The Horseracing Integrity and Safety Act of 2020, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8051-3060, delegates federal law-enforce- ment and rulemaking power to a private corpora- tion—the Horseracing Integrity and Safety Authority (the “Authority”)—to govern the horseracing industry. The Act gives the Authority the exclusive power to en- force both the Act and the rules against regulated par- ties in federal court, as well as the powers to issue subpoenas, search the businesses and property of reg- ulated persons, and impose sanctions that include fines, penalties, disgorgement, and lifetime bans from horseracing. The Act also requires the Federal Trade Commission to promulgate the private Authority’s rules as federal law, even if it disagrees with them as a policy matter, so long as they are “consistent” with the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 3053(c)(2).

The Sixth Circuit below previously held that the Act does not violate the private non-delegation doc- trine—the principle that Congress cannot delegate governmental power to private entities. The Fifth Circuit, however, declared the Act unconstitutional, and a divided panel of the Eighth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit. This Court vacated all three deci- sions and remanded for reconsideration in light of FCC v. Consumers’ Research, 606 U.S. 656 (2025). On remand, the Sixth Circuit again upheld the Act.

The question presented is whether the Act’s dele- gation of law-enforcement and rulemaking power to the private Authority violates the Constitution’s pri- vate non-delegation doctrine.

1. Whether a non-practicing patent owner that does not manufacture or sell any patented article, and has not granted any ongoing license authorizing third parties to do so, has any obligation under 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) to ensure that unrelated third-party products are marked with patent notice, or to plead compliance with § 287(a) in its complaint.

2. Whether a patent owner’s textually grounded and precedent-based legal position on an unresolved question of statutory interpretation—specifically, whether this Court’s decisions in Wine Railway Appliance Co. vu. Enterprise Railway Equipment Co., 297 U.S. 387 (1936), and Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244 (1894), exempt non-practicing entities from § 287(a)’s marking requirements—can properly support a finding that the case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014), thereby authorizing mandatory attorney fee awards against the patent owner.

3. Whether the First Amendment and this Court’s sham-litigation doctrine impose a categorical prohibition on courts using settlement offers—including offers below the cost of defense or labeled “nuisance value’—as

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from mandating that an individual accept the administration of a drug that is exempt from 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) — on penalty of losing benefits — where the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act expressly requires the Secretary to ensure such administration is the product of voluntary, informed consent.

2. Whether a State mandate for an individual to accept the administration of a_ covered countermeasure 1s consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment insofar as the PREP Act’s immunity clause of 42 U.S.C. § 247d- 6d(a)(1), upon administration, extinguishes the right to access courts if injured by the countermeasure.

Many States have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes that authorize a special motion to dismiss, 1mpose a heightened burden on the plaintiff, and mandate fee- shifting to a prevailing defendant. The courts of appeals are divided three ways on whether and how such statutes operate in federal court under Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010). The D.C., Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits hold they are displaced by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. The First Circuit applies them as enacted. The Ninth Circuit— in the decision below—applies a hybrid approach that substitutes the Federal Rules’ merits standards while preserving mandatory fee-shifting. The court below eranted Nevada’s anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss after designating Petitioners as limited-purpose public figures and finding no actual malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

The Questions Presented are:

1. Whether such an anti-SLAPP statute is dis- placed by Rules 12(b)(6) and 56, applies as enacted, or applies only in the hybrid form described above.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit erred by designating Petitioners as limited-purpose public figures without finding a pre-existing public controversy, voluntary injection into it, and germaneness, as required by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 823 (1974), Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 448 U.S. 157 (1979), and Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).