The NDAA for FY 2004, as amended by the Project BioShield Act of 2004, allows the government to authorize experimental drugs for emergency use, but only with the informed consent of patients. This right to informed consent has been recognized for members of the armed forces but not for civilians. QUESTION:

Does a civilian have the same private right of action to enforce his right to informed consent to an emergency use authorized drug as members of the armed forces?

This Court held that a government violates the Takings Clause the moment it takes private property without compensation. Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 184-85 (2019). Government cannot nullify or moot a property owner’s Fifth Amendment right to compensation by rescission of its action. Jd. Property owners may sue for compensation without first exhaust- ing other remedies. /d. at 185.

City served Rogne with a second cease and desist order and then physically took possession of Rogne’s property by constructing a barrier fence, denying him from stockpiling dirt on his vacant lots. Rogne sued in state court for a taking without just compensation and lost on a prudential rule of exhaustion and mootness based on City’s rescission.

He refiled his Takings Clause claim in federal court under the Oklahoma savings statute because the prior action failed other than on the merits. The district court dismissed. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding Rogne’s Takings Clause claim was resolved on the merits, citing the state appellate court, “…asa matter of law there was no taking because Mr. Rogne was granted relief as soon as he sought an admuinis- trative remedy and the City rescinded the Cease and Desist Order.”

THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS:

Is the application of a prudential rule of exhaustion, where the only relief is voluntary cessation of govern- ment’s physical possession, a decision on the merits of an uncompensated Takings Clause claim?

Petitioners own and operate adjoining shopping centers in Southern California (“the Centers”). The Centers prohibit petitioning and leafletting on their property. Alex Salazar, a self-described “activist,” sought permission to distribute leaflets expressing his belief that “[m]Jen are not legally and financially responsible for supporting a child that a woman chooses to have,” and “[m]en are not owned by women through their bodies!” Consistent with its policy, the Centers denied his request. Salazar sued, claiming he had a right to engage in expressive activity on the Centers’ property under the California Constitution’s free speech guarantee. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal agreed. Relying on Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the court held that Salazar’s activity was protected by the state constitution’s free speech provision and did not violate the Centers’ right to exclude under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause or its right to remain silent under the First Amendment compelled speech doctrine.

The question presented is:

Whether, contrary to PruneYard, a State violates the Takings Clause and the First Amendment when it requires the owners of private commercial property to allow unwanted expressive activity on their land?

In City of Canton v. Harris, this Court held that municipalities may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a failure to train their employees only “where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indif- ference” to constitutional rights. 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). More recently, this Court left open a narrow possibility that a plaintiff might be able to demonstrate such deliberate indifference based on a single uncon- stitutional incident. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). But the Court emphasized that for such single- incident liability, the unconstitutional consequences of the failure to train must be “patently obvious.” Id. at 64.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether a plaintiff can plead single-incident municipal liability without alleging a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.

2. Whether a plaintiff can plead single-incident municipal liability without alleging a complete lack of training on the constitutional right in question.

(I)

The structural-error doctrine categorically exempts a narrow class of constitutional errors from harmless-error review. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). When such an error 1s preserved and raised on direct appeal, automatic reversal follows without inquiry into prejudice. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999). In Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286 (2017), this Court identified three rationales that have explained why certain errors are structural, including that some errors’ effects are “too hard to measure.” /d. at 295. These rationales were offered as description, not as a test for determining whether a novel error qualifies as structural. But lower courts, reading Weaver’s explanatory framing as prescriptive, have used the measurability rationale to deny structural-error status to errors whose effects they found quantifiable. The result is reasoning that treats the ability to perform harmless-error analysis as proof that the analysis is reliable, when the structural-error doctrine’s measurability inquiry asks not whether such analysis can be performed but whether the nature of the error renders it a valid method of assessment. This inversion, which Weaver’s explanatory framing invited, has divided the lower courts.

The question presented is:

Whether a court of appeals may deny structural-error status to a trial error on the ground that harmless-error analysis of it is possible and its effects quantifiable, when the structural-error doctrine asks not whether such analysis can be performed but whether the nature of the error renders it reliable, and whether Weaver v. Massachusetts should be clarified to foreclose that reasoning, which produced in this case harmless-error review of an error that exposed a deliberating jury to excluded evidence on a central disputed issue without curative instruction.

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