Under the landmark decision Schlesinger uv. United States, 390 F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1968), the termination for default (“T4D”) of a federal contract is void if the contracting officer abdicates their independent admunistrative discretion. This core principle was codified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 49.402-3(f) factors adopted in 1984, which mandate that a contracting officer “shall” consider seven performance-related business factors prior to T4D. In a series of decisions culminating in Dept of Transp. v. Eagle Peak Rock & Paving, Inc., 69 F.4th 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2023), however, the Federal Circuit has eradicated Schlesinger and the role of the FAR factors, establishing that a contracting officer’s failure to exercise independent judgment is legally irrelevant and T4D is proper as an automatic consequence of a contractor’s technical breach.

The questions presented are:

1. Whether the government must prove that a contracting officer exercised independent, contemporaneous discretion prior to T4D, or whether a T4D remains valid when the evidentiary record contains zero evidence that the contracting officer exercised any independent business discretion, so long as an underlying breach occurred.

2. Whether the government may satisfy its burden to prove the contemporaneous exercise of administrative discretion by relying solely on an unauthenticated memorandum that appears fraudulent on its face and is admitted “not for the truth of its contents.”

Does a person’s 14th Amendment right to procedural due process include the right to see the evidence that a court uses against them if the opposing party who submitted that evidence claims it is secret under the attorney-client privilege?

Different courts answer this constitutional question differently. Some federal Circuits hold that due process requires the person to see all that evidence. Other Circuits hold the person can see most of that evidence. And in this case, the Washington state courts held the person can see none of that evidence — limiting the person to a blacked-out version of the evidence upon which the court based its ruling. (Image of the blacked-out versions 1s 1n the body of this petition.)

To end the all, most, none split in our nation’s courts, this Petition asks this Court to establish a uniform due process right for all Americans regardless of which Circuit or State they live in.

The questions presented in this petition are:

1. Whether a defendant’s challenge to a sentence exceeding the guideline range advocated by the defense at sentencing survived an appeal waiver that expressly recognized the defendant’s right to argue against guideline enhancements at sentencing and the waiver did not explicitly state that any resulting enhancements could not be appealed.

2. Whether an appeal waiver applies when the sentencing judge advises the defendant of the right to appeal without a government objection.

The questions presented in this petition are pending before the Court in Hunter v. United States, No. 24-1063, 146 8. Ct. 288, 2025 WL 2885281 (2025), addressing the limits of appeal waivers agreed to as part of a guilty plea.

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The country 1s in the midst of a circuit split as to the appropriate resolution of challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(¢g)(1). Three circuits have opened the door to individuals with prior felony convictions retaining their right to possess firearms despite their convictions. Unlike those other circuits, the Tenth Circuit openly rejects application of the Bruen analysis when a defendant challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Mr. Nunamaker has previous convictions for violations of Oklahoma Second Degree Burglary. However, Second Degree Burglary is indisputably not generic burglary, as it currently permits convictions based upon breaking into and stealing from vending machines or other coin-operated devices, and earlier versions included breaking into vehicles.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari poses two questions:

1. Whether the Tenth Circuit’s open rejection of Bruen, in reliance upon its pre-Bruen precedent, is appropriate in light of the current circuit split.
2. What is the appropriate standard to be applied when courts consider whether a particular prior felony offense allows Congress to permanently disarm an individual under penalty of imprisonment?

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1. Whether a public university and state collection agencies violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they terminate a fellowship and impose state debt without providing meaningful pre-deprivation process.

2. Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars prospective declaratory and injunctive relief under Ex parte Young where state officials are engaged in ongoing constitutional violations.

3. Whether a federal court may dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s due-process claims at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage by resolving disputed factual issues against the plaintiff without discovery.

4. Whether summary affirmance without addressing controlling Supreme Court precedent conflicts with this Court’s Due Process jurisprudence under Mathews vy. Eldridge, Goss v. Lopez, and Ex parte Young.

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-1. WHETHER A MOTION FILED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(b) (6) ALLEGING

“INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UNDER THE SIX AMENDMENT” AND “DEFECT IN THE | INTEGRITY OF PRIOR HABEAS PROCEEDING” IS IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED AS A SECOND OR , SUCCESSIVE MOTION UNDER. 28 U.S.C.°§ 2255.

2. WHETHER EXPERT EVIDENCE IDENTIFIES DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO THE FIFIH AMENDMENT INVOLVING “FRAUD UPON THE COURT” ““PROSECUTORIAL MISGONDUCT” AND FABRICATED INDICIMENTS” JUSTIFY REOPENING HABEAS PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE 60 : | (b)(6) in the interest of justice.

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The First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have held that assault on a federal officer is a specific-intent crime, to which a defendant may raise a diminished capacity defense. The Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have held that assault on a federal officer 1s a general-intent crime, precluding diminished capacity defenses. The Seventh and Eighth Circuit have issued conflicting opinions on the matter.

The question presented 1s: Is assault on a federal officer under 18 U.S.C. § 111 a general-intent or specific-intent crime?

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