The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) contains a one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) that begins when the judgment becomes final at “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. That limitations period is tolled when “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

In Jimenez v. Quarterman, this Court held that “where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal,” the limita- tions period is reset when that direct appeal proceeding ends (or the time to seek review expires). 555 U.S. 1138, 121 (2009) (emphasis added). But Jimenez did not address what happens when a state court denies a prisoner’s request to file an out-of-time direct appeal—or whether such a request counts as an application for collateral review that triggers tolling under § 2244(d)(2). Jd. at 120 n.4. This Court later elaborated on § 2244(d)(2) in Wall v. Kholi, explaining that “‘collateral review’ of a judgment or claim means a judicial reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process.” 562 U.S. 545, 553 (2011). Since Kholi, circuit courts have split on the question left open in Jimenez about how to categorize a motion for a belated appeal.

The question presented 1s:

Whether a state-court motion asking to file a be- lated direct appeal is an “application . .. for other collateral review” under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), that tolls AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations.

1

1. Whether a statute imposing on all convicted felons a lifetime ban on possession of a firearm or ammunition with no individualized finding of dangerousness violates the Second Amendment?

2. Whether a person charged with a felony in state court has the right to trial by a twelve-member of jury under the Sixth Amendment?

1