QUESTION PRESENTED An employer granted an employee an exemption from the COVID vaccine because of her sincerely held religious beliefs but denied the same employee an exemption from weekly testing based on the same expressed beliefs. Failure to comply with the employer’s testing mandate could result in discipline, including termination. The question presented 1s: Whether an employer’s threat of discipline or termination for failing to do weekly testing for COVID, and forcing an employee to choose between following her religious beliefs or losing her job, is considered an adverse employment action sufficient to state a claim under Title VII’s failure to accommodate provisions.

2. Does stare decisis require a court to uncritically

and broadly apply against Petitioner that prior deci- : sion that unmistakably infringes upon the separation of powers, and upon the contract rights, agency, and | | self-determination of our citizenry - thereby under- mining the right of millions of Americans to choose

_ what they are, or are not, willing to agree to within a _ , : contract? | |

3. At the core, should the broadly applied stare de- | cisis authority of the court be allowed to infringe on | fundamental legislative power and thereby create a new class of contract law, a non-consensual contract?

Whether harmless error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) requires the Government to show that erroneously admitted evidence did not substantially influence the jury’s verdict, or whether an appeals court may affirm a conviction based on the sufficiency of untainted evidence alone.

Whether an appellate court errs when it labels “waived” a claim of prejudicial spillover from vacated counts, without inquiring whether the failure to raise that claim in the opening brief was an intentional relinquishment of a known right, where the predicate for the claim first materialized when the government conceded that the counts should be vacated less than two weeks before oral argument and almost two years after the opening brief was filed.

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Federal law subjects millions of Americans each year to potential criminal liability for statements made on government forms containing undefined statutory and regulatory terminology. Most courts of appeals, consistent with Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), and the Due Process Clause, hold that a perjury conviction cannot rest on an answer to a question whose meaning reasonable persons of ordinary intellect could not ascertain at the time it was asked. The Fourth Circuit departed from that rule, concluding that ambiguity may be cured by a district court’s post-hoc definition supplied years after the statement was made.

The question presented 1s:

Whether, in a prosecution for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, courts must determine whether the challenged question had a meaning upon which reasonable persons of ordinary intellect could agree at the time the defendant answered it, or whether a conviction may instead be sustained based on a definition first supplied by a court after the fact.

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The police seized a traveler’s belongings (including his cellphone), waited six days to apply for a search warrant, offered no justification for one of those days and—for another—said they were excused from working on the warrant application because “it was Valentine’s Day.” The question presented is whether this delay was constitutionally reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, as the Ninth Circuit held, just because the delay wasn’t longer than six days and the traveler, who did not consent to his belongings’ seizure, did not demand his luggage back.

1

Four different sentencing guidelines — the ones for Basic Economic Offenses (§ 2B1.1), Tax Fraud (§ 2T1.1), Aiding and Abetting Tax Frauds (§ | 2711.4), and Smuggling Offenses (§ 274.1) — include an identical enhancement for defendants who employed “sophisticated means” to commit or conceal the crime. The circuits are split over whether a district court’s application of a guideline enhancement to a specific set of facts is reviewed deferentially or de

, novo and, equally, but along different lines, over the standard to apply when reviewing a district court’s application of the sophisticated means enhancement to undisputed facts.

The question presented is:

Whether a district court’s application of a guidelines enhancement to undisputed facts — such as the “sophisticated means” enhancement — is a question of fact reviewed for clear error, a discretionary judgment call reviewed only for abuse of discretion or, instead, a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review. —