1. The Supreme Court of California should not have denied the Petition for Review, and the subject Order against EZOR should be reversed.

2. The Supreme Court of California had inherent and statutory authority to order the relief requested and violated constitutional norms in not properly ruling in favor of EZOR and against ELLIE PAGE (“PAGE”).

3. The Supreme Court of California denied EZOR proper and meaningful constitutional review.

4. Denying EZOR review, and a full-fledged hear- ing on the merits, with oral argument and a reasoned written decision, was a denial of Due Process and Equal | Protection of Laws under both the California and U.S. Constitutions.

5. Denial of review violated EZOR’s First Amend- ment right of access to the courts.

6. EZOR was denied a fair and impartial process in his underlying case, making the subject Order void ab initio.

7. Procedural and substantive due process was | violated, and valuable Property, legal and equitable rights were abridged and lost, when the Supreme Court of California did not reverse the improper granting of summary judgment by the trial court (App.la), and the Court of Appeal’s affirmance of same (App.2a). There are material triable issues in the case that should have been heard by a jury.

8. EZOR was denied his primordial constitutional right to a jury trial pursuant to the 14th and 7th Amend- ments and appropriate remedies in law and equity.

Congress, in a comprehensive set of statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4248, provided procedures and standards for examinations and detention of federal defendants suffering from various mental health issues. In § 4246(a), Congress provided for the civil commitment of certain persons, including those such as petitioner. The statute sets forth the procedures for determining whether the person should be committed, which are triggered when the “director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies that a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons”:

against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for

reasons related to the mental condition of the person, 1s presently

suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements

for State custody and care of the person are not available.

That certification is sent to the clerk of the district court “for the district in which the person is confined” for commitment proceedings. The filing of a certificate “stay[s] the release of the person pending the completion of procedures contained in this section.”

No certificate was filed in the present case, yet the district court presiding over Mr. Williamson’s criminal case ordered his commitment for an examination to allow the director of the BOP facility to determine whether to issue a certificate to initiate commitment proceedings.

That order raises the question presented:

Whether the district court can, contrary to the plain language of the statute, order an examination of a person under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 where the director of the facility in which the person is confined has not filed any certificate to commence § 4246 proceedings.

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IV. Whether state courts and state housing agencies may lawfully permit the disbursement and acceptance of federal Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP) funds while simultaneously allowing landlords to maintain unhabitable conditions that violate federal housing standards and statutes attached to funding

V. Whether this Court may vacate a state-court eviction judgment under its authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and Supreme Court Rule 20 where the record demonstrates unresolved federal questions, structural due-process violations, and abuse of discretion — including the reassignment of judges with prior prosecutorial involvement against the petitioner, in closed or inaccessible proceedings, and the state court’s refusal to adjudicate federal statutory and constitutional claims.

Vil. Whether the Supreme Court may exercise its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the Fourteenth Amendment, and Supreme Court Rule 20 to preserve Petitioners’ federal rights and refer for investigation two COVID-19- wrongful deaths arising from misuse of Covid-19 emergency assistance funds, habitability violations, and the state’s failure to enforce the federal CDC eviction moratorium — where the petitioner, a Black Indigenous American, alleges systemic civil-rights violations, discriminatory treatment, and the state courts’ refusal to address or remedy these federal harms.

. -8-

Before he was sentenced to death, Rodney Beeler underwent tests that showed severe neurological damage. He had a history of brutal psychological abuse, head injuries, and blackouts; and undisputed evidence showed he hallucinated and disassociated from events occurring around him at the time of his capital trial.

The question presented is: Did the Ninth Circuit’s opinion conflict with this Court’s decisions in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975), when it found that Beeler’s conviction and death sentence when he was incompetent to stand trial did not violate his due process rights?

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The questions presented are:

1. Did Congress exceed its authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment when it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), the federal hate crimes statute, which criminalizes all acts of racially motivated violence—even those that have nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude?

2. Should the Court should overrule Jones uv. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) and apply the congruent-and-proportional and current-needs tests that govern the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Thirteenth Amendment’s substantively identical enforcement clause?

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1. Whether dismissal of individual defendants for alleged failure of service is proper where evidence establishes valid service and defendants had actual notice of the action.

2. Whether a federal court may dismiss a pro se civil-rights complaint at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage by resolving disputed factual issues and denying discovery.

3. Whether a public university’s expulsion of a doctoral student and termination of fellowship without meaningful pre-deprivation process violates the Fourteenth Amendment under Goss v. Lopez and Mathews v. Eldridge.

4. Whether Eleventh Amendment immunity bars prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against state officials under Ex parte Young.

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