1. Whether plain-error review may be applied to a violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), where the prosecution did not merely fail to correct false testimony, but affirmatively exploited the uncorrected falsity in closing and rebuttal arguments the defense could not answer.

2. Whether a court of appeals may excuse a district court’s complete failure to conduct any Rule 702 gatekeeping analysis as to whether specialized opinion testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable principles and methods, and reflects a reliable application of those principles and methods, on the sole ground that the witnesses would have qualified as experts based on their credentials and experience.

In Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152 (2028), this Court held that the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations 1s a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule and thus reversed and remanded the court of appeals’ judgment affirming the dismissal of Petitioner’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Despite this ruling, the District Court on remand applied the law of the case doctrine to hold that Petitioner’s quiet title claims are untimely.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine. The court of appeals also held that Petitioner’s quiet title claims seeking adjudication about the scope of a Forest Service easement across his property were untimely because the claims accrued when, more than twelve years before he filed suit, private citizens illegally used the road easement that crosses Petitioner’s property.

The questions presented are:

1. Does the law of the case doctrine apply when this Court reverses a lower court’s judgment?

2. Does a property owner’s quiet title claim under the Quiet Title Act accrue based on the illegal and unauthorized actions of private citizens, rather than the actions of government officials?

Does the admissibility of “other acts” evidence that is the subject of a pending, unresolved criminal prosecution in another contemporaneous criminal trial violate a defendant’s constitutional rights afforded by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution?

1. In an issue of first impression with potential far-reaching impacts, whether the Colorado Court of Appeals correctly construed case law stemming from this Court by concluding that a special district’s debt to bondholders need not be repaid because the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution bars imposing a special assessment on a landowner not benefited by improvements, even where the owner acquired the land with full knowledge of both the special assessment and the lack of benefits that would be received.

2. In another issue of first impression with similarly far-reaching potential impacts, whether the Colorado Court of Appeals correctly construed case law emanating from this Court by concluding that a special district’s debt to bondholders need not be repaid under a theory of unjust enrichment where the district allegedly spent the money.

Rule 705(d)(4)(B) of the Rules for Military Commissions provides that the government “may withdraw from a pretrial agreement at any time before the accused begins performance of promises contained in the agreement.” The question presented is:

Whether, consistent with the standard for mandamus relief, it is clear and indisputable that an accused has not begun performance under Rule 705(d)(4)(B) when the accused and the government have signed a pretrial agreement, the accused has entered into a detailed stipulation of fact with the prosecution admitting to the basis behind the charges, and the accused has taken additional actions that the government itself treated as required by the agreement.

Whether in government employee speech cases the State must clear the Sullivan malice hurdle before proceeding to balancing, as this Court originally held in Pickering?

Whether the Sullivan malice standard answers the question left open in Garcetti regarding academic freedom in a state university?

Whether balancing was properly weighed here under any conceivable test, where no consideration was given to the fact that petitioner had produced a landmark scientific study within his field, but was stripped of tenure and fired anyway, allegedly for breaking obscure research rules’ for which respondents themselves were equally at fault, and for which violation no real disruption was demonstrated?

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In Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), the Court held that the failure to submit to the jury an essential element of the offense charged is not structural error, but rather subject to harmless-error review. In conducting that review, appellate judges examine the trial record and decide either that the government has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error or that “the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” Jd. at 19. Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that when “we judges” decide that the defendant “is unquestionably guilty,” the defendant has been deprived of his fundamental right to a jury trial on every element. Id. at 31—32 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, joined by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.)

The questions presented here are:

I. Should the Court overrule Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), as inconsistent with the bedrock Fifth and Sixth Amendment principles underlying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and its progeny?

II. If Neder survives, what is the proper test for harmless-error review following a guilty plea where the government failed to charge and prove to a jury a fact necessary to the punishment, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?

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