When a district court imposes imprisonment following revocation of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3588(e) excludes the retributive considerations identified in § 35538(a)(2)(A). In Esteras, this Court confirmed that a revocation court may not rely on the seriousness of the underlying offense, promoting respect for the law, or just punishment. !

Petitioner Gilbert Gomez received a twenty-four-month revocation sentence after the district court stated that it had considered “the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 35538(a),” without limiting its consideration to the factors incorporated by § 3583(e). The Fifth Circuit nevertheless affirmed under plain-error review, concluding that Petitioner had not shown that the district court actually relied on a prohibited factor or that any error affected his substantial rights. Therefore, the question presented is as follows:

After Esteras v. United States, when imposing revocation imprisonment, does an unqualified invocation of “the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” establish actual reliance, expressly or by unmistakable implication, on the retributive considerations excluded by 18 U.S.C. § 8583(e) when the district court does not limit its statement to the factors incorporated by § 8583(e) or adequately explain the length and consecutive structure of the revocation sentence?

1 Ksteras v. United States, 145 8S. Ct. 20381 (2025). 1

1. WHETHER A PANEL FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN |

DETERMINING THAT SORENSEN’S TWO PRIOR STATE CONVICTIONS QUALIFIED

AS FELONY DRUG OFFENSES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE ENHANCEMENT OF

§ 851 IMPOSED LIFE SENTENCE. © 2. WHETHER SORENSEN’S TWO PRIOR STATE CONVICTIONS QUALIFY AS FELONY

DRUG OFFENSES FOR THE PURPOSE OF § 841. ARE THE TWO STATE CONVICTIONS

OVERBROAD AS A RESULT OF STATE DRUG SCHEDULES? IF SO, ARE THE TWO

STATE STATUTES INDIVISIBLE? .

The Government charged Sean Jarred Davis in a four-count superseding indictment that related to the distribution of heroin and fentanyl. Davis subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and for distributing those illicit substances. In the resulting plea agreement, Davis preserved his right to appeal a firearm enhancement and a leadership enhancement. And the Government agreed that it would not seek additional enhancements.

Davis’s pre-sentence investigation report nevertheless included a livelihood enhancement that Davis and the Government had not discussed before they struck their deal. At Davis’s sentencing hearing, the Government said nothing when the district court adopted the livelihood enhancement, even after the district court solicited feedback about Davis’s sentence.

Thus, the question presented is whether Due Process requires district courts to assess if the Government has committed an implied breach through the totality of its conduct at sentencing when a criminal defendant alleges Government breach of a_ plea agreement or whether district courts should confine their assessment to the four corners of a_ plea agreement.