In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979), this Court held that a state judge who participated in the execution of a search “allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party,” and “was not acting as a judicial officer, but as an adjunct law enforcement officer.” The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits apply that principle to deny absolute immunity to judges who personally direct or supervise officers in conducting arrests. The Third Circuit below parted company with its sister circuits in refusing to withhold judicial immunity for actions indistinguishable from a sheriffs in directing Petitioner’s warrantless arrest 1n his home.

The question presented 1s:

Whether absolute judicial immunity bars a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action against a state trial judge who personally directs and supervises police officers in conducting a warrantless arrest of a litigant inside the litigant’s home.

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Major General William T. Cooley was found guilty of one nonconsensual kiss. For that conviction, he was sentenced to forfeit over $50,000 of his pay. The Government demonstrated no harm to any party to justify such a high fine and no state law equivalent permits a fine of this size.

Does General Cooley’s sentence to forfeit over $50,000 of his pay constitute an “excessive fine[] imposed” in violation of the Eighth Amendment?

In 1982, Congress enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (““FTAIA”) “to promote certainty in assessing the applicability of American antitrust law to international business transactions.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-686, at 9 (1982). As relevant here, the FTAIA permits antitrust suits based on conduct involving foreign commerce only where the defendant’s conduct “has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect … on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations,” and “such effect” then “gives rise to” the plaintiff’s claim. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)-(2).

In the decision below, the Ninth Circuit became the first court in history to hold that foreign defendants can be held liable to foreign purchasers for foreign transactions based solely on the fact that those transactions were negotiated in part in the United States. In so holding, the court broke sharply from the Seventh Circuit, which has held in materially identical circumstances that transactions abroad between a foreign seller and a foreign buyer are not subject to the Sherman Act even if some of the transactions’ terms were negotiated in the United States.

The question presented is:

Whether domestic negotiations are sufficient to bring foreign injuries from allegedly price-fixed foreign transactions within the reach of the Sherman Act, even where those negotiations have no intervening “effect … on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations.” 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(A).

I. Whether a district court violates F.R.C.P. 32(i)(3)(B) when it fails to expressly rule on-a defendant’s preserved objection to loss calculation and a sophisticated-means enhancement. yet states only that the presentence report’s offense level is Vaccurate’’?: .

II. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit erred by affirming a sentence based on an “implicit” ruling theory where the district court did not comply with F.R.C.P. 32(i)(3)(B)? | |

TIL. Whether failure: to. comply with F.R.C.P. 32(i)(3)(B) constitutes reversible procedural error requiring resentencing? -1V- ,

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require a “substantial” effect on interstate or foreign commerce.

2. If 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) 1s construed to require a “substantial” effect on interstate or foreign commerce, whether there is an insufficient factual basis for the convictions in this case under the statute because the government failed to adduce evidence of such effect on interstate commerce as to the robbery and attempted robbery offenses.

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