Section 1367 of Title 28 authorizes federal district courts in certain circumstances to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law. Section 1367 further provides that “[t]he period of limitations for any [such] claim… shall be tolled while the claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). The Court has never addressed the effect of § 1367(d)’s tolling provision when, as here, the state-claim limitations period expires after the case is timely filed in state court but before the defendant removes the case to federal court, and the federal court eventually declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims.

The questions presented are: When a case is timely filed in state court and then removed to federal court, does the tolling provision in § 1367(d) stop the clock on the limitations period for any state-law claims as of the time the plaintiff initially, and timely, filed the claim in state court? Or, does the clock stop only once the claim is pending in federal court, even if removal to federal court is beyond the plaintiffs control?

1. Whether a court may defeat a Title VI hostile work environment claim on summary judgment by parsing the record incident by incident instead of evaluating the totality of the circumstances.

2. Whether a Title VII disparate treatment claim may be defeated at the prima facie stage by treating comparator evidence as an inflexible prerequisite under McDonnell Douglas.

3. Whether, after Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, a forced transfer is nonactionable whenever pay and benefits remain unchanged.

4. Whether Title VII retaliation protection covers internal reporting, advocacy for coworkers, and related opposition when the employer fires the employee for that speech and assistance.

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“The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction.” United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 709 (1882). And “federal district courts have only such jurisdiction as is provided, in terms, by the Constitution or a statute.” Warren G. Kleban Engg Corp. v. Caldwell, 490 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1974). Though there is a “limited exception” for “ancillary jurisdiction,” id., that doctrine is a “creature of necessity,” requiring proof of some “practical need to protect legal rights” of a party. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 849, 356, 359 (1996) (citation omitted). Therefore, the petitioner presents the following question:

May a district court rely exclusively on the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine to enforce a restitution judgment notwithstanding the existence of legislation independently authorizing that very act?

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