter

entirely outside the issues pled, and

prohibits a court from using the law of the

case doctrine to avoid making that

determination.

1. Whether a court may, consistent with the Constitution, resolve disputed issues of fact bearing on private property rights by weighing competing evidence and making factual findings in the course of granting summary judgment, without trial.

2. Whether such a practice 1s consistent with the Due Process Clause, the original understanding of the judicial power and the Seventh Amendment.

The country is in the midst of a circuit split as to the appropriate resolution of challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1). Three circuits have opened the door to individuals with prior felony convictions retaining their right to possess firearms despite their convictions. The Fifth Circuit would reject Congress’s authority to take away the rights of someone like Mr. Lewis. If Mr. Lewis had possessed a firearm in Texas, Louisiana, or Mississippi, his conviction would not stand, and he would not be in prison today. Unlike those other circuits, the Tenth Circuit openly rejects application of the Bruen analysis when a defendant challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

As ajuvenile, Mr. Lewis was adjudicated a delinquent and Oklahoma makes it a felony offense for someone with a prior juvenile delinquency adjudication to possess a firearm. He was later convicted on three counts of being in possession of a firearm following a juvenile delinquency adjudication. A year later, now with felony convictions, Mr. Lewis was convicted of being in possession of a firearm following a prior felony conviction. Mr. Lewis is a prohibited person by the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) because of these prior convictions.

In light of the circuit split, the question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢)(1) is constitutional as applied to a person whose prior qualifying felony convictions are for the possession of firearms following a juvenile delinquency adjudication and a subsequent conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

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(1) Whether after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(2) If so, whether under the Bruen/Rahimi methodology, the Second Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant like Petitioner given his unique set of prior criminal convictions.

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(1) Whether after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), a criminal defendant may raise an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(2) If so, whether under the Bruen/Rahimi methodology, the Second Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to a defendant like Petitioner whose felony convictions are for non-violent offenses.

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