18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) makes kidnapping a federal offense where the defendant uses “any means, facili- ty, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign com- merce.”

The Question Presented is whether an automobile 1s per se an instrumentality of interstate commerce, which would make a federal offense of every kidnap- ping involving an automobile.

Whether a capital defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated where (a) during voir dire the trial court publicly sanctioned and jailed one prospective juror in front of the entire jury venire; and (b) failed to conduct any inquiry into how other members of the venire were impacted by the court’s conduct, despite indications that multiple jurors were intimidated or otherwise affected?

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1. Whether individuals retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in IP addresses and basic subscriber information associated with their online accounts?

2. Whether this Court should grant the petition, vacate the decision below, and remand after its decision in Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112, which will likely provide greater guidance on a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic data?

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1. Whether an inferior court exceeds the limits of Article [JI judicial power and the Supremacy Clause when it issues and permits an appellate judgment to remain operative where the underlying proceeding nullified a constitutional mandate of this Court governing the structure of a first appeal as of right?

2. Whether an inferior court may, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, treat compliance

| with this Court’s controlling constitutional mandate governing the structure of a first appeal as of right as discretionary in operation by permitting a judgment to remain operative despite a proceeding that failed to satisfy those requirements?

3. Whether considerations of finality or the passage of time permit an appellate judgment to remain operative where the underlying proceeding failed to comply with this Court’s controlling constitutional mandate governing the structure of a first appeal as of right? - :

Paget sf:

I. Whether decisions in other United States Circuits are in conflict with the decision made by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, with regard to the exhaustion of all available adminos- trative remedies, prior to filing a lawsuit in a federal district court?

Petitioner answers “YES” | II. Did justice Chad A. Readler of the United States Court of

| Appeals, for the Sixth Circuit, fail to uphold his own decision in

& previous similar ruling?

Petitioner answers “YES” III. Did the United States District Court judge, Terrence E. Berg of the Eastern District of Michigan, abuse his discretion when he dismissed this civil action sua sponte?

Petitioner answers “YES” !

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The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”), forbids the Government from substantially burdening a person’s exercise of religion unless the Government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 2) 1s the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). The RFRA further provides that “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).

The Question Presented is:

Does a pro se criminal defendant properly assert a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that a criminal prosecution substantially burdens his Constitutional right to exercise religious freedom by claiming that the prosecution violates the First Amendment and that it prevents him from exercising his religious rights and by moving to dismiss the indictment arguing that “Our Religious freedoms have been violated,” and “Our Freedom of speech violated,” or as the Eleventh Circuit held, must a pro se defendant actually cite the RFRA by name or statute in order to avoid plain error review on appeal?

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Whether the failure to instruct a jury on the knowledge-of-status element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢), as required by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019) 1s an error of the most fundamental character warranting coram nobis relief where the defendant was precluded at trial from presenting compelling evidence of his state of mind and the prosecutor told the jury that the government did not have to prove knowledge.

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