In addition to the reversal of the November 24, 2025, Judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the questions for which Petitioners seek certiorari are as follows:

1. Whether this Court’s Opinion in Knick, supra, permits a federal cause of action against a municipal entity for an uncompensated physical taking when the municipal entity has materially impaired the value and precluded the alienability of the Petitioners’ property.

2. Whether the actions of the Village in singling out the Petitioners’ property and engaging in concerted actions to prevent its sale at auction are sufficient to state a claim for violation of Petitioners’ rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1988), the Court held that securities fraud plaintiffs can obtain class certification by proving prerequisites tending to show that the defendant’s alleged misrep- resentations affected the “market price” of the defendant’s stock. The defendant may then rebut that showing with evidence that its statements did not in fact affect the stock price. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, 594 U.S. 118, 123 (2021). Most plaintiffs claim that the defendant’s alleged “front-end” misstatements affected stock price by concealing a material business risk, thus prevent- ing the stock price from declining. Plaintiffs here point to a stock price decline that occurred after the “back- end” disclosure of bad news, and argue that the de- cline would have happened earlier if the defendant’s front-end statements had been truthful.

In Goldman, the Court held defendants must have a meaningful opportunity to rebut this “inflation maintenance” theory of price impact by showing that the back-end disclosures didn’t “actually correct[]” the defendant’s front-end statements. Jd. But the Ninth Circuit here held that investors may invoke the theory if the front- and back-end statements address the same general subject matter, even absent correction.

The question presented is whether a defendant can rebut the inflation maintenance theory by show- ing that back-end disclosures didn’t actually correct its alleged misstatements, as the Second Circuit has held, or whether the inflation maintenance theory is functionally immune from challenge if the disclosures are about the same general subject as the prior state- ments, as the Third and Ninth Circuits have held.

The Twenty-first Amendment grants to the States the power to regulate the “transportation or importa- tion” of alcohol into the States. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, §2. Employing that authority, Ohio operates a three-tier system for the sale and distribution of wine. Wine suppliers must sell to licensed wholesal- ers with a physical presence in Ohio; wine wholesal- ers must sell to licensed retailers that maintain a physical presence in Ohio; and only those licensed retailers may sell wine to consumers in Ohio. Wine sold in Ohio must, generally, pass through all three tiers. Doing so reduces alcohol consumption and serves the State’s health and safety goals by facilitating inspection of in-state retail premises and products meant for consumption in Ohio as well as ensuring adherence to other Ohio liquor laws. This system is “unquestionably legitimate.” Granholm uv. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (quotation omitted).

To seal off leaks from the three-tier funnel, Ohio law imposes two restrictions: (1) retailers located outside Ohio may not directly ship wine to consum- ers in Ohio and (2) individuals may not personally transport more than six bottles of wine, per thirty- day period, into the State.

The Question Presented is: under §2 of the Twen- ty-first Amendment, may a State restrict out-of-state retailers from directly shipping alcohol to in-state consumers and may it cap the amount of alcohol that individuals may personally transport into the State?

This Court recognized in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896), the common-law tenet that “mere words” do not mitigate murder to manslaughter based on a heat of passion defense. The prevailing view across the country, however, 1s that words may support a heat of passion defense when those words impart highly provocative information. This informational words exception also existed at common law, though this Court did not have occasion to address it in Allen or subsequently. The question presented 1s:

Whether informational words may constitute adequate provocation for a heat of passion defense.

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’ Spouse was the aggressor and had started to aggressively charge at him again — and when the officers arrived after the incident, fabricated an “ON VIEW” notation, and entered the curtilage without exigent circumstances or a warrant.

2. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that a pro se petitioner’s objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation were insufficiently specific to preserve de novo review under 28 USC. § 636(b)(1), where the objections explicitly identified the magistrate’s failure to address self-defense evidence, the recorded 911 call, the pre- arrest video, the absence of any complaining witness filing charges, and the officers’ |

alleged fabrication of the “ON VIEW” notation.

3. Whether the Fourth Circuit erred in affirming the quashing of a pro se petitioner’s discovery subpoena seeking officers’ personnel records showing prior incidents of excessive force and civil-rights violations, where those records were relevant to | establishing municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and the district court did not consider whether the subpoena could be cured or reissued. |

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This case arises from disputed accounts of a fatal police shooting on November 14, 2020, when a deputy sheriff shot and killed Jacob Settle, Sr. in the backyard of his home. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Petitioner, the district court denied qualified immunity, recognizing that a jury must resolve the competing versions of events. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. In doing so, it evaded settled limits on appellate review: it reconfigured the factual predicates, relied on post hoc risks untethered to the district court’s findings and unsupported by the record, and resolved disputed facts by drawing its own inferences under the guise of “common sense.” This Court should grant certiorari to re-establish the constitutional boundary between judge and jury and halt the lower court’s practice of resolving factual disputes under the guise of qualified immunity.

1. In an interlocutory qualified immunity appeal, may a court of appeals uphold deadly force by relying on predictive theories and inferred risks not supported by the evidentiary record?

2. Whether appellate courts may, resolve genuine disputes of material fact in excessive-force cases by re-weighing the evidence under the guise of “common sense.”

This motion is brought pursuant to Rule 39.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Respectfully submitted,

AMY KARLIN

Interim Federal Public Defender DATED: June 2, 2026 By:__s/ Jonathan C. Aminoff

JONATHAN C. AMINOFF*

MICHAEL PETERSEN

Deputy Federal Public Defenders

Attorneys for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record

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(Pet. App. A—2.)

The question presented is: should the withdrawal of a panelist from an appellate court after that court has published a decision open the door, absent any other basis, for the appointment of a new panelist, a re- adjudication of the appeal, and reversal of the original result?

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